{
 "description": "One canonical grade per published protocol (DELTA / PROTECTIVE / ALIGNED / OBSERVED) and a 5-factor control-plane rosette derived deterministically from Pacta's published records (index.json, rpc-pinned.json) and controller facts. A factor the published evidence does not decide is 'n' (not determined); docs-vs-chain parity is 'u' (uncompared) for every RPC-observed protocol. States: g strong, b moderate, a weak, n not determined, u uncompared.",
 "factorCoverage": {
  "emergency": 21,
  "parity": 86,
  "quorum": 67,
  "timelock": 56,
  "upgrade": 24
 },
 "factors": [
  {
   "key": "upgrade",
   "label": "Upgradeability"
  },
  {
   "key": "timelock",
   "label": "Timelock floor"
  },
  {
   "key": "quorum",
   "label": "Signer quorum"
  },
  {
   "key": "emergency",
   "label": "Emergency / freeze scope"
  },
  {
   "key": "parity",
   "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity"
  }
 ],
 "grades": {
  "aligned": {
   "label": "ALIGNED",
   "meaning": "Docs and chain match",
   "protocols": 50
  },
  "delta": {
   "label": "DELTA",
   "meaning": "Docs and chain differ",
   "protocols": 28
  },
  "observed": {
   "label": "OBSERVED",
   "meaning": "Chain pinned; docs not assessed",
   "protocols": 4
  },
  "protective": {
   "label": "PROTECTIVE",
   "meaning": "Chain stronger than documented",
   "protocols": 8
  }
 },
 "protocols": [
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Lending Market (Base)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "aave.com/docs (governance): 'The Protocol Emergency Guardian is a 4 of 7 multi-signature wallet consisting of the following signers:' and 'The Protocol Emergency Guardian holds the EMERGENCY_ ADMIN'; ACL Manager docs: 'Holders of this role can pause and unpause the pool or an individual reserve.'",
    "observed": "Protocol Guardian Safe (0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968, v1.3.0): getThreshold() = 4 of 7 owners, the 7 signers listed in the docs; ACLManager 0x43955b0899Ab7232E3a454cf84AedD22Ad46FD33 hasRole(EMERGENCY_ADMIN, Safe) = true, hasRole(POOL_ADMIN, Safe) = false.",
    "recordId": "aave-v3-base-emergency-admin-protocol-guardian-4of7-s19",
    "surface": "EMERGENCY_ADMIN (pause / unpause) = Aave Protocol Guardian 4-of-7 Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aave-v3-base-payloads-level1-1d-delay-s19: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aave-v3-base-emergency-admin-protocol-guardian-4of7-s19: Protocol Guardian Safe (0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968, v1.3.0): getThreshold() = 4 of 7 owners, the 7 signers listed in the docs",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (4-of-N Safe)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "EMERGENCY_ADMIN (pause / unpause) = Aave Protocol Guardian 4-of-7 Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Aave V3 (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57886975,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277",
    "block_number": 57886975,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "aave-v3-base-emergency-admin-protocol-guardian-4of7-s19",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968",
    "target_label": "Aave Protocol Guardian Safe (Base)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Aave V3 (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "aave v3 (base) aave-v3-base lending market (base) aave aave base 0x2dc219e716793fb4b21548c0f009ba3af753ab01 0x56c1a4b54921dea9a344967a8693c7e661d72968",
   "slug": "aave-v3-base",
   "summary_short": "Pause and unpause admin is the Aave Guardian 4-of-7 Safe, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aave-v3-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Blue-Chip Lending & Decentralized Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Aave V3 & Governance v3 address book specifies Level 1 Short Executor (1-day execution delay) and 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe.",
    "observed": "ACLManager hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A) = true; PayloadsController (0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5) getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); GHO (0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f) totalSupply = 699,000,000 GHO.",
    "recordId": "aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1",
    "surface": "ACLManager Admin Role, Executor Lvl1 Delay & Guardian Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1: … 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1: EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30)",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (4-of-7)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "ACLManager Admin Role, Executor Lvl1 Delay & Guardian Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Aave V3 / GHO",
   "pinnedBlock": 26402160,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc",
    "block_number": 26402160,
    "call_args": [
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
     "0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A"
    ],
    "call_signature": "hasRole(bytes32,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1",
    "repro_calldata": "0x91d1485400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005300a1a15135ea4dc7ad5a167152c01efc9b192a",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x91d14854",
    "target_contract": "0xc2aaCf6553D20d1e9d78E365AAba8032af9c85b0",
    "target_label": "ACLManager"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Aave V3 / GHO control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "aave v3 / gho aave-v3-gho blue-chip lending & decentralized stablecoin gho aave 0xc2aacf6553d20d1e9d78e365aaba8032af9c85b0",
   "slug": "aave-v3-gho",
   "summary_short": "ACL admin role, executor delay and Guardian Safe match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aave-v3-gho/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Intent-Based Cross-Chain Settlement",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.across.to (security model): 'The Across Bond Token is a custom ERC-20 that functions similarly to WETH.' 'ABT has an additional property: it restricts which addresses may propose root bundles to the HubPool.'",
    "observed": "Across Bond Token 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea (Sourcify exact match): proposers(0xf7bAc63fc7CEaCf0589F25454Ecf5C2ce904997c, the current root-bundle proposer) = true, proposers(address(0)) = false; hubPool() = HubPool 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda; owner() = the HubPool owner Safe 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715.",
    "recordId": "across-protocol-hubpool-abt-proposer-allowlist-s22",
    "surface": "Root-bundle proposals: only allow-listed ABT proposers"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "across-protocol-hubpool-bond-045-abt-s22: … 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715 (3-of-5, v1.3.0); not a proxy (Sourcify match).",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Immutable or ownership renounced"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "across-protocol-hubpool-bond-045-abt-s22: … 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715 (3-of-5, v1.3.0); not a proxy (Sourcify match).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "across-protocol-hubpool-bond-045-abt-s22: paused() = false",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Root-bundle proposals: only allow-listed ABT proposers",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Across Protocol (HubPool)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26429396,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71",
    "block_number": 26429396,
    "call_args": [
     "0xf7bAc63fc7CEaCf0589F25454Ecf5C2ce904997c"
    ],
    "call_signature": "proposers(address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "across-protocol-hubpool-abt-proposer-allowlist-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0x18177497000000000000000000000000f7bac63fc7ceacf0589f25454ecf5c2ce904997c",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x18177497",
    "target_contract": "0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea",
    "target_label": "Across Bond Token (ABT)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Across Protocol (HubPool) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "across protocol (hubpool) across-protocol-hubpool intent-based cross-chain settlement acx 0xc186fa914353c44b2e33ebe05f21846f1048beda 0xee1dc6bcf1ee967a350e9ac6caaaa236109002ea",
   "slug": "across-protocol-hubpool",
   "summary_short": "Only allow-listed proposers can submit root bundles, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/across-protocol-hubpool/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base"
   ],
   "category": "Base Liquidity Hub & ve(3,3) DEX",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "github.com/aerodrome-finance/contracts (README): 'EpochGovernor.sol A simple epoch-based governance contract used exclusively for adjusting emissions.' / SPECIFICATION.md: 'Managed NFTs can be deactivated, a process which prevents the NFT from voting and from receiving deposits (requires emergency council).'",
    "observed": "Voter 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5: emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration 0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721 (Sourcify match; MIGRATION_OPEN() = 1792620000), owned by Safe 0x42255e3C2d0b71a0b006243148fdF1a71d054cE0 (3-of-7, v1.5.0, the same 7 signers as the governor Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075).",
    "recordId": "aerodrome-finance-base-emergency-council-migration-s21",
    "surface": "Voter emergency council and epoch governor: the AerodromeMigration contract"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aerodrome-finance-base-emergency-council-migration-s21: … 0x42255e3C2d0b71a0b006243148fdF1a71d054cE0 (3-of-7, v1.5.0, the same 7 signers as the …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aerodrome-finance-base-poolfactory-max-fee-3pct-s21: pauser() = feeManager() = Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075 (3-of-7, v1.3.0, no modules), also the Voter governor() and the FactoryRegistry …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-7)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Voter emergency council and epoch governor: the AerodromeMigration contract: docs say github.com/aerodrome-finance/contracts (README): 'EpochGovernor.sol A simple epoch-based governance contract used exclusively for adjusting emissions.' / SPECIFICATION.md: 'Managed NFTs can be deactivated, a process whi… · chain says Voter 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5: emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration 0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721 (Sourcify match;",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Aerodrome Finance (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 58203774,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x619b45ca763563ff11fc3246da1d039a7d0ab2780bedff6cb0428c9290a2cb10",
    "block_number": 58203774,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "emergencyCouncil()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "aerodrome-finance-base-emergency-council-migration-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x7778960e",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x7778960e",
    "target_contract": "0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5",
    "target_label": "AerodromeVoter"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Aerodrome Finance (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "aerodrome finance (base) aerodrome-finance-base base liquidity hub & ve(3,3) dex aero veaero 0x16613524e02ad97edfef371bc883f2f5d6c480a5 0x420dd381b31aef6683db6b902084cb0ffece40da",
   "slug": "aerodrome-finance-base",
   "summary_short": "Voter emergency council and epoch governor are the AerodromeMigration contract",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aerodrome-finance-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base"
   ],
   "category": "Concentrated-Liquidity DEX",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Aerodrome PERMISSIONS.md: 'Protocol Team' 'Multisig at [0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075]' and 'Fee Manager' 'Protocol team'; Slipstream deploy constants (script/constants/Base.json) name the same Safe as poolFactoryOwner and feeManager.",
    "observed": "CLFactory (0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A) owner() = swapFeeManager() = unstakedFeeManager() = 3-of-7 Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075; swapFeeModule() = 0x090b2A6bb475c00e2256e2095A60887cD710803b, unstakedFeeModule() = 0x0AD08370c76Ff426F534bb2AFFD9b5555338ee68, defaultUnstakedFee() = 100000, allPoolsLength() = 3684. Context, not compared: Voter (0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5) governor() = the same Safe; emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration (0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721, owner() a 3-of-7 Safe v1.5.0), not the security page's Council 0x99249b10593fCa1Ae9DAE6D4819F1A6dae5C013D; the docs announce the 2026 merger into Aero.",
    "recordId": "aerodrome-slipstream-clfactory-team-3of7-s18",
    "surface": "CLFactory owner, swap & unstaked fee managers = Protocol Team 3-of-7 Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "aerodrome-slipstream-clfactory-team-3of7-s18: … swapFeeManager() = unstakedFeeManager() = 3-of-7 Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075; …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "CLFactory owner, swap & unstaked fee managers = Protocol Team 3-of-7 Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Aerodrome Slipstream (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57842915,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129",
    "block_number": 57842915,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "aerodrome-slipstream-clfactory-team-3of7-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A",
    "target_label": "Slipstream CLFactory"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Aerodrome Slipstream (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "aerodrome slipstream (base) aerodrome-slipstream-base concentrated-liquidity dex aero slipstream 0x5e7bb104d84c7cb9b682aac2f3d509f5f406809a",
   "slug": "aerodrome-slipstream-base",
   "summary_short": "Pool factory owner and fee managers are the 3-of-7 team Safe, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aerodrome-slipstream-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Cross-Chain Gateway & Interchain Token Service",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "axelar-contract-deployments (mainnet config, chains.ethereum, linked from docs.axelar.dev): '\"implementation\": \"0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098\"' / '\"authModule\": \"0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0\"'",
    "observed": "AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: implementation() = 0x16C22cbDD77350b1AC88AdDA344F691c12f41960, authModule() = 0x3d3C73E91B1b0C243f1437F2d8363b1D5B093BD0 (whose owner() is the gateway); the deployment config lists implementation 0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098 and auth module 0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0.",
    "recordId": "axelar-network-gateway-auth-module-s25",
    "surface": "Gateway implementation and auth module differ from the deployment config"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "axelar-network-governance-timelock-s25: operator() = 0xc8a8399c3D1207f4e109673be7047604737c1D56 (no contract code), which can run executeOperatorProposal immediately (no delay) for proposals Axelar …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s: an operator can execute approved proposals without waiting the timelock delay"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "axelar-network-its-owner-s25: paused() = false.",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Gateway implementation and auth module differ from the deployment config: docs say axelar-contract-deployments (mainnet config, chains.ethereum, linked from docs.axelar.dev): '\"implementation\": \"0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098\"' / '\"authModule\": \"0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0\"' · chain says AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: implementation() = 0x16C22cbDD77350b1AC88AdDA344F691c12f41960, authModule() = 0x3d3C73E91B1b0C243f1437F2d8363b1D5B093BD0 (whose owner() is the gateway);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Axelar Network",
   "pinnedBlock": 26434786,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "authModule()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "axelar-network-gateway-auth-module-s25",
    "repro_calldata": "0x64940c56",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x64940c56",
    "target_contract": "0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5",
    "target_label": "AxelarGateway (proxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 5,
   "rosetteAria": "Axelar Network control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "axelar network axelar-network cross-chain gateway & interchain token service axl axelar axelargateway interchaintokenservice 0x4f4495243837681061c4743b74b3eedf548d56a5 0x7acbae6cba67d78aaf69e47000884ae00f9b2525 0xb5fb4be02232b1bba4dc8f81dc24c26980de9e3c 0xcc940ae49c78f20e3f13f3cf37e996b98ac3ec68",
   "slug": "axelar-network",
   "summary_short": "Deployment config lists an older gateway implementation; 3-day timelock with operator path",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/axelar-network/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Programmable Liquidity Vault",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.balancer.fi (multisig): 'DAO Multi-sig 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f open in new window 6/11 DAO Signers DAO administrative permissions' and 'Ethereum DAO Multisig — Authorizer admin on Mainnet'",
    "observed": "Authorizer 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 (the getActualAuthorizer() of the Vault's AuthorizerWithAdaptorValidation 0x6048A8c631Fb7e77EcA533Cf9C29784e482391e7): getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 1, member 0 = DAO Multi-sig 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f, a 6-of-11 Safe (v1.1.1, no modules).",
    "recordId": "balancer-v2-vault-timelock-authorizer-admin-dao-multisig-s21",
    "surface": "Authorizer DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: the 6-of-11 DAO Multi-sig"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "balancer-v2-vault-timelock-authorizer-admin-dao-multisig-s21: … 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f, a 6-of-11 Safe (v1.1.1, no modules).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-11"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "balancer-v2-vault-timelock-vault-immutable-pause-expired-s21: Vault 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8: getPausedState() = (false, 1626633407, 1629225407) - the pause window and buffer period ended before the pin",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Authorizer DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: the 6-of-11 DAO Multi-sig",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Balancer V2 Vault & TimelockAuthorizer",
   "pinnedBlock": 26427612,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac",
    "block_number": 26427612,
    "call_args": [
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
     "0x0"
    ],
    "call_signature": "getRoleMember(bytes32,uint256)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "balancer-v2-vault-timelock-authorizer-admin-dao-multisig-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x9010d07c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x9010d07c",
    "target_contract": "0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6",
    "target_label": "Balancer V2 Authorizer"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Balancer V2 Vault & TimelockAuthorizer control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "balancer v2 vault & timelockauthorizer balancer-v2-vault-timelock programmable liquidity vault bal vebal 0xa331d84ec860bf466b4cdccfb4ac09a1b43f3ae6 0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8",
   "slug": "balancer-v2-vault-timelock",
   "summary_short": "Authorizer admin role is the 6-of-11 DAO multisig, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/balancer-v2-vault-timelock/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.bedrock.technology (uniETH contracts): 'Restaking proxy contract: https://etherscan.io/address/0x3f4eaceb930b0edfa78a1dfcbae5c5494e6e9850' / 'Restaking implementation: https://etherscan.io/address/0x9609af0490b96d7add7eea3554b1a944ee440262#code'",
    "observed": "Restaking proxy 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x1e4D0A963953e7c08Fc7602B01e683547Fc4E518 (Sourcify match), not the documented 0x9609Af0490b96D7AdD7EEa3554b1a944ee440262; admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6.",
    "recordId": "bedrock-unieth-restaking-impl-s25",
    "surface": "Restaking implementation differs from the one the docs list"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "bedrock-unieth-restaking-impl-s25: admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6.",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: the ProxyAdmin's owner delay (1 other upgrade path not determined)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "bedrock-unieth-restaking-impl-s25: admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6.",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "bedrock-unieth-upgrade-admin-s25: … 0x3050620423f4dB43E1904815E898C466526387b8 (3-of-5, no guard); uniETH owner() = Safe 0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Restaking implementation differs from the one the docs list: docs say docs.bedrock.technology (uniETH contracts): 'Restaking proxy contract: https://etherscan.io/address/0x3f4eaceb930b0edfa78a1dfcbae5c5494e6e9850' / 'Restaking implementation: https://etherscan.io/address/0x9609af0490b96d7… · chain says Restaking proxy 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x1e4D0A963953e7c08Fc7602B01e683547Fc4E518 (Sourcify match), not the documented 0x9609Af0490b96D7AdD7EEa3554b1a944ee440262;",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Bedrock (uniETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26434786,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "bedrock-unieth-restaking-impl-s25",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850",
    "target_label": "Bedrock Restaking (proxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Bedrock (uniETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "bedrock (unieth) bedrock-unieth liquid restaking unieth 0x3f4eaceb930b0edfa78a1dfcbae5c5494e6e9850 0x4befa2aa9c305238aa3e0b5d17eb20c045269e9d 0x926720ae39114d0e2043b79570a1e08f00d01cce 0xf1376bcef0f78459c0ed0ba5ddce976f1ddf51f4",
   "slug": "bedrock-unieth",
   "summary_short": "Docs list an older restaking implementation; uniETH upgrades via a 3-of-5 Safe ProxyAdmin",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/bedrock-unieth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Automated Yield Vaults & CLM (Base)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.beefy.finance (contracts and timelocks): 'Beefy ensures that all privileged functions and upgrades are protected by standardised smart contract timelocks.' and 'By default, a 6-hour timelock is configured for all strategy changes and upgrades.' / Base address book: 'vaultOwner: '0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309','",
    "observed": "vaultOwner timelock 0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309: getMinDelay() = 0s; the dev multisig 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 holds PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE, so an operation it schedules can execute in the same block; the timelock is its own admin (Sourcify exact match).",
    "recordId": "beefy-finance-base-vault-owner-timelock-zero-delay-s22",
    "surface": "Vault owner timelock: no delay (0 seconds)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "beefy-finance-base-fee-config-owner-dev-multisig-s22: transparent proxy (Sourcify exact match), implementation 0xAb35d11199216c7F7368080Cf41beD8f3AbBc4E4, EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a 1h–47h delay (6h)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "beefy-finance-base-vault-owner-timelock-zero-delay-s22: observed_delay_seconds = 0",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "beefy-finance-base-fee-config-owner-dev-multisig-s22: … 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 (3-of-6 Safe, v1.3.0, no modules); transparent …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 6 h · chain says 0 s (no delay)",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Beefy Finance (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 58315414,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd",
    "block_number": 58315414,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "beefy-finance-base-vault-owner-timelock-zero-delay-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309",
    "target_label": "BeefyVaultOwnerTimelock_Base"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Beefy Finance (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability moderate; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "beefy finance (base) beefy-finance-base automated yield vaults & clm (base) bifi 0x09d19184f46a32213df06b981122e06882b61309 0x3b60f7f25b09e71356cdffc6475c222a466a2ac9 0xfc69704cc3caac545cc7577009ea4aa04f1a61eb",
   "slug": "beefy-finance-base",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs 6 hours · chain none",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/beefy-finance-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Stablecoin / Credit",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.cap.app (access controls): 'Roles are managed by the Access Control admin, currently set to Cap's multisig address'",
    "observed": "AccessControl 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683: the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member, and the only grantAccess / revokeAccess holder, is the Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab; the Developer multisig 0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793 does not hold DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so role changes wait the 1-day delay.",
    "recordId": "cap-access-control-admin-is-timelock-s20",
    "surface": "Access-control admin: the Timelock, not the multisig directly"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "cap-1d-timelock-min-delay-s20: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "cap-1d-timelock-min-delay-s20: … 0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793 (3-of-5 Safe); the timelock is its own admin.",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Access-control admin: the Timelock, not the multisig directly: docs say docs.cap.app (access controls): 'Roles are managed by the Access Control admin, currently set to Cap's multisig address' · chain says AccessControl 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683: the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member, and the only grantAccess / revokeAccess holder, is the Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab;",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Cap",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "cap-1d-timelock-min-delay-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab",
    "target_label": "Cap TimelockController (Developer multisig proposer)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Cap control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "cap cap stablecoin / credit cusd stcusd cap 0x7731129a10d51e18cde607c5c115f26503d2c683 0xd8236031d8279d82e615af2bfab5fc0127a329ab",
   "slug": "cap",
   "summary_short": "Access-control admin is a Timelock, not the multisig the docs name",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/cap/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Institutional RWA Liquidity Pools",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.centrifuge.io (guardians) / Base deployment config: 'The ops guardian is deployed at `0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE` on all networks.' / 'The `OpsGuardian` is controlled by a separate Ops Safe multisig and handles day-to-day operational tasks such as adapter initialization, network wiring, and pool creation. It has no pause authority.' / '\"opsAdmin\": \"0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16\",'",
    "observed": "Root 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f (Base, block #58534152): wards(OpsGuardian 0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE) = 0; OpsGuardian (Sourcify match) opsSafe() = Safe 0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16 (2-of-7, v1.4.1), not a ward either.",
    "recordId": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-ops-guardian-s24",
    "surface": "OpsGuardian: not a ward of Root (no pause authority), run by the Ops Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-root-timelock-s24: … 172800s (48 hours); paused() = false; not a proxy.",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Immutable or ownership renounced"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-root-timelock-s24: observed_delay_seconds = 172800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-ops-guardian-s24: … 0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16 (2-of-7, v1.4.1), not a ward either.",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-root-timelock-s24: paused() = false",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "OpsGuardian: not a ward of Root (no pause authority), run by the Ops Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Centrifuge V3 Root (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 58534152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843",
    "block_number": 58534152,
    "call_args": [
     "0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE"
    ],
    "call_signature": "wards(address)",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-ops-guardian-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0xbf353dbb000000000000000000000000055589229506ee89645ef08ebe9b9a863486d0de",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xbf353dbb",
    "target_contract": "0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f",
    "target_label": "Centrifuge Root (Base)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Centrifuge V3 Root (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "centrifuge v3 root (base) centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base institutional rwa liquidity pools cfg 0x7ed48c31f2fdc40d37407cbabf0870b2b688368f",
   "slug": "centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base",
   "summary_short": "OpsGuardian has no pause authority over Root, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Cross-Chain Messaging & Token Bridge Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.chain.link (CCIP upgradability): 'All proposals originate from a ManyChainMultiSig (MCMS), which requires multiple independent signers to sign off.' / 'For example, you can view the Ethereum mainnet MCMS on Etherscan.'",
    "observed": "RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449: getRoleMemberCount(PROPOSER_ROLE) = 3: ManyChainMultiSig 0xE53289F32c8E690b7173aA33affE9B6B0CB0012F (the MCMS the docs link), GnosisSafeProxy 0xD6597750bf74DCAEC57e0F9aD2ec998D837005bf (Safe v1.3.0, 6-of-12; also a canceller) and ManyChainMultiSig 0xD9757aA52907798d1aF2FDa7A6C0cC733E5aCf7e.",
    "recordId": "chainlink-ccip-timelock-proposers-s24",
    "surface": "Timelock proposers: a 6-of-12 Safe besides the ManyChainMultiSigs (docs: all proposals from an MCMS)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "chainlink-ccip-config-owner-rbac-timelock-s24: BYPASSER_ROLE has 1 member, ManyChainMultiSig 0x117ec8aD107976e1dBCc21717ff78407Bc36aADc, which can execute calls immediately through bypasserExecuteBatch (no …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s: a bypasser role can execute without waiting the timelock delay"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "chainlink-ccip-timelock-proposers-s24: … 0xD6597750bf74DCAEC57e0F9aD2ec998D837005bf (Safe v1.3.0, 6-of-12; also a canceller) and ManyChainMultiSig …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-12"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock proposers: a 6-of-12 Safe besides the ManyChainMultiSigs (docs: all proposals from an MCMS): docs say docs.chain.link (CCIP upgradability): 'All proposals originate from a ManyChainMultiSig (MCMS), which requires multiple independent signers to sign off.' / 'For example, you can view the Ethereum mainnet MCMS on Ethersc… · chain says RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449: getRoleMemberCount(PROPOSER_ROLE) = 3: ManyChainMultiSig 0xE53289F32c8E690b7173aA33affE9B6B0CB0012F (the MCMS the docs link), GnosisSafeProxy 0xD6597750bf74DCAEC5…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Chainlink CCIP",
   "pinnedBlock": 26433001,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7",
    "block_number": 26433001,
    "call_args": [
     "0xb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1"
    ],
    "call_signature": "getRoleMemberCount(bytes32)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "chainlink-ccip-timelock-proposers-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0xca15c873b09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xca15c873",
    "target_contract": "0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449",
    "target_label": "CCIP RBACTimelock (Ethereum)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Chainlink CCIP control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "chainlink ccip chainlink-ccip cross-chain messaging & token bridge infrastructure ccip link chainlink 0x0b047953451a207743fb62541b21199b95190602 0x44835bbba9d40deda9b64858095ecfb2693c9449 0x80226fc0ee2b096224eeac085bb9a8cba1146f7d 0xb22764f98dd05c789929716d677382df22c05cb6",
   "slug": "chainlink-ccip",
   "summary_short": "Docs: only the MCMS proposes · chain: a 6-of-12 Safe can also propose",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/chainlink-ccip/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Fiat-Backed Stablecoin (USDC)",
   "chains": [
    "base",
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Circle token design (stablecoin-evm, doc/tokendesign.md): '`owner` - re-assign any of the roles except for `admin`'; '`masterMinter` - adds and removes minters and increases their minting allowance'; '`pauser` - pause the contract, which prevents all transfers, minting, and burning'; '`blacklister` - prevent all transfers to or from a particular address, and prevents that address from minting or burning' / developers.circle.com (USDC contract addresses): 'Base 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913'",
    "observed": "USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): owner() = 0x3ABd6f64A422225E61E435baE41db12096106df7, pauser() = 0xD3571B3bc51CECFf49194AD67aFFFC648d5e07b4, blacklister() = 0x1f2e3A640175d20ac31ed523B6733B977173E277 (no contract code); masterMinter() = MasterMinter 0x2230393EDAD0299b7E7B59F20AA856cD1bEd52e1, whose owner() is 0xb5bff84d169a72e76e94eC950da51Bac90b60284 (no code); rescuer() = 0x0; paused() = false; version() = 2.",
    "recordId": "circle-usdc-base-owner-role-assignment-s23",
    "surface": "USDC (Base) roles: owner, masterMinter, pauser and blacklister are single administrator addresses, as documented"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "circle-usdc-base-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23: USDC FiatTokenProxy 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: no timelock in front of upgrades"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "circle-usdc-base-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23: USDC FiatTokenProxy 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "circle-usdc-base-owner-role-assignment-s23: … 0x1f2e3A640175d20ac31ed523B6733B977173E277 (no contract code); masterMinter() = MasterMinter 0x2230393EDAD0299b7E7B59F20AA856cD1bEd52e1, …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "circle-usdc-base-owner-role-assignment-s23: USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): owner() = 0x3ABd6f64A422225E61E435baE41db12096106df7, pauser() = …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority held by a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "USDC (Base) roles: owner, masterMinter, pauser and blacklister are single administrator addresses, as documented",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Circle USDC",
   "pinnedBlock": 58422815,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x5aced8e0d59eebe168d9dc8778d0305063a1a02f9ffd264774cbd75b3b979a51",
    "block_number": 58422815,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "circle-usdc-base-owner-role-assignment-s23",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
    "target_label": "USDC FiatTokenProxy (Base)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Circle USDC control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope weak; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "circle usdc circle-usdc fiat-backed stablecoin (usdc) usdc 0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913 0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48",
   "slug": "circle-usdc",
   "summary_short": "USDC roles on Base are single admin addresses, as Circle documents",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/circle-usdc/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking Token (ETH)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "github.com/coinbase/wrapped-tokens-os (README): 'The wrapped staked tokens inherit from Centre's fiat token contract and add an oracle role that can set an exchangeRate.' and 'we'll utilize a seperate rate limited exchange rate updater contract to minimize operational load.'",
    "observed": "cbETH 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704: oracle() = ExchangeRateUpdater 0x9b37180d847B27ADC13C2277299045C1237Ae281 (Sourcify exact match), whose owner() is an externally owned account 0xA57aFe0Ba93f6854ed1DCd58dCE301E10B15D1D6.",
    "recordId": "coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-oracle-exchange-rate-updater-s21",
    "surface": "Exchange-rate oracle: the rate-limited ExchangeRateUpdater"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-oracle-exchange-rate-updater-s21: … (Sourcify exact match), whose owner() is an externally owned account 0xA57aFe0Ba93f6854ed1DCd58dCE301E10B15D1D6.",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-proxy-admin-separate-owner-s21: owner() = 0x4b8741C89ABFf2562e854899E24d67A36406eA03, pauser() = 0x9596EAE1744997161ac094252e5020E9314BDCc2, blacklister() = …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority held by a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Exchange-rate oracle: the rate-limited ExchangeRateUpdater",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH",
   "pinnedBlock": 26427612,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac",
    "block_number": 26427612,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "oracle()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-oracle-exchange-rate-updater-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x7dc0d1d0",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x7dc0d1d0",
    "target_contract": "0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704",
    "target_label": "Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH (cbETH) FiatTokenProxy"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope weak; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "coinbase wrapped staked eth coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth liquid staking token (eth) cbeth 0xbe9895146f7af43049ca1c1ae358b0541ea49704",
   "slug": "coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth",
   "summary_short": "The exchange rate is set by a rate-limited updater, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Lending Market (Base)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.compound.finance (governance): 'The Timelock on Mainnet is the administrator of all community sanctioned instances of Compound III.' and 'Local Timelocks have an additional delay before Comet admin functions can be called via proposal execution.'",
    "observed": "BridgeReceiver (0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A).govTimelock() = Ethereum Timelock 0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925 (delay() = 172800s on Ethereum); localTimelock() = 0xCC3E7c85Bb0EE4f09380e041fee95a0caeDD4a02 (delay() = 86400s, admin() = the BridgeReceiver); governor() of cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F), owner() of CometProxyAdmin 0xbdE8F31D2DdDA895264e27DD990faB3DC87b372d and governor() of the Configurator 0x45939657d1CA34A8FA39A924B71D28Fe8431e581 are the local timelock.",
    "recordId": "compound-v3-base-mainnet-timelock-local-1d-delay-s19",
    "surface": "Both Base Comet markets are governed by the Ethereum Timelock through a bridge receiver and a 1-day local timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-base-mainnet-timelock-local-1d-delay-s19: governor() of cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F), owner() of CometProxyAdmin …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a 1h–47h delay (1d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-base-mainnet-timelock-local-1d-delay-s19: governor() of cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F), owner() of CometProxyAdmin …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-base-pause-guardian-community-multisig-5of9-s19: … 0x3cb4653F3B45F448D9100b118B75a1503281d2ee (5-of-9, v1.3.0), whose 9 owners equal, in …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-9"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-base-pause-guardian-community-multisig-5of9-s19: cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F) pauseGuardian() = Safe …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (5-of-9)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Both Base Comet markets are governed by the Ethereum Timelock through a bridge receiver and a 1-day local timelock",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Compound V3 (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57886975,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277",
    "block_number": 57886975,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "govTimelock()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "compound-v3-base-mainnet-timelock-local-1d-delay-s19",
    "repro_calldata": "0x22086dbe",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x22086dbe",
    "target_contract": "0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A",
    "target_label": "Compound BridgeReceiver (Base)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Compound V3 (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability moderate; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "compound v3 (base) compound-v3-base lending market (base) comp cusdcv3 0x18281dfc4d00905da1aaa6731414eaba843c468a 0x9c4ec768c28520b50860ea7a15bd7213a9ff58bf",
   "slug": "compound-v3-base",
   "summary_short": "Base markets follow the Ethereum Timelock plus a 1-day local timelock",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/compound-v3-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Blue-Chip Lending",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Compound V3 governance documentation specifies 48-hour Timelock ownership and Community Multi-Sig pause guardian.",
    "observed": "Sampled cUSDCv3 (0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3) & cWETHv3 (0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94) governor() = CompoundTimelock (0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925, delay() = 172800s / 48h, admin() = CompoundGovernor 0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0); pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c).",
    "recordId": "compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe",
    "surface": "Comet Governor, 48h Timelock & Pause-Guardian Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe: observed_delay_seconds = 172800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe: … 0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0); pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-9"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe: pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c).",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (5-of-9)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Comet Governor, 48h Timelock & Pause-Guardian Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Compound V3 (Comet)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26402160,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc",
    "block_number": 26402160,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "governor()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe",
    "repro_calldata": "0x0c340a24",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x0c340a24",
    "target_contract": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
    "target_label": "cUSDCv3"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Compound V3 (Comet) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "compound v3 (comet) compound-v3-comet blue-chip lending comp cusdcv3 comet 0xc3d688b66703497daa19211eedff47f25384cdc3",
   "slug": "compound-v3-comet",
   "summary_short": "Governor, 48-hour Timelock and Pause Guardian Safe match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/compound-v3-comet/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Yield Vaults (ERC-4626)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.concrete.xyz (risks and safety): 'Separated roles. Vault operations are split across distinct roles. No single key has full control or can drain a vault.'",
    "observed": "Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; it is the vault owner() (the gate for factory-driven vault upgrades), the only VAULT_MANAGER member and the factory's getFactoryManager().",
    "recordId": "concrete-vault-owner-safe-1of2-s20",
    "surface": "Vault owner, VAULT_MANAGER and factory manager Safe threshold: 1-of-2"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "concrete-vault-proxy-admin-factory-s20: ctDeltaWeETH vault (0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20) EIP-1967 admin slot = ConcreteFactory 0x0265d73a8E61F698d8EB0dfeb91Ddce55516844C, which is also …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 1-of-2"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Vault owner, VAULT_MANAGER and factory manager Safe threshold: 1-of-2: docs say docs.concrete.xyz (risks and safety): 'Separated roles. · chain says Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners;",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Concrete",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "concrete-vault-owner-safe-1of2-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381",
    "target_label": "Concrete Delta WeETH owner multisig"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Concrete control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "concrete concrete yield vaults (erc-4626) ctdeltaweeth concrete 0x8f5f1d40243b259ceb7ab44ba421ff191bcd3381 0xb9dc54c8261745cb97070cefbe3d3d815aee8f20",
   "slug": "concrete",
   "summary_short": "Vault and factory manager Safe runs at 1-of-2 despite documented role separation",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/concrete/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Curve Governance Aggregation",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Convex Booster governance ownership hierarchy documentation.",
    "observed": "Convex Booster (0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31) owner() resolves via 0x3cE6408F923326f81A7D7929952947748180f1E6 -> 0x256e1bbA846611C37CF89844a02435E6C098b86D -> 3-of-5 DAO Multisig (0xa3C5A1e09150B75ff251c1a7815A07182c3de2FB) at block 26401312.",
    "recordId": "convex-booster-governance-chain",
    "surface": "Sampled Booster Governance Ownership Chain"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "convex-booster-governance-chain: … 0x256e1bbA846611C37CF89844a02435E6C098b86D -> 3-of-5 DAO Multisig (0xa3C5A1e09150B75ff251c1a7815A07182c3de2FB) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Booster Governance Ownership Chain",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Convex Finance",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401312,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109",
    "block_number": 26401312,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "convex-booster-governance-chain",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31",
    "target_label": "Convex Booster"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Convex Finance control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "convex finance convex-finance curve governance aggregation cvx cvxcrv 0xf403c135812408bfbe8713b5a23a04b3d48aae31",
   "slug": "convex-finance",
   "summary_short": "Booster governance ownership chain matches the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/convex-finance/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Decentralized Stablecoin & Lending",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "curvefi/docs docs/developer/crvusd/factory.md states 'Only its admin, the CurveOwnershipAgent, can call to add a market'; LendingOwnerProxy intermediate wrapper added at block 26300155.",
    "observed": "ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC) admin() = LendingOwnerProxy (0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1), where dao() = CurveOwnershipAgent (0x40907540d8a6C65c637785e8f8B742ae6b0b9968, Aragon voteTime = 604800s / 7d on 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) and emergency_dao() = 5-of-9 EmergencyDAO Safe (0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c); crvUSD (0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E) minter() = ControllerFactory, totalSupply = 2,134,809,204.98 crvUSD; debt_ceiling(0x370a449FeBb9411c95bf897021377fe0B7D100c0) = 1,000,000,000 crvUSD.",
    "recordId": "curve-crvusd-factory-lending-owner-proxy",
    "surface": "ControllerFactory Admin Proxy & EmergencyDAO Debt-Ceiling Guard"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "curve-crvusd-factory-lending-owner-proxy: … 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) and emergency_dao() = 5-of-9 EmergencyDAO Safe (0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-9"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "ControllerFactory Admin Proxy & EmergencyDAO Debt-Ceiling Guard: docs say curvefi/docs docs/developer/crvusd/factory.md states 'Only its admin, the CurveOwnershipAgent, can call to add a market'; · chain says ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC) admin() = LendingOwnerProxy (0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1), where dao() = CurveOwnershipAgent (0x40907540d8a6C65c637785e8f8B742ae6b0b9968, Ara…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Curve Finance (crvUSD)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403523,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a",
    "block_number": 26403523,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "admin()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "curve-crvusd-factory-lending-owner-proxy",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf851a440",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf851a440",
    "target_contract": "0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC",
    "target_label": "crvUSD ControllerFactory"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Curve Finance (crvUSD) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "curve finance (crvusd) curve-finance-crvusd decentralized stablecoin & lending crvusd crv 0xc9332fdcb1c491dcc683bae86fe3cb70360738bc",
   "slug": "curve-finance-crvusd",
   "summary_short": "crvUSD factory admin is a LendingOwnerProxy; docs name the OwnershipAgent",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/curve-finance-crvusd/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Restaking Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts main README documents Core ProxyAdmin, 10-day TimelockController + CommunityMultisig Executor wrapper, and PauserRegistry 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.",
    "observed": "DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = 1-of-2 ExecutorMultisig (0x369e6F597e22EaB55fFb173C6d9cD234BD699111) shared between 10d TimelockController (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.",
    "recordId": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock",
    "surface": "Core ProxyAdmin, Dual-Owner Executor Safe & 10d Timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock: DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: a 1-of-N executor co-owned by the timelock and a non-timelock signer bypasses the delay"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock: DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock: … (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 9-of-13 (via a 1-of-N contract-executor wrapper co-owned with a timelock)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock: pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Core ProxyAdmin, Dual-Owner Executor Safe & 10d Timelock",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "EigenLayer Core",
   "pinnedBlock": 26402160,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc",
    "block_number": 26402160,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d",
    "target_label": "EigenLayerTimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "EigenLayer Core control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "eigenlayer core eigenlayer-core restaking infrastructure eigen 0xc06fd4f821eac1ff1ae8067b36342899b57baa2d",
   "slug": "eigenlayer-core",
   "summary_short": "Core ProxyAdmin, executor Safe and 10-day Timelock match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/eigenlayer-core/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "On-chain Asset Management",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "specs.enzyme.finance (fund lifecycle): 'MigratorA waits for the `migrationTimelock` defined on the `Dispatcher` to pass. [NOTE: This is no longer used and is set to `0`]'; access-control handoff: 'The owner is already the Enzyme Council.' (no Council address or threshold is published).",
    "observed": "Dispatcher (0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32, Sourcify exact_match) getMigrationTimelock() = 604800s (7d), enforced by signalMigration (executableTimestamp = block.timestamp + migrationTimelock). getOwner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0xb270FE91e8E4b80452fBF1b4704208792A350f53 (getNominatedOwner() = 0), which also owns the live FundDeployer 0x4f1C53F096533C04d8157EFB6Bca3eb22ddC6360 (getCurrentFundDeployer()); setCurrentFundDeployer and setMigrationTimelock are onlyOwner with no delay.",
    "recordId": "enzyme-dispatcher-7d-migration-timelock-s18",
    "surface": "Dispatcher migration timelock = 7 days (specs: 'no longer used and is set to 0')"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "enzyme-dispatcher-7d-migration-timelock-s18: observed_delay_seconds = 604800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "enzyme-dispatcher-7d-migration-timelock-s18: … + migrationTimelock). getOwner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0xb270FE91e8E4b80452fBF1b4704208792A350f53 …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 0 s (no delay) · chain says 7 d",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Enzyme Finance",
   "pinnedBlock": 26421541,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d",
    "block_number": 26421541,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMigrationTimelock()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "enzyme-dispatcher-7d-migration-timelock-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0x2fa0c161",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x2fa0c161",
    "target_contract": "0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32",
    "target_label": "Enzyme Dispatcher"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Enzyme Finance control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "enzyme finance enzyme-finance on-chain asset management mln enzyme 0xc3dc853dd716bd5754f421ef94fdcbac3902ab32",
   "slug": "enzyme-finance",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs none · chain 7 days (stricter)",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/enzyme-finance/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Synthetic Dollar / Basis Collateral",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 2,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks and 7 signatures (key-addresses.md lists 5/11); Risk Committee forum topic 810 (Jul 2026) notes 1-day delay.",
    "observed": "getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe).",
    "recordId": "ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe",
    "surface": "TimelockController MinDelay & Dev Multisig Quorum"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 86400s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe: … getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-10"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 7 d · chain says 1 d",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Ethena (USDe / sUSDe)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26406106,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e",
    "block_number": 26401638,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94",
    "target_label": "EthenaTimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "ethena (usde / susde) ethena-usde-susde synthetic dollar / basis collateral usde susde ena 0xe8dc0fab349ea169283c48ccfd09d797e6db7c94",
   "slug": "ethena-usde-susde",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs 7 days · chain 1 day",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ethena-usde-susde/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "RWA-Backed Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.ethena.fi key addresses (Dev multisig): '5/11 signers.' and 'Owner of Ethena's deployed mainnet smart contracts & able to modify contract parameters.'",
    "observed": "PSM (0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728).owner() = EthenaTimelockController 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (getMinDelay() = 86400s), which also holds the PSM DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig does not); the Dev multisig 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862 (5-of-10, v1.3.0) holds PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on the timelock; asset() = USDtb, isSwapEnabled() = true.",
    "recordId": "ethena-usdtb-psm-owner-24h-timelock-s19",
    "surface": "USDtb PSM owned by a 24-hour TimelockController (Dev multisig proposes), not by the Dev multisig directly"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "ethena-usdtb-single-admin-no-timelock-s19: USDtb (0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C).owner() = 0xd93826BB299765c87D13AeBa2A7E5d9B27A03956 (no code), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and owns …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: no timelock in front of upgrades"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ethena-usdtb-single-admin-no-timelock-s19: USDtb (0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C).owner() = 0xd93826BB299765c87D13AeBa2A7E5d9B27A03956 (no code), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and owns …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ethena-usdtb-single-admin-no-timelock-s19: … 0xd93826BB299765c87D13AeBa2A7E5d9B27A03956 (no code), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ethena-usdtb-single-admin-no-timelock-s19: MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, BLOCKLISTER_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE are each held by one address without code",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority held by a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "USDtb PSM owned by a 24-hour TimelockController (Dev multisig proposes), not by the Dev multisig directly: docs say docs.ethena.fi key addresses (Dev multisig): '5/11 signers.' and 'Owner of Ethena's deployed mainnet smart contracts & able to modify contract parameters.' · chain says PSM (0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728).owner() = EthenaTimelockController 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (getMinDelay() = 86400s), which also holds the PSM DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig does…",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Ethena USDtb",
   "pinnedBlock": 26422243,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410",
    "block_number": 26422243,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "ethena-usdtb-psm-owner-24h-timelock-s19",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728",
    "target_label": "USDtb PSM"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Ethena USDtb control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope weak; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "ethena usdtb ethena-usdtb rwa-backed stablecoin usdtb usdtb 0x73e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728 0xc139190f447e929f090edeb554d95abb8b18ac1c",
   "slug": "ethena-usdtb",
   "summary_short": "USDtb PSM is owned by a 24-hour timelock, not the Dev multisig directly",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ethena-usdtb/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking & Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Public pre-execution brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/etherfi-op-0x244e/ (decoded calldata, storage-layout and delegate trace).",
    "observed": "getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d); operation 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1795193651 (2026-11-20 16:54:11 UTC). The scheduled call EtherfiL1SyncPoolETH (0xD789870beA40D056A4d26055d0bEFcC8755DA146).setDelegate(EtherFiTimelock) puts the LayerZero V2 endpoint delegate behind the 10-day timelock.",
    "recordId": "etherfi-core-timelock-op-0x244e",
    "surface": "Core Upgrade Timelock (10d) — queued LayerZero V2 setDelegate to Timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "etherfi-core-timelocks: … (0xcD425f44758a08BaAB3C4908f3e3dE5776e45d7a) getMinDelay() = 172800s (2 days); LiquidityPool (0x308861A430be4cce5502d0A12724771Fc6DaF216) …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Core Upgrade Timelock (10d) — queued LayerZero V2 setDelegate to Timelock: docs say Public pre-execution brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/etherfi-op-0x244e/ (decoded calldata, storage-layout and delegate trace). · chain says getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d);",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26405302,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e",
    "block_number": 26401638,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "etherfi-core-timelocks",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761",
    "target_label": "ether.fi Upgrade Timelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "ether.fi core (eeth / weeth) ether-fi-core-eeth-weeth liquid staking & restaking eeth weeth ethfi 0x9f26d4c958fd811a1f59b01b86be7dffc9d20761",
   "slug": "ether-fi-core-eeth-weeth",
   "summary_short": "10-day upgrade timelock; a queued LayerZero delegate change moves behind it",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ether-fi-core-eeth-weeth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Curated Restaking Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Sampled BoringVault Accountant authority() and RolesAuthority TimelockController ownership verified at block 26401070.",
    "observed": "AccountantWithRateProviders (0x0d05D94a5F1E76C18fbeB7A13d17C8a314088198) authority() = 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122; RolesAuthority.owner() = 0xD829F278016b90FEc735F9A12Bf8b75E06102C89 (TimelockController, getMinDelay = 86400s / 1d at block 26401070).",
    "recordId": "etherfi-liquid-veda-roles-authority",
    "surface": "Sampled RolesAuthority Owner & Timelock Wiring"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 86400s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled RolesAuthority Owner & Timelock Wiring",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "ether.fi Liquid / Veda BoringVault",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401070,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234",
    "block_number": 26401070,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "etherfi-liquid-veda-roles-authority",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122",
    "target_label": "Liquid RolesAuthority"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "ether.fi Liquid / Veda BoringVault control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "ether.fi liquid / veda boringvault ether-fi-liquid-veda-boringvault curated restaking vaults liquid veda boringvault 0x485bde66bb668a51f2372e34e45b1c6226798122",
   "slug": "ether-fi-liquid-veda-boringvault",
   "summary_short": "RolesAuthority owner and timelock wiring match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ether-fi-liquid-veda-boringvault/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Modular Lending Vault Kit",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.euler.finance: '`FactoryGovernor` is installed as the `upgradeAdmin` of the EVK factory.' and 'The deployed EVC is immutable'; Euler forum: 'The signer set will be updated to 6 Euler Labs signers and 2 Foundation Directors, with a 4/8 threshold.' The prose docs state no delay; the official evk-periphery deployment script sets EVAULT_FACTORY_TIMELOCK_MIN_DELAY = 4 days.",
    "observed": "GenericFactory (0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e).upgradeAdmin() = FactoryGovernor 0x2F13256E04022d6356d8CE8C53C7364e13DC1f3d; its only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is TimelockController 0xfb034c1C6c7F42171b2d1Cb8486E0f43ED07A968 (getMinDelay() = 345600s, 4d; PROPOSER_ROLE: 4-of-8 Safe 0xcAD001c30E96765aC90307669d578219D4fb1DCe; EXECUTOR_ROLE open; CANCELLER_ROLE: that Safe and 2-of-3 Safe 0xb3b84e8320250Afe7a5fb313Ee32B52982b73c53). PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE has 3 members (2-of-6 Safe 0xB1345E7A4D35FB3E6bF22A32B3741Ae74E5Fba27, 0xff217004BdD3A6A592162380dc0E6BbF143291eB, 0xcC6451385685721778E7Bd80B54F8c92b484F601); UNPAUSE_ADMIN_ROLE: the 2-of-6 Safe. EthereumVaultConnector (0x0C9a3dd6b8F28529d72d7f9cE918D493519EE383): no EIP-1967 slots; owner() and admin() revert.",
    "recordId": "euler-v2-evk-factorygovernor-4d-timelock-s18",
    "surface": "EVK factory upgradeAdmin = FactoryGovernor behind a 4d TimelockController (DAO 4-of-8 proposes)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 345600s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "4d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "euler-v2-evk-factorygovernor-4d-timelock-s18: … open; CANCELLER_ROLE: that Safe and 2-of-3 Safe 0xb3b84e8320250Afe7a5fb313Ee32B52982b73c53). …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-3"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "euler-v2-evk-factorygovernor-4d-timelock-s18: its only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is TimelockController 0xfb034c1C6c7F42171b2d1Cb8486E0f43ED07A968 (getMinDelay() = 345600s, 4d; PROPOSER_ROLE: 4-of-8 Safe …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-3)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "EVK factory upgradeAdmin = FactoryGovernor behind a 4d TimelockController (DAO 4-of-8 proposes)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Euler V2 (EVK)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26421541,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d",
    "block_number": 26421541,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "upgradeAdmin()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "euler-v2-evk-factorygovernor-4d-timelock-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0xc4d5608a",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xc4d5608a",
    "target_contract": "0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e",
    "target_label": "EulerEVaultFactory (GenericFactory)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Euler V2 (EVK) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "euler v2 (evk) euler-v2-evk modular lending vault kit eul evk evc 0x29a56a1b8214d9cf7c5561811750d5cbdb45cc8e",
   "slug": "euler-v2-evk",
   "summary_short": "Factory upgrades wait 4 days in a timelock (DAO 4-of-8 proposes), as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/euler-v2-evk/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Leveraged Yield & Lending (Base)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": false,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Extra Finance (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.extrafi.io/; governance: https://snapshot.org/#/extrafi.eth). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state.",
    "observed": "ExtraLendingPool_Base (0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (20,198 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns governance controller contract 0x5a70429e0e5c7BE9E5F83B497C18F5AC82345113.",
    "recordId": "extra-finance-base-control-plane",
    "surface": "ExtraLendingPool_Base · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "u",
     "value": "Uncompared: documentation not assessed (RPC-observed)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "ExtraLendingPool_Base · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture",
   "grade": "observed",
   "gradeLabel": "OBSERVED",
   "name": "Extra Finance (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57421449,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0",
    "block_number": 57421449,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "extra-finance-base-control-plane",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD",
    "target_label": "ExtraLendingPool_Base"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Extra Finance (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity uncompared",
   "search": "extra finance (base) extra-finance-base leveraged yield & lending (base) extra 0xbb505c54d71e9e599cb8435b4f0ceec05fc71cbd",
   "slug": "extra-finance-base",
   "summary_short": "Non-proxy lending pool with role-based admin; docs not assessed",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/extra-finance-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Leveraged ETH / Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "LongPoolManager (0x250893CA4Ba5d05626C785e8da758026928FCD24) and v2 governance docs scope EmergencySafe strictly to EMERGENCY_ROLE behind 3-day Timelock admin.",
    "observed": "DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on all 4 v2 ProtocolTreasury proxies (0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6, 0xb178197E88D58Da21bE22A408E850d1e6Dc09A38, 0x6D9e81c5b7C4b37d0Fe9E8CDA776e057f4040868, 0x87d5e4cAaF4358A4337C10859c7107c7AEF4f8Ce) held directly by OpsSafe (0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF, 6-of-9 Safe) and EmergencySafe (0x28c921adAC4c1072658eB01a28DA06b5F651eF62, 3-of-4 Safe), while Timelock (0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, getMinDelay = 259200s) holds false.",
    "recordId": "fx-protocol-v2-treasury-admin",
    "surface": "ProtocolTreasury DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Holders"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "fx-protocol-v2-treasury-admin: … (0x28c921adAC4c1072658eB01a28DA06b5F651eF62, 3-of-4 Safe), while Timelock (0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-4"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "ProtocolTreasury DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Holders: docs say LongPoolManager (0x250893CA4Ba5d05626C785e8da758026928FCD24) and v2 governance docs scope EmergencySafe strictly to EMERGENCY_ROLE behind 3-day Timelock admin. · chain says DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on all 4 v2 ProtocolTreasury proxies (0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6, 0xb178197E88D58Da21bE22A408E850d1e6Dc09A38, 0x6D9e81c5b7C4b37d0Fe9E8CDA776e057f4040868, 0x87d5e4cAaF4358A4337C1…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "f(x) Protocol v2",
   "pinnedBlock": 26400152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa9a61622304ec55c5fec49abbcabec60069f66f28792cf841bdd7aef12ce63aa",
    "block_number": 26400152,
    "call_args": [
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
     "0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF"
    ],
    "call_signature": "hasRole(bytes32,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "fx-protocol-v2-treasury-admin",
    "repro_calldata": "0x91d14854000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000026b2ec4e02ebe2f54583af25b647b1d619e67bbf",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x91d14854",
    "target_contract": "0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6",
    "target_label": "ProtocolTreasury (wstETH)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "f(x) Protocol v2 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "f(x) protocol v2 f-x-protocol-v2 leveraged eth / stablecoin fxusd fxn 0x32356fe312eba9b7d6a157ad28d1ca91b571cda6",
   "slug": "f-x-protocol-v2",
   "summary_short": "Treasury admin sits with the Ops and Emergency Safes, not the 3-day Timelock",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/f-x-protocol-v2/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Synthetic Dollar",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.falcon.finance/mechanism/redemptions/: 'This is not to be confused with unstaking, where users can unstake their sUSDf and receive USDf in return immediately.'",
    "observed": "sUSDf (0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0).cooldownDuration() = 0; asset() = USDf (0xFa2B947eEc368f42195f24F36d2aF29f7c24CeC2); totalSupply() = 33,273,012.15 sUSDf (USDf 1,516,215,860.42). Context, not compared with documentation: USDf and sUSDf are EIP-1967 proxies whose admins (0x3Ef1127Fdf81B553066daE0FaEA58785A2AA6E14, 0x16a2605C026BFe4f4B7f4471933714D9b2149AcE) both return owner() = 4-of-6 Safe 0x1E482B60bf19Cb1cc859389e0eA3DED153f16Bd7.",
    "recordId": "falcon-susdf-zero-cooldown-instant-unstake-s17",
    "surface": "sUSDf cooldownDuration() = 0 — instant unstaking to USDf"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "falcon-susdf-zero-cooldown-instant-unstake-s17: … 0x16a2605C026BFe4f4B7f4471933714D9b2149AcE) both return owner() = 4-of-6 Safe 0x1E482B60bf19Cb1cc859389e0eA3DED153f16Bd7.",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "sUSDf cooldownDuration() = 0 — instant unstaking to USDf",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Falcon Finance (USDf / sUSDf)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26418060,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c",
    "block_number": 26418060,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "cooldownDuration()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "falcon-susdf-zero-cooldown-instant-unstake-s17",
    "repro_calldata": "0x35269315",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x35269315",
    "target_contract": "0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0",
    "target_label": "Falcon sUSDf vault"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Falcon Finance (USDf / sUSDf) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "falcon finance (usdf / susdf) falcon-finance-usdf-susdf synthetic dollar usdf susdf 0xc8cf6d7991f15525488b2a83df53468d682ba4b0",
   "slug": "falcon-finance-usdf-susdf",
   "summary_short": "sUSDf cooldown is zero, so unstaking to USDf is instant, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/falcon-finance-usdf-susdf/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Modular Lending & DEX Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "fluid-permissions-and-mutability.md describes narrow fee/reward/magnifier team multisig scope outside migration grants.",
    "observed": "isVaultAuth(vault, 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e) returns true on Vault 76 (0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8), Vault 110 (0xee327311D8640156E87eC33ea55FcbF2309e0ce6), Vault 111 (0x984636a30ed2B4A61FB7150CED644096349275d3), and Vault 144 (0x0e19B64F3A79FeeE12Df1b6f239929c6ab6C7ED0) per IGP-98 / IGP-126 migration configuration.",
    "recordId": "fluid-instadapp-vault-factory-auth",
    "surface": "VaultFactory.isVaultAuth Migration Scope"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "VaultFactory.isVaultAuth Migration Scope: docs say fluid-permissions-and-mutability.md describes narrow fee/reward/magnifier team multisig scope outside migration grants. · chain says isVaultAuth(vault, 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e) returns true on Vault 76 (0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8), Vault 110 (0xee327311D8640156E87eC33ea55FcbF2309e0ce6), Vault 111 (0x984636a30ed2B4A6…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Fluid / Instadapp",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401405,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510",
    "block_number": 26401405,
    "call_args": [
     "0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8",
     "0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e"
    ],
    "call_signature": "isVaultAuth(address,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "fluid-instadapp-vault-factory-auth",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe04c8e5d0000000000000000000000007fe0b032cb5982af72498f96be3dd6566f7b7de80000000000000000000000004f6f977acdd1177dcd81ab83074855ecb9c2d49e",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe04c8e5d",
    "target_contract": "0x324c5Dc1fC42c7a4D43d92df1eBA58a54d13Bf2d",
    "target_label": "VaultFactory"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Fluid / Instadapp control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "fluid / instadapp fluid-instadapp modular lending & dex vaults fluid inst 0x324c5dc1fc42c7a4d43d92df1eba58a54d13bf2d",
   "slug": "fluid-instadapp",
   "summary_short": "Migration auth is live on four vaults, beyond the documented multisig scope",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/fluid-instadapp/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking & Monetary Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.frax.com (frxETH addresses): 'Multisigs / Chain / Name / Contract / Ethereum / Comptroller / 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C'",
    "observed": "frxETHMinter 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138: owner() = Comptroller 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C (4-of-7 Safe), nominatedOwner() = 0; not upgradeable.",
    "recordId": "frax-ether-comptroller-owns-frxethminter-s20",
    "surface": "frxETHMinter owner: the documented Comptroller"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "frax-ether-upgrade-timelock-24h-s20: owner of ProxyAdmin 0x223a681fc5c5522c85C96157c0efA18cd6c5405c, the EIP-1967 admin of both Ethereum lockboxes.",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a 1h–47h delay (1d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "frax-ether-upgrade-timelock-24h-s20: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "frxETHMinter owner: the documented Comptroller",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "frax-ether-comptroller-owns-frxethminter-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138",
    "target_label": "frxETHMinter"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability moderate; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "frax ether (frxeth / sfrxeth) frax-ether-sfrxeth liquid staking & monetary infrastructure frxeth sfrxeth fxs 0xb1748c79709f4ba2dd82834b8c82d4a505003f27 0xb898ad2976b4d8f2e21521c9db16b7497825e503 0xbafa44efe7901e04e39dad13167d089c559c1138",
   "slug": "frax-ether-sfrxeth",
   "summary_short": "frxETHMinter owner is the documented Comptroller",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/frax-ether-sfrxeth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Fiat-Redeemable Stablecoin (frxUSD) & Yield Vault",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.frax.com (frxUSD): 'The Frax DAO retains ownership and ultimate control of the protocol and may amend or revoke delegated authority at any time.' / addresses: 'frxUSD Chain type Address Ethereum Native 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29'",
    "observed": "frxUSD 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x0b2C3dF006b2bd43cBCC60075e7a0bf314474eD6, owner() = Timelock 0xb898Ad2976b4d8f2E21521C9db16b7497825E503 (Sourcify exact match): delay() = 86400s (1 day), admin() = Safe 0xfFFffF4F3baC444b2C0ecf2A1840d018bE783937 (4-of-7, v1.3.0); frxUSD owner() is the same Safe directly.",
    "recordId": "frax-usd-frxusd-admin-upgrades-1d-timelock-s23",
    "surface": "frxUSD upgrades: ProxyAdmin owned by a 1-day timelock run by the 4-of-7 Frax Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "frax-usd-sfrxusd-proxyadmin-safe-3of5-s23: sfrxUSD 0xcf62F905562626CfcDD2261162a51fd02Fc9c5b6: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xeA0a6EC8114a0Af6Cf74Ca0036Ab31d892Df13cB, owner() = Safe …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: no timelock in front of upgrades"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "frax-usd-sfrxusd-proxyadmin-safe-3of5-s23: sfrxUSD 0xcf62F905562626CfcDD2261162a51fd02Fc9c5b6: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xeA0a6EC8114a0Af6Cf74Ca0036Ab31d892Df13cB, owner() = Safe …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "frax-usd-sfrxusd-proxyadmin-safe-3of5-s23: … 0xB1748C79709f4Ba2Dd82834B8c82D4a505003f27 (3-of-5, v1.3.0; no timelock); timelockAddress() …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "frxUSD upgrades: ProxyAdmin owned by a 1-day timelock run by the 4-of-7 Frax Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Frax USD (frxUSD)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26431152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46",
    "block_number": 26431152,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "frax-usd-frxusd-admin-upgrades-1d-timelock-s23",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103",
    "target_contract": "0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29",
    "target_label": "frxUSD (TransparentUpgradeableProxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Frax USD (frxUSD) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "frax usd (frxusd) frax-usd-frxusd fiat-redeemable stablecoin (frxusd) & yield vault frxusd sfrxusd 0x831822660572bd54ebaa065c2acef662a6277d40 0xcacd6fd266af91b8aed52accc382b4e165586e29 0xcf62f905562626cfcdd2261162a51fd02fc9c5b6",
   "slug": "frax-usd-frxusd",
   "summary_short": "Upgrades go through a 1-day timelock run by the 4-of-7 Frax Safe",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/frax-usd-frxusd/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Leveraged Credit & Curated Lending",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.gearbox.finance states technical changes are 'behind a 2-day timelock' (172800s) and lists InstanceManager multisig as '4-of-12 (Subject to chain-specific configuration)'.",
    "observed": "LegacyTimelock (0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b) delay() = 129600s (36 hours, GIP-104), admin() = LegacyGovernor (0x29B97F37B3E0C704bCFD785F5b7bBa2A0B7df2c7); InstanceManager (0x77777777144339Bdc3aCceE992D8d4D31734CB2e) owner() = 4-of-21 Gnosis Safe (0x1E9ec044853611F4bCD4BBcFE7657508BD1c53D3); Tech (0xA7D5DDc1b8557914F158076b228AA91eF613f1D5, 6-of-12), Veto (0xbb803559B4D58b75E12dd74641AB955e8B0Df40E, 4-of-12), Treasury (0x7b065Fcb0760dF0CEA8CFd144e08554F3CeA73D1, 5-of-10), and Fee (0x3E965117A51186e41c2BB58b729A1e518A715e5F, 5-of-10) Guard Safes match documented thresholds.",
    "recordId": "gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe",
    "surface": "LegacyTimelock Delay & InstanceManager Safe Quorum"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe: observed_delay_seconds = 129600",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d 12h minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe: … (0xbb803559B4D58b75E12dd74641AB955e8B0Df40E, 4-of-12), Treasury (0x7b065Fcb0760dF0CEA8CFd144e08554F3CeA73D1, …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-12"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 2 d · chain says 36 h",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Gearbox V3 / V3.1",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403523,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a",
    "block_number": 26403523,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "delay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe",
    "repro_calldata": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "target_contract": "0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b",
    "target_label": "Gearbox LegacyTimelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Gearbox V3 / V3.1 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "gearbox v3 / v3.1 gearbox-v3-v3-1 leveraged credit & curated lending gear 0xa133c9a92fb8ddb962af1cbae58b2723a0bdf23b",
   "slug": "gearbox-v3-v3-1",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs 2 days · chain 36 hours",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/gearbox-v3-v3-1/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Onchain Capital Allocator (Sky Star)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.grove.finance (allocator permissions, governance addresses): 'DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Grants and revokes all other roles.' / 'Grove SubProxy ( GROVE_PROXY) 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba'",
    "observed": "ALMProxy 0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E, MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5 and RateLimits 0x5F5cfCB8a463868E37Ab27B5eFF3ba02112dF19a: hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Grove SubProxy 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba) = true; CONTROLLER on the ALMProxy and RateLimits = the MainnetController; none of the three is a proxy.",
    "recordId": "grove-finance-alm-admin-subproxy-s21",
    "surface": "Role admin over allocator custody: Grove SubProxy (Sky governance)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "grove-finance-freezer-safe-2of5-s21: … 0xB0113804960345fd0a245788b3423319c86940e5) = true; that Safe is 2-of-5 (v1.4.1, no modules).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "grove-finance-freezer-safe-2of5-s21: MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5: hasRole(FREEZER, 0xB0113804960345fd0a245788b3423319c86940e5) = true; that Safe is 2-of-5 (v1.4.1 …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-5)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Role admin over allocator custody: Grove SubProxy (Sky governance)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Grove Finance",
   "pinnedBlock": 26427612,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac",
    "block_number": 26427612,
    "call_args": [
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
     "0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba"
    ],
    "call_signature": "hasRole(bytes32,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "grove-finance-alm-admin-subproxy-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x91d1485400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001369f7b2b38c76b6478c0f0e66d94923421891ba",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x91d14854",
    "target_contract": "0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E",
    "target_label": "Grove ALMProxy (custody of allocator funds)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Grove Finance control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "grove finance grove-finance onchain capital allocator (sky star) grove stgrove 0x491edfb0b8b608044e227225c715981a30f3a44e 0xfd9dea9a8d5b955649579af482db7198a392a9f5",
   "slug": "grove-finance",
   "summary_short": "Allocator custody role admin is the Grove SubProxy under Sky governance",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/grove-finance/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Yield-Bearing Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.infinifi.xyz (roles documentation): 'PAUSE / Pause protocol functions / GOVERNOR / UNPAUSE / Unpause functions / GOVERNOR'",
    "observed": "InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490: getRoleAdmin(UNPAUSE) = getRoleAdmin(PAUSE) = keccak256(\"MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER\") (0x9849206c..6512), whose members are the Team Multisig 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c and the Long Timelock; GOVERNOR is not the admin of either role.",
    "recordId": "infinifi-pause-role-admin-minor-roles-s20",
    "surface": "PAUSE / UNPAUSE role admin: MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER, not GOVERNOR"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 604800s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "infinifi-pause-role-admin-minor-roles-s20: InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490: getRoleAdmin(UNPAUSE) = getRoleAdmin(PAUSE) = keccak256(\"MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER\") (0x9849206c..6512) …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (4-of-N Safe)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "PAUSE / UNPAUSE role admin: MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER, not GOVERNOR: docs say docs.infinifi.xyz (roles documentation): 'PAUSE / Pause protocol functions / GOVERNOR / UNPAUSE / Unpause functions / GOVERNOR' · chain says InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490: getRoleAdmin(UNPAUSE) = getRoleAdmin(PAUSE) = keccak256(\"MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER\") (0x9849206c..6512), whose members are the Team Multisig 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b1…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "infiniFi",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [
     "0xe7276a2a84d8de556657ec9cf93a55a7d66f096e529d0582ed08e9e2208b92b5"
    ],
    "call_signature": "getRoleAdmin(bytes32)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "infinifi-pause-role-admin-minor-roles-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0x248a9ca3e7276a2a84d8de556657ec9cf93a55a7d66f096e529d0582ed08e9e2208b92b5",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x248a9ca3",
    "target_contract": "0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490",
    "target_label": "InfiniFiCore role registry"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "infiniFi control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "infinifi infinifi yield-bearing stablecoin iusd siusd liusd 0x3d18480cc32b6ab3b833dcabd80e76cfd41c48a9 0x80608f852d152024c0a2087b16939235fec2400c 0xf6d48735eccf12bdc1df2674b1ce3fcb3bd25490",
   "slug": "infinifi",
   "summary_short": "Pause roles are administered by MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER; docs say GOVERNOR",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/infinifi/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Fixed-Rate Lending",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Working-groups governance documentation lists 5-of-9 Policy Committee multisig.",
    "observed": "GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h).",
    "recordId": "inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe",
    "surface": "Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe: observed_delay_seconds = 172800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe: … getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe: GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (4-of-7)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock: docs say Working-groups governance documentation lists 5-of-9 Policy Committee multisig. · chain says GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold(…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Inverse Finance (FiRM)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26406106,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x8bf896b892683ff3267b88b367ab015a70cf5caf53542eb405f4f648f6bcde8a",
    "block_number": 26399876,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7",
    "target_label": "Policy Committee Safe"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Inverse Finance (FiRM) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "inverse finance (firm) inverse-finance-firm fixed-rate lending dola inv firm 0x01eca33e20a4c379bd8a5361f896a7dd2bae4ce8 0x4b6c63e6a94ef26e2df60b89372db2d8e211f1b7",
   "slug": "inverse-finance-firm",
   "summary_short": "Policy Committee Safe: docs 5-of-9 · chain 4-of-7",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/inverse-finance-firm/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Kelp DAO security & contract documentation specifies 10-day TimelockController upgrade governance and multisig admin.",
    "observed": "rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78), owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1, getMinDelay() = 864000s / 10d); LRTConfig (0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7) DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by 6-of-11 Safe (0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d); rsETH totalSupply = 338,071.33 rsETH.",
    "recordId": "kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock",
    "surface": "ProxyAdmin 10d Timelock & LRTConfig Admin Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock: rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78), owner() = TimelockController …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (10d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 864000s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "10d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock: … (0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7) DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by 6-of-11 Safe (0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-11"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "ProxyAdmin 10d Timelock & LRTConfig Admin Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Kelp DAO (rsETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26406106,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc",
    "block_number": 26402160,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1",
    "target_label": "KelpTimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Kelp DAO (rsETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "kelp dao (rseth) kelp-dao-rseth liquid restaking rseth 0x49bd9989e31ad35b0a62c20be86335196a3135b1 0xa1290d69c65a6fe4df752f95823fae25cb99e5a7",
   "slug": "kelp-dao-rseth",
   "summary_short": "ProxyAdmin sits behind a 10-day timelock; config admin Safe as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/kelp-dao-rseth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Cross-Chain Messaging (Endpoint & Message Libraries)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.layerzero.network (endpoint): 'The LayerZero Endpoint is the immutable, permissionless protocol entrypoint for sending and receiving omnichain messages.' / 'The LayerZero Endpoint is the single, immutable entry and exit point for cross‑chain messaging, built on five core modules:'",
    "observed": "EndpointV2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c (Ethereum; Sourcify match): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x0 (not a proxy); the Base endpoint at the same address is also not a proxy.",
    "recordId": "layerzero-v2-endpoint-immutable-s25",
    "surface": "EndpointV2: not a proxy; its code cannot be replaced"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "layerzero-v2-endpoint-immutable-s25: EndpointV2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c (Ethereum; Sourcify match): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x0 (not a proxy)",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "EndpointV2: not a proxy; its code cannot be replaced",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "LayerZero V2",
   "pinnedBlock": 26434786,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "layerzero-v2-endpoint-immutable-s25",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c",
    "target_label": "LayerZero EndpointV2 (Ethereum)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "LayerZero V2 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "layerzero v2 layerzero-v2 cross-chain messaging (endpoint & message libraries) zro layerzero endpointv2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c 0xbb2ea70c9e858123480642cf96acbcce1372dce1",
   "slug": "layerzero-v2",
   "summary_short": "Endpoint is immutable; a 5-of-9 multisig sets the message defaults, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/layerzero-v2/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Blue-Chip Liquid Staking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "lidofinance/dual-governance deploy-config-mainnet.toml, lidofinance/docs committee specs, and forum record 10032.",
    "observed": "EmergencyProtectedTimelock (0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316) getAfterSubmitDelay() = 259200s (3d), getAfterScheduleDelay() = 86400s (1d), getGovernance() = DualGovernance (0xC1db28B3301331277e307FDCfF8DE28242A4486E), getEmergencyProtectionDetails() = (2592000, 0, 1813449600); Emergency Activation (0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45, 4-of-7 Safe), Emergency Execution (0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF, 5-of-7 Safe), Reseal (0xFFe21561251c49AdccFad065C94Fb4931dF49081, 5-of-6 Safe), and CircuitBreaker (0x8772E3a2D86B9347A2688f9bc1808A6d8917760C, 3-of-6 Safe); stETH totalSupply = 9,759,371.53 stETH.",
    "recordId": "lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock",
    "surface": "EmergencyProtectedTimelock Delays, DualGovernance & Committee Safes"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock: observed_delay_seconds = 259200",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "3d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock: … (0x8772E3a2D86B9347A2688f9bc1808A6d8917760C, 3-of-6 Safe); stETH totalSupply = 9,759,371.53 …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "EmergencyProtectedTimelock Delays, DualGovernance & Committee Safes",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Lido (stETH / Dual Governance)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403121,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c",
    "block_number": 26403121,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getAfterSubmitDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0x709105d7",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x709105d7",
    "target_contract": "0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316",
    "target_label": "EmergencyProtectedTimelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Lido (stETH / Dual Governance) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "lido (steth / dual governance) lido-steth-dual-governance blue-chip liquid staking steth wsteth ldo 0xce0425301c85c5ea2a0873a2dee44d78e02d2316",
   "slug": "lido-steth-dual-governance",
   "summary_short": "Dual Governance timelock delays and committee Safes match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/lido-steth-dual-governance/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Institutional Liquid Staking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.liquidcollective.io (ETH FAQs): 'An administrative multisig is made up of a variety of Liquid Collective ecosystem participants.'",
    "observed": "River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549) EIP-1967 admin slot = Firewall 0x3A5b4db174a3CC17d8cE40C5B04272737195151b, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0x8EE3fC0Bcd7B57429203751C5bE5fdf1AB8409f3 (4-of-7, v1.3.0, no modules); getAdmin() = Firewall 0xd745A68c705F5aa75DFf528540678288ed2aD9eE, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0xE3208Aa9d1186c1D1C8A5b76E794b2B68E6cb3a5 (4-of-7, the same 7 owners, no modules); the Firewall executor Safe 0xDE55C9dc78f985fE1502484Cb98EBfAB66A56B62 (2-of-3) may call pause() but not unpause() or upgradeTo(address). Implementation RiverV1 0x0056f9ed62dAa4dc3F972340C92326AcCddd1a9D (version() = 1.3.0).",
    "recordId": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19",
    "surface": "River (LsETH) upgrade and admin Firewalls are administered by 4-of-7 Safes"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19: River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549) EIP-1967 admin slot = Firewall 0x3A5b4db174a3CC17d8cE40C5B04272737195151b, whose getAdmin() is Safe …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: upgraded by a Safe directly (a Safe has no delay of its own) (1 other upgrade path not determined)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19: River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549) EIP-1967 admin slot = Firewall 0x3A5b4db174a3CC17d8cE40C5B04272737195151b, whose getAdmin() is Safe …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19: … 0xDE55C9dc78f985fE1502484Cb98EBfAB66A56B62 (2-of-3) may call pause() but not unpause() …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-3"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19: the Firewall executor Safe 0xDE55C9dc78f985fE1502484Cb98EBfAB66A56B62 (2-of-3) may call pause() but not unpause() or upgradeTo(address). Implementation RiverV1 …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-3)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "River (LsETH) upgrade and admin Firewalls are administered by 4-of-7 Safes",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Liquid Collective (LsETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26422243,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410",
    "block_number": 26422243,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103",
    "target_contract": "0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549",
    "target_label": "River (LsETH) proxy"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Liquid Collective (LsETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "liquid collective (lseth) liquid-collective-lseth institutional liquid staking lseth liquid collective 0x8c1bed5b9a0928467c9b1341da1d7bd5e10b6549",
   "slug": "liquid-collective-lseth",
   "summary_short": "Upgrade and admin firewalls are run by 4-of-7 Safes, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/liquid-collective-lseth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Interest-Free ETH-Backed Borrowing",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.liquity.org (Liquity V1, borrowing): 'This is a protocol parameter that is set to `110%`.' / Recovery Mode: 'During Recovery Mode, Troves with a collateral ratio below 150% can be liquidated.'",
    "observed": "TroveManager 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: MCR() = 1100000000000000000 (110%), CCR() = 1500000000000000000 (150%); compile-time constants of a contract with no owner and no proxy.",
    "recordId": "liquity-v1-lusd-collateral-ratios-110-150-s22",
    "surface": "Liquidation thresholds: 110% minimum, 150% in Recovery Mode"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "liquity-v1-lusd-core-ownership-renounced-s22: … 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: owner() = 0x0; BorrowerOperations 0x24179CD81c9e782A4096035f7eC97fB8B783e007, …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Immutable or ownership renounced"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Liquidation thresholds: 110% minimum, 150% in Recovery Mode",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Liquity V1 (LUSD)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26429396,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71",
    "block_number": 26429396,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "MCR()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "liquity-v1-lusd-collateral-ratios-110-150-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0x794e5724",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x794e5724",
    "target_contract": "0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2",
    "target_label": "Liquity V1 TroveManager"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Liquity V1 (LUSD) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "liquity v1 (lusd) liquity-v1-lusd interest-free eth-backed borrowing lusd lqty 0xa39739ef8b0231dbfa0dcda07d7e29faabcf4bb2",
   "slug": "liquity-v1-lusd",
   "summary_short": "Liquidation thresholds are 110% and 150% in Recovery Mode, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/liquity-v1-lusd/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Immutable CDP Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Liquity V2 immutability and non-upgradeable core specification.",
    "observed": "BOLD.owner() = 0x0; Governance (0x807DEf5E7d057DF05C796F4bc75C3Fe82Bd6EeE1) owner() = 0x0; CollateralRegistry (0xf949982B91C8c61e952B3bA942cbbfaef5386684) EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x00...00.",
    "recordId": "liquity-v2-bold-immutability",
    "surface": "Sampled Owner & EIP-1967 Slot Alignment"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "liquity-v2-bold-immutability: CollateralRegistry (0xf949982B91C8c61e952B3bA942cbbfaef5386684) EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x00...00.",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Owner & EIP-1967 Slot Alignment",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Liquity V2 (BOLD)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401540,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641",
    "block_number": 26401540,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "liquity-v2-bold-immutability",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x6440f144b7e50D6a8439336510312d2F54beB01D",
    "target_label": "BOLD Token"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Liquity V2 (BOLD) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "liquity v2 (bold) liquity-v2-bold immutable cdp stablecoin bold lqty 0x6440f144b7e50d6a8439336510312d2f54beb01d",
   "slug": "liquity-v2-bold",
   "summary_short": "Sampled owner and proxy slots match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/liquity-v2-bold/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Institutional BTCfi / Liquid Staked Bitcoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.lombard.finance/learn/transparency/smart-contracts states 'Each Proxy Upgrade Timelock enforces a 24-hour minimum delay on contract upgrades.'",
    "observed": "LBTC (0x8236a87084f8B84306f72007F36F2618A5634494) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xbae061C73876952aa2C5e483B74DfA785425f879), whose owner() — along with AssetRouter ProxyAdmin (0xBf4202c8a0d852D432266dfE112ED624a1a36754) and Consortium ProxyAdmin (0x1629AE77cC70DaAc95Ec479caAEA23ECE77c67c5) — resolves to TimelockController (0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59, getMinDelay() = 86400s / 24h, EXECUTOR_ROLE held by 3-of-5 Safe 0x251a604E8E8f6906d60f8dedC5aAeb8CD38F4892 with Guard 0x87bde523e05Fee2C557d6F592F7EB686C69189Ab); LBTC totalSupply = 6,203.54 LBTC (8 dec).",
    "recordId": "lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock",
    "surface": "Sampled Core ProxyAdmin Wiring & 24h TimelockController"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock: LBTC (0x8236a87084f8B84306f72007F36F2618A5634494) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xbae061C73876952aa2C5e483B74DfA785425f879), whose owner() — along with …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a 1h–47h delay (1d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 86400s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock: … 86400s / 24h, EXECUTOR_ROLE held by 3-of-5 Safe 0x251a604E8E8f6906d60f8dedC5aAeb8CD38F4892 …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Core ProxyAdmin Wiring & 24h TimelockController",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Lombard (LBTC)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26407707,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a",
    "block_number": 26403523,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59",
    "target_label": "Lombard TimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Lombard (LBTC) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability moderate; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "lombard (lbtc) lombard-lbtc institutional btcfi / liquid staked bitcoin lbtc 0x055e84e7fe8955e2781010b866f10ef6e1e77e59 0xc3ecfe771564e3f28cfb7a9b203f4d10279338ed",
   "slug": "lombard-lbtc",
   "summary_short": "Core ProxyAdmin wiring and 24-hour timelock match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/lombard-lbtc/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Stablecoin Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.m0.org/raw/protocol/m-token.md: 'The MToken contract itself is designed to be immutable, meaning its core logic cannot be upgraded directly.'",
    "observed": "MToken (0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b) EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots are both 0 (no EIP-1967 proxy); name() = 'M by M^0', totalSupply() = 249,955,861.65 M (6 decimals); ttgRegistrar() = Registrar (0x119FbeeDD4F4f4298Fb59B720d5654442b81ae2c), minterGateway() = MinterGateway (0xf7f9638cb444D65e5A40bF5ff98ebE4ff319F04E).",
    "recordId": "m0-mtoken-no-eip1967-proxy-immutable-s17",
    "surface": "MToken: no EIP-1967 proxy slots (immutable core logic)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "m0-ttg-registrar-governors-match-docs-s17: EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0. MinterGateway.ttgRegistrar() returns the same Registrar.",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "MToken: no EIP-1967 proxy slots (immutable core logic)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "M0 Protocol ($M)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26418060,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c",
    "block_number": 26418060,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "m0-mtoken-no-eip1967-proxy-immutable-s17",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b",
    "target_label": "M0 MToken ($M)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "M0 Protocol ($M) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "m0 protocol ($m) m0-protocol-m stablecoin infrastructure m m0 mtoken 0x119fbeedd4f4f4298fb59b720d5654442b81ae2c 0x866a2bf4e572cbcf37d5071a7a58503bfb36be1b",
   "slug": "m0-protocol-m",
   "summary_short": "MToken has no proxy slots: immutable core logic, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/m0-protocol-m/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking & Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.mantle.xyz/meth/concepts/risk-management/upgradability-and-timelock.md previously noted 'The timelock is configured with a default delay of 0' (live deployment enforces stricter 3-day UpgradeTimelock).",
    "observed": "mETH (0xd5F7838F5C461fefF7FE49ea5ebaF7728bB0ADfa) & Staking (0xe3cBd06D7dadB3F4e6557bAb7EdD924CD1489E8f) EIP-1967 admin slots point to UpgradeTimelock (0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3 days) and PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-14 Security Council Safe (0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f); mETH totalSupply = 217,256.94 mETH.",
    "recordId": "mantle-lsp-meth-upgrade-timelock",
    "surface": "Core Proxy EIP-1967 Admin Slot & 3-Day UpgradeTimelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 259200s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "3d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "mantle-lsp-meth-upgrade-timelock: … (3 days) and PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-14 Security Council Safe (0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-14"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 0 s (no delay) · chain says 3 d",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Mantle Liquid Staking (mETH / cmETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403121,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c",
    "block_number": 26403121,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "mantle-lsp-meth-upgrade-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2",
    "target_label": "Mantle UpgradeTimelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Mantle Liquid Staking (mETH / cmETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "mantle liquid staking (meth / cmeth) mantle-liquid-staking-meth-cmeth liquid staking & restaking meth cmeth 0xc26016f1166be7b6c5611aab104122e0f6c2ace2",
   "slug": "mantle-liquid-staking-meth-cmeth",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs none · chain 3 days (stricter)",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/mantle-liquid-staking-meth-cmeth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Institutional Credit / RWA",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Governor admin actions documentation describes GovernorTimelock (3-day delay) governance path.",
    "observed": "EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec).",
    "recordId": "maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin",
    "surface": "EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin: EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock: docs say Governor admin actions documentation describes GovernorTimelock (3-day delay) governance path. · chain says EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Maple Finance V2 / Syrup",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401540,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641",
    "block_number": 26401540,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103",
    "target_contract": "0xBe10aDcE8B6E3E02Db384E7FaDA5395DD113D8b3",
    "target_label": "PoolPermissionManager"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Maple Finance V2 / Syrup control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "maple finance v2 / syrup maple-finance-v2-syrup institutional credit / rwa syrup syrupusdc syrupusdt 0xbe10adce8b6e3e02db384e7fada5395dd113d8b3",
   "slug": "maple-finance-v2-syrup",
   "summary_short": "Proxy admin is the 4-of-7 DAO Safe; docs describe a 3-day GovernorTimelock",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/maple-finance-v2-syrup/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Restaking / Curated Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "lidofinance/docs (earn/deployment-contracts.md line 199) lists 3/6 multisig; Mellow Core Vault docs describe bounded curator permissions.",
    "observed": "getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe); DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on earnETH (0x6a37725ca7f4CE81c004c955f7280d5C704a249e) and earnUSD (0x014e6DA8F283C4aF65B2AA0f201438680A004452) held by 5-of-8 Lazy Vault Admin Safe (0x0Dd73341d6158a72b4D224541f1094188f57076E, Timelock 0x363Ba8843d06BA5968f55C26aB055162eDd62189 getMinDelay = 0s), where all 5 Curator signers are Lazy Vault Admin owners.",
    "recordId": "mellow-lido-earn-curator-quorum",
    "surface": "Curator Safe Quorum & Lazy Admin Signer Overlap"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 0s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "mellow-lido-earn-curator-quorum: getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe); DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Curator Safe Quorum & Lazy Admin Signer Overlap: docs say lidofinance/docs (earn/deployment-contracts.md line 199) lists 3/6 multisig; · chain says getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Mellow Protocol / Lido Earn",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401312,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109",
    "block_number": 26401312,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "mellow-lido-earn-curator-quorum",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0xe5abcc40196174Ae0d12153dE286F0D8E401769d",
    "target_label": "Mellow Curator Safe"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Mellow Protocol / Lido Earn control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "mellow protocol / lido earn mellow-protocol-lido-earn liquid restaking / curated vaults mellow lido earn 0xe5abcc40196174ae0d12153de286f0d8e401769d",
   "slug": "mellow-protocol-lido-earn",
   "summary_short": "Curator Safe: docs 3-of-6 · chain 3-of-5",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/mellow-protocol-lido-earn/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Curated Lending Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Peer Re7 curated vault architecture and Aragon guardian integration.",
    "observed": "Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian).",
    "recordId": "metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity",
    "surface": "Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity: observed_delay_seconds = 259200",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "3d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity: … 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-4"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity: Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-4)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration: docs say Peer Re7 curated vault architecture and Aragon guardian integration. · chain says Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401405,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510",
    "block_number": 26401405,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "guardian()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity",
    "repro_calldata": "0x452a9320",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x452a9320",
    "target_contract": "0x78Fc2c2eD1A4cDb5402365934aE5648aDAd094d0",
    "target_label": "MetaMorpho Re7 WETH"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "metamorpho (re7 weth vs. re7 usdt) metamorpho-re7-weth-vs-re7-usdt curated lending vaults re7weth re7usdt metamorpho 0x78fc2c2ed1a4cdb5402365934ae5648adad094d0",
   "slug": "metamorpho-re7-weth-vs-re7-usdt",
   "summary_short": "Re7 WETH vault has no guardian; its owner is a 2-of-4 Safe with a 3-day timelock",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/metamorpho-re7-weth-vs-re7-usdt/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Base Lending & Borrowing",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.'",
    "observed": "Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05.",
    "recordId": "moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18",
    "surface": "Comptroller pauseGuardian = 2-of-4 Safe (Constitution: pause = Security Council 3-of-5)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "moonwell-temporal-governor-24h-security-council-3of5-s18: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18: … (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-4"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18: Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1)",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (2-of-4)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Comptroller pauseGuardian = 2-of-4 Safe (Constitution: pause = Security Council 3-of-5): docs say Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... · chain says Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Moonwell Lending (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57842915,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129",
    "block_number": 57842915,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "pauseGuardian()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0x24a3d622",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x24a3d622",
    "target_contract": "0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C",
    "target_label": "Moonwell Unitroller (Comptroller proxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Moonwell Lending (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "moonwell lending (base) moonwell-lending-base base lending & borrowing well 0xfbb21d0380bee3312b33c4353c8936a0f13ef26c",
   "slug": "moonwell-lending-base",
   "summary_short": "Pause guardian: docs 3-of-5 Security Council · chain 2-of-4 Safe",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/moonwell-lending-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Base Lending Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Morpho Blue core singleton ownership and immutable fee/LLTV bound specification.",
    "observed": "Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070.",
    "recordId": "morpho-blue-singleton-owner",
    "surface": "Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Morpho Blue Core",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401070,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234",
    "block_number": 26401070,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "morpho-blue-singleton-owner",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb",
    "target_label": "Morpho Blue Singleton"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Morpho Blue Core control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "morpho blue core morpho-blue-core base lending infrastructure morpho 0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb",
   "slug": "morpho-blue-core",
   "summary_short": "Singleton owner and fee and LLTV bounds match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/morpho-blue-core/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Discretionary Mutual / Cover",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.nexusmutual.io/governance/: 'Three votes in favour carry the proposal, at which point voting closes and the timelock starts.' and 'A 24-hour timelock runs before a carried proposal can be executed.'",
    "observed": "Governor (0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32, EIP-1967 proxy; implementation Governor 0xcafea466bF6dEFe480cdd54056C020c63b7DA830, Sourcify exact_match): TIMELOCK_PERIOD() = 86400s, VOTING_PERIOD() = 259200s, ADVISORY_BOARD_THRESHOLD() = 3. Registry (0xcafea2c575550512582090AA06d0a069E7236b9e, ADVISORY_BOARD_SEATS() = 5) lists the Governor at contract index 2, is the proxyOwner() of all 10 module proxies resolved through NXMaster.getLatestAddress (GV, P1, MR, TC, CO, SP, RA, AS, CI, LO), and is itself an EIP-1967 proxy administered by the Governor; its verified upgradeContract is onlyGovernor. Pause: getPauseConfig() = 0; isEmergencyAdmin() is true for 6 EOAs (the 5 Advisory Board seat holders and 0x6fe2c2643cb5064951fb7dd87fbce4777fb146e3), and a pause needs one admin to propose and another to confirm. Context, not compared: the legacy NXMaster (0x01BFd82675DBCc7762C84019cA518e701C0cD07e) is owned by the legacy Governance proxy (0x4A5C681dDC32acC6ccA51ac17e9d461e6be87900) running TemporaryGovernance, whose advisoryBoardMultisig (0x51ad1265C8702c9e96Ea61Fe4088C2e22eD4418e, 3-of-5 Safe owned by the 5 seat holders) can execute any call through it without a timelock; the docs list NXMaster and Governance as legacy.",
    "recordId": "nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18",
    "surface": "Governor: 3 Advisory Board votes + 24h timelock; Registry upgrades every module"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18: … (0x51ad1265C8702c9e96Ea61Fe4088C2e22eD4418e, 3-of-5 Safe owned by the 5 seat holders) can …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18: isEmergencyAdmin() is true for 6 EOAs (the 5 Advisory Board seat holders and 0x6fe2c2643cb5064951fb7dd87fbce4777fb146e3), and a pause needs one admin to propose …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-5)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Governor: 3 Advisory Board votes + 24h timelock; Registry upgrades every module",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Nexus Mutual",
   "pinnedBlock": 26421541,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d",
    "block_number": 26421541,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "TIMELOCK_PERIOD()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0x4a5bcbf8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x4a5bcbf8",
    "target_contract": "0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32",
    "target_label": "Nexus Mutual Governor"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Nexus Mutual control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "nexus mutual nexus-mutual discretionary mutual / cover nxm wnxm nexus mutual 0xcafea6063d4ec6b045d9676e58897c1f0882ca32",
   "slug": "nexus-mutual",
   "summary_short": "Governance needs 3 Advisory Board votes plus a 24-hour timelock, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/nexus-mutual/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Distributed Validator Infrastructure & Governance Token",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.obol.org (token distribution; OBOL token): 'The total supply is capped at 500 million tokens.' / 'The official token contract address of the OBOL Token is 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7'",
    "observed": "ObolToken 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 (Sourcify exact match): totalSupply() = 500000000000000103303500000 (500,000,000.0000001033035 OBOL); mint() has no supply cap; MINTER_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by Safe 0x42D201CC4d9C1e31c032397F54caCE2f48C1FA72 (2-of-3, v1.3.0), not by the timelock.",
    "recordId": "obol-network-token-supply-cap-s24",
    "surface": "OBOL supply: documented cap of 500M, no cap on-chain; a 2-of-3 Safe holds MINTER_ROLE"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 432000s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "5d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "obol-network-stobol-withdraw-delay-s24: … 0x7E90E03654732ABedF89Faf87f05BcD03ACEeFdC (1-of-2, v1.4.1).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 1-of-2"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "OBOL supply: documented cap of 500M, no cap on-chain; a 2-of-3 Safe holds MINTER_ROLE: docs say docs.obol.org (token distribution; · chain says ObolToken 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 (Sourcify exact match): totalSupply() = 500000000000000103303500000 (500,000,000.0000001033035 OBOL);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Obol Network",
   "pinnedBlock": 26433001,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7",
    "block_number": 26433001,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "totalSupply()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "obol-network-token-supply-cap-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0x18160ddd",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x18160ddd",
    "target_contract": "0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7",
    "target_label": "ObolToken"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Obol Network control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "obol network obol-network distributed validator infrastructure & governance token obol stobol obol 0x0b010000b7624eb9b3dfbc279673c76e9d29d5f7 0x4094c8d36e40795ca25bfe9451f158d30614666a 0xcdbf527842ab04da548d33eb09d03db831381fb0 0xcb1622185a0c62a80494bede05ba95ef29fbf85c",
   "slug": "obol-network",
   "summary_short": "Supply: docs cap 500M · chain no cap; a 2-of-3 Safe holds the minter role",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/obol-network/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Institutional RWA / Tokenized Treasuries",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/instant-limits.md states 'Instant minting has a $50M Global Limit' and 'Instant redemptions have a $50M Global Limit'; Flux docs specify 1-day Timelock governance.",
    "observed": "RateLimiter (0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c) globalSubscriptionLimits(0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92) word [2] = 100000000000000000000000000 ($100M per 86400s window), globalRedemptionLimits(OUSG) word [2] = 50000000000000000000000000 ($50M per 86400s); Flux Comptroller (0x95Af143a021DF745bc78e845b54591C53a8B3A51) admin() = FluxTimelock (0x2c5898da4DF1d45EAb2B7B192a361C3b9EB18d9c, delay() = 86400s / 1d, admin() = 0x336505EC1BcC1A020EeDe459f57581725D23465A); OUSG totalSupply = 1,110,569.33 OUSG.",
    "recordId": "ondo-ousg-rate-limiter-and-flux-timelock",
    "surface": "OUSG RateLimiter Global Subscription Limit & Flux 1d Timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ondo-ousg-rate-limiter-and-flux-timelock: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "OUSG RateLimiter Global Subscription Limit & Flux 1d Timelock: docs say docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/instant-limits.md states 'Instant minting has a $50M Global Limit' and 'Instant redemptions have a $50M Global Limit'; · chain says RateLimiter (0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c) globalSubscriptionLimits(0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92) word [2] = 100000000000000000000000000 ($100M per 86400s window), globalRedemptionLimits(OUSG…",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Ondo Finance (OUSG & Flux Finance)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403121,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c",
    "block_number": 26403121,
    "call_args": [
     "0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92"
    ],
    "call_signature": "globalSubscriptionLimits(address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "ondo-ousg-rate-limiter-and-flux-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0x435e3a080000000000000000000000001b19c19393e2d034d8ff31ff34c81252fcbbee92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x435e3a08",
    "target_contract": "0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c",
    "target_label": "Ondo RateLimiter"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Ondo Finance (OUSG & Flux Finance) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "ondo finance (ousg & flux finance) ondo-finance-ousg-flux-finance institutional rwa / tokenized treasuries ousg ondo flux 0x98db502215da1ad9f626d4a0090a8a2f4971003c",
   "slug": "ondo-finance-ousg-flux-finance",
   "summary_short": "OUSG instant mint limit: docs $50M · chain $100M per day",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ondo-finance-ousg-flux-finance/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Supercharged Liquid Staking (Base)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": false,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.originprotocol.com/; governance: https://snapshot.org/#/ousdgov.eth). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state.",
    "observed": "SuperOETHb_VaultProxy (0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,402 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0xCcd483cE093682D7D9a41e645EEb710AFaa88249, EIP-1967 admin slot = zero (UUPS / internal upgrade authority). Direct admin() returns timelock controller 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f with minimum delay 172,800s (2d).",
    "recordId": "origin-superoeth-base-control-plane",
    "surface": "SuperOETHb_VaultProxy · 2d Timelock Admin Path"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "origin-superoeth-base-control-plane: SuperOETHb_VaultProxy (0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,402 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (2d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "origin-superoeth-base-control-plane: SuperOETHb_VaultProxy (0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,402 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "u",
     "value": "Uncompared: documentation not assessed (RPC-observed)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SuperOETHb_VaultProxy · 2d Timelock Admin Path",
   "grade": "observed",
   "gradeLabel": "OBSERVED",
   "name": "Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57421449,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0",
    "block_number": 57421449,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "admin()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [
     {
      "signature": "getMinDelay()(uint256)",
      "to": "0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f"
     }
    ],
    "id": "origin-superoeth-base-control-plane",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf851a440",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf851a440",
    "target_contract": "0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3",
    "target_label": "SuperOETHb_VaultProxy"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity uncompared",
   "search": "origin protocol (superoethb base) origin-superoeth-base supercharged liquid staking (base) superoethb oeth ogn 0xdbfefd2e8460a6ee4955a68582f85708baea60a3",
   "slug": "origin-superoeth-base",
   "summary_short": "Vault proxy admin path runs through a 2-day timelock; docs not assessed",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/origin-superoeth-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Fiat-Backed Stablecoin (PYUSD)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "PYUSD contract README: 'In the event of a critical security threat, Paxos has the ability to pause transfers and approvals of the PYUSD token. The ability to pause is controlled by a single `owner` role,' / 'The `ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE` can freeze and unfreeze the token balance of any address on chain.' / docs.paxos.com: 'Ethereum Mainnet 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8'",
    "observed": "PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: defaultAdmin() = owner() = 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B (no contract code), holding PAUSE_ROLE, ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (roles not enumerable); defaultAdminDelay() = 10800s (3 hours); no pending default admin; paused() = false.",
    "recordId": "paypal-usd-pyusd-pause-asset-protection-single-owner-role-s23",
    "surface": "Pause and asset-protection roles: one address without contract code, as documented"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "paypal-usd-pyusd-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23: PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = 0xC94BcF6e1d8B3558E3B62e743630D50497E3851C (no contract …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: no timelock in front of upgrades (2 other upgrade paths not determined)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "paypal-usd-pyusd-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23: PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = 0xC94BcF6e1d8B3558E3B62e743630D50497E3851C (no contract …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "paypal-usd-pyusd-pause-asset-protection-single-owner-role-s23: … 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B (no contract code), holding PAUSE_ROLE, ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "paypal-usd-pyusd-pause-asset-protection-single-owner-role-s23: PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: defaultAdmin() = owner() = 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B (no contract code), holding PAUSE_ROLE …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority held by a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Pause and asset-protection roles: one address without contract code, as documented",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "PayPal USD (PYUSD)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26431152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46",
    "block_number": 26431152,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "defaultAdmin()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "paypal-usd-pyusd-pause-asset-protection-single-owner-role-s23",
    "repro_calldata": "0x84ef8ffc",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x84ef8ffc",
    "target_contract": "0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8",
    "target_label": "PayPal USD (PYUSD) AdminUpgradeabilityProxy"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "PayPal USD (PYUSD) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope weak; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "paypal usd (pyusd) paypal-usd-pyusd fiat-backed stablecoin (pyusd) pyusd 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770bedfcaba0e23a0e8",
   "slug": "paypal-usd-pyusd",
   "summary_short": "Pause and asset-protection roles sit with one key address, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/paypal-usd-pyusd/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Yield Tokenization & AMM",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.pendle.finance (fees): '20% of all swap fees are given to LP providers of the pool as yield.'",
    "observed": "PendleMarketFactory (0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f).reserveFeePercent() = 80 (maxReserveFeePercent() = 100); treasury() = 0x8270400d528c34e1596EF367eeDEc99080A1b592; owner() = PendleGovernanceProxy 0x2aD631F72fB16d91c4953A7f4260A97C2fE2f31e (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1); EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin 0xA28c08f165116587D4F3E708743B4dEe155c5E64 (owner() = the Safe).",
    "recordId": "pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19",
    "surface": "Market factory sends 80% of swap fees to the treasury, leaving 20% to LPs"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19: EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin 0xA28c08f165116587D4F3E708743B4dEe155c5E64 (owner() = the Safe).",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Upgradeable with no enforced delay: upgraded by a Safe directly (a Safe has no delay of its own)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19: EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin 0xA28c08f165116587D4F3E708743B4dEe155c5E64 (owner() = the Safe).",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19: … 0x2aD631F72fB16d91c4953A7f4260A97C2fE2f31e (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Market factory sends 80% of swap fees to the treasury, leaving 20% to LPs",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Pendle Finance V2",
   "pinnedBlock": 26422243,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410",
    "block_number": 26422243,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "reserveFeePercent()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19",
    "repro_calldata": "0x1feec244",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x1feec244",
    "target_contract": "0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f",
    "target_label": "PendleMarketFactory (V7Upg)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Pendle Finance V2 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability weak; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "pendle finance v2 pendle-finance-v2 yield tokenization & amm pendle vependle 0x3e6eba46abc5ab18ed95f6667d8b2fd4020e4637 0x6d247b1c044fa1e22e6b04fa9f71baf99eb29a9f",
   "slug": "pendle-finance-v2",
   "summary_short": "Markets send 80% of swap fees to the treasury and 20% to LPs, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/pendle-finance-v2/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Native Liquid Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.puffer.fi (multisig): 'Puffer's Community Multisig is a 3-of-6 multisig composed of reputable and aligned Ethereum community members and auditing firms.'",
    "observed": "Safe 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a (= Timelock COMMUNITY_MULTISIG()): getThreshold() = 3 with 7 owners (v1.3.0); holds AccessManager role 1 (upgrader) with execution delay 0.",
    "recordId": "puffer-community-multisig-3of7-s20",
    "surface": "Community Multisig threshold: 3-of-7"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "puffer-7d-timelock-delay-s20: ACCESS_MANAGER() = 0x8c1686069474410E6243425f4a10177a94EBEE11, the authority() of PufferVault 0xD9A442856C234a39a81a089C06451EBAa4306a72, where upgradeToAndCall …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (168h)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "puffer-7d-timelock-delay-s20: ACCESS_MANAGER() = 0x8c1686069474410E6243425f4a10177a94EBEE11, the authority() of PufferVault 0xD9A442856C234a39a81a089C06451EBAa4306a72, where upgradeToAndCall …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "168h minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Community Multisig threshold: 3-of-7: docs say docs.puffer.fi (multisig): 'Puffer's Community Multisig is a 3-of-6 multisig composed of reputable and aligned Ethereum community members and auditing firms.' · chain says Safe 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a (= Timelock COMMUNITY_MULTISIG()): getThreshold() = 3 with 7 owners (v1.3.0);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Puffer Finance (pufETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "puffer-community-multisig-3of7-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a",
    "target_label": "Puffer Community Multisig (upgrader role)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Puffer Finance (pufETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "puffer finance (pufeth) puffer-finance-pufeth native liquid restaking pufeth puffer 0x3c28b7c7ba1a1f55c9ce66b263b33b204f2126ea 0x446d4d6b26815f9ba78b5d454e303315d586cb2a 0xc0896ab1a8cae8c2c1d27d011eb955cca955580d",
   "slug": "puffer-finance-pufeth",
   "summary_short": "Community multisig: docs 3-of-6 · chain 3-of-7",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/puffer-finance-pufeth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Zero-Knowledge Privacy Pool (Shielded Wallet)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.railgun.org (deductions / helpful links): 'The smart contracts take a 0.25% deduction per shield and unshield interaction which is then sent to the “treasury address”.' / 'Protocol deductions (0.25% on shield and unshield interactions) are sent directly on-chain to the treasury contract for that network.'",
    "observed": "RailgunSmartWallet 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9: shieldFee() = 25 and unshieldFee() = 25 basis points (of 10000); treasury() = 0xE8A8B458BcD1Ececc6b6b58F80929b29cCecFF40.",
    "recordId": "railgun-fees-shield-unshield-s25",
    "surface": "Shield and unshield fees: 0.25% each"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "railgun-upgrade-admin-s25: RailgunSmartWallet 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x4F8E20f55f879beE7Bc010Bd6bD2138B34aC65c8, owner() = Delegator …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Shield and unshield fees: 0.25% each",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "RAILGUN",
   "pinnedBlock": 26434786,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "shieldFee()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "railgun-fees-shield-unshield-s25",
    "repro_calldata": "0x01c37790",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x01c37790",
    "target_contract": "0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9",
    "target_label": "RailgunSmartWallet (proxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "RAILGUN control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "railgun railgun zero-knowledge privacy pool (shielded wallet) rail railgun 0x4f8e20f55f879bee7bc010bd6bd2138b34ac65c8 0xb6d513f6222ee92fff975e901bd792e2513fb53b 0xfa7093cdd9ee6932b4eb2c9e1cde7ce00b1fa4b9 0xc480f68a3dcc3edd82134fab45c14a0fcf1da3cc",
   "slug": "railgun",
   "summary_short": "0.25% shield fees; upgrades and pauses only via the on-chain protocol vote, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/railgun/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Reinsurance-Backed Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.re.xyz (ICL permissions note): 'The Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on every ICL (Ethereum reUSD and reUSDe, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base), alongside the chain's timelock.' and '... so the Safe can grant itself ICL UPGRADER_ROLE with no delay'",
    "observed": "ICL 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 (shareToken() = reUSD): hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD) = false; the Timelock 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and UPGRADER_ROLE; getRoleAdmin(UPGRADER_ROLE) = DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so granting UPGRADER_ROLE on this ICL waits the 48-hour delay.",
    "recordId": "re-icl-admin-timelock-not-safe-s21",
    "surface": "Deposit vault role admin held behind the delay; multisig lacks it"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 172800s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "re-safe-sole-timelock-proposer-s21: … timelock is its own admin; the Safe is 3-of-5 (v1.4.1, no modules).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Deposit vault role admin held behind the delay; multisig lacks it: docs say docs.re.xyz (ICL permissions note): 'The Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on every ICL (Ethereum reUSD and reUSDe, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base), alongside the chain's timelock.' and '... · chain says ICL 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 (shareToken() = reUSD): hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD) = false;",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Re Protocol (reUSD / reUSDe)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26427612,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac",
    "block_number": 26427612,
    "call_args": [
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
     "0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93"
    ],
    "call_signature": "hasRole(bytes32,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "re-48h-timelock-token-admin-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x91d14854000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000069ddea332723cf5407151aaf68b9b076557fca93",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x91d14854",
    "target_contract": "0x5086bf358635B81D8C47C66d1C8b9E567Db70c72",
    "target_label": "reUSD senior-tranche stablecoin token"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Re Protocol (reUSD / reUSDe) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "re protocol (reusd / reusde) re reinsurance-backed stablecoin reusd reusde re 0x4691c475be804fa85f91c2d6d0adf03114de3093 0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72 0x69ddea332723cf5407151aaf68b9b076557fca93",
   "slug": "re",
   "summary_short": "Vault admin role sits only behind the timelock; docs say the Safe holds it too",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/re/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.renzoprotocol.com/docs/products/staking-suite/ezeth states 10% fee on restaking rewards.",
    "observed": "feeBasisPoints() = 1500 (15%); Admin Multisig (0xD1e6626310fD54Eceb5b9a51dA2eC329D6D4B68A) is 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe; ezETH (0xbf5495Efe5DB9ce00f80364C8B423567e58d2110) totalSupply = 39,495.32 ezETH.",
    "recordId": "renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee",
    "surface": "DepositQueue.feeBasisPoints Parameter vs. Staking Docs"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee: … (0xD1e6626310fD54Eceb5b9a51dA2eC329D6D4B68A) is 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe; ezETH (0xbf5495Efe5DB9ce00f80364C8B423567e58d2110) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "DepositQueue.feeBasisPoints Parameter vs. Staking Docs: docs say docs.renzoprotocol.com/docs/products/staking-suite/ezeth states 10% fee on restaking rewards. · chain says feeBasisPoints() = 1500 (15%);",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Renzo Protocol (ezETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401725,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1",
    "block_number": 26401725,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "feeBasisPoints()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee",
    "repro_calldata": "0xb8606eef",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xb8606eef",
    "target_contract": "0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60",
    "target_label": "DepositQueue"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Renzo Protocol (ezETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "renzo protocol (ezeth) renzo-protocol-ezeth liquid restaking ezeth rez 0xf2f305d14dcd8aaef887e0428b3c9534795d0d60",
   "slug": "renzo-protocol-ezeth",
   "summary_short": "Restaking fee: docs 10% · chain 15%",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/renzo-protocol-ezeth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Asset-Backed RToken Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.reserve.org (Yield DTF advanced parameters): 'Long freeze duration (s) The number of seconds a long freeze lasts. Long freezes can be disabled by removing all addresses associated with the role. Default value: 604800 = 1 week'",
    "observed": "eUSD Main 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a (eUSD 0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F.main()): longFreeze() = 604800s (1 week); frozen() = false.",
    "recordId": "reserve-eusd-long-freeze-1-week-s23",
    "surface": "Long freeze: 1 week, the documented default"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Long freeze: 1 week, the documented default",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26431152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46",
    "block_number": 26431152,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "longFreeze()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "reserve-eusd-long-freeze-1-week-s23",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf8aa0c4e",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf8aa0c4e",
    "target_contract": "0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a",
    "target_label": "Reserve eUSD Main"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "reserve protocol (eusd rtoken) reserve-protocol-rtoken asset-backed rtoken infrastructure eusd rsr 0x18ba6e33ceb80f077deb9260c9111e62f21ae7b8 0x7697ae4def3c3cd52493ba3a6f57fc6d8c59108a",
   "slug": "reserve-protocol-rtoken",
   "summary_short": "Long freeze is 1 week, the documented default",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/reserve-protocol-rtoken/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Delta-Neutral Synthetic Dollar",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.resolv.xyz/litepaper/for-developers/smart-contracts.md core token and external request manager deployment registry.",
    "observed": "Sampled USR (0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110) defaultAdmin() = 4-of-6 Core Safe (0xD6889F307BE1b83Bb355d5DA7d4478FB0d2Af547) with defaultAdminDelay() = 86400s (1 day); sampled UsrExternalRequestsManager (0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861) and RlpExternalRequestsManager (0xc7AB90c2Ea9271EFB31f5fA2843Eeb4B331eaFA0) return paused() = true; USR totalSupply = 6,085,929.53 USR, RLP (0x4956b52aE2fF65D74CA2d61207523288e4528f96) totalSupply = 1,592,731.62 RLP.",
    "recordId": "resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe",
    "surface": "Sampled USR AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay & Request Counters"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe: … (0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110) defaultAdmin() = 4-of-6 Core Safe (0xD6889F307BE1b83Bb355d5DA7d4478FB0d2Af547) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe: sampled UsrExternalRequestsManager (0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861) and RlpExternalRequestsManager (0xc7AB90c2Ea9271EFB31f5fA2843Eeb4B331eaFA0) …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled USR AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay & Request Counters",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Resolv (USR / RLP)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403523,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a",
    "block_number": 26403523,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "defaultAdminDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe",
    "repro_calldata": "0xcc8463c8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xcc8463c8",
    "target_contract": "0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110",
    "target_label": "Resolv USR Token"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Resolv (USR / RLP) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "resolv (usr / rlp) resolv-usr-rlp delta-neutral synthetic dollar usr rlp wstusr resolv 0x66a1e37c9b0eaddca17d3662d6c05f4decf3e110",
   "slug": "resolv-usr-rlp",
   "summary_short": "USR admin-rules delay and request counters match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/resolv-usr-rlp/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults",
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "CDP Stablecoin (reUSD) & Lending Markets",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.resupply.finance (multisig and admin permissions): 'Multisig Members (3 of 4)' / contract addresses: 'Multisig (3-of-4) | `0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6`'",
    "observed": "Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 5 owners; Safe v1.4.1, no modules).",
    "recordId": "resupply-main-multisig-3of5-s22",
    "surface": "Main multisig: 3-of-5 signers"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "resupply-guardian-role-main-multisig-s22: ERC-1967 proxy with implementation GuardianUpgradeable 0x74C85620F1459862834A947dB9441911BCEBF066 (Sourcify match). The Treasury Manager operator proxy …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resupply-core-voter-execution-delay-1d-s22: observed_delay_seconds = 86400",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resupply-main-multisig-3of5-s22: … 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "resupply-guardian-role-main-multisig-s22: Guardian operator proxy 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3: guardian() = Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-N Safe)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Safe threshold: docs say 3-of-4 · chain says 3-of-5",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Resupply",
   "pinnedBlock": 26429396,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71",
    "block_number": 26429396,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "resupply-main-multisig-3of5-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6",
    "target_label": "Resupply Main Multisig (Safe)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Resupply control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "resupply resupply cdp stablecoin (reusd) & lending markets rsup sreusd 0x10101010e0c3171d894b71b3400668af311e7d94 0xa4745e0b1f40ab3dcfd98f381835de591a8974e3 0xfe11a5009f2121622271e7dd0fd470264e076af6 0xc07e000044f95655c11fda4cd37f70a94d7e0a7d",
   "slug": "resupply",
   "summary_short": "Safe threshold: docs 3-of-4 · chain 3-of-5",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/resupply/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Decentralized Liquid Staking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "rpips.rocketpool.net RPIP-33 parameter table, members.leave.time: 'How long a member must give notice for before manually leaving the security council' with the bound '< 14 days'",
    "observed": "RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity (0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf).getLeaveTime() = 2419200s (28 days). The security council has 1 member, Safe 0x6C565aF34f15dE064b56afEdF7B0F59C15bB20FE (2-of-3).",
    "recordId": "rocket-pool-reth-security-council-leave-time-28d-s19",
    "surface": "Security council members.leave.time = 28 days (RPIP-33 bound: < 14 days)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "rocket-pool-reth-upgrade-delay-1w-s19: observed_delay_seconds = 604800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "rocket-pool-reth-security-council-leave-time-28d-s19: … 0x6C565aF34f15dE064b56afEdF7B0F59C15bB20FE (2-of-3).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-3"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Security council members.leave.time = 28 days (RPIP-33 bound: < 14 days): docs say rpips.rocketpool.net RPIP-33 parameter table, members.leave.time: 'How long a member must give notice for before manually leaving the security council' with the bound '< 14 days' · chain says RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity (0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf).getLeaveTime() = 2419200s (28 days).",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Rocket Pool (rETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26422243,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410",
    "block_number": 26422243,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getLeaveTime()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "rocket-pool-reth-security-council-leave-time-28d-s19",
    "repro_calldata": "0x11b5e486",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x11b5e486",
    "target_contract": "0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf",
    "target_label": "RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "Rocket Pool (rETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "rocket pool (reth) rocket-pool-reth decentralized liquid staking reth rpl 0xc9d771aaf504f33bb3c8a7e67ea9f1881f837cff 0xda1ab39e62e0a5297af44c7064e501b0613f0d01",
   "slug": "rocket-pool-reth",
   "summary_short": "Council leave notice: chain 28 days · RPIP-33 bound under 14 days",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/rocket-pool-reth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Smart Account & Multisig Custody Core",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "safe-deployments registry (v1.4.1): '\"address\": \"0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67\",' / '\"1\": \"canonical\",' / 'The Safe proxy factory contract provides a simple way to create a new proxy contract pointing to a singleton and executing a setup function in the newly deployed proxy all in one transaction.'",
    "observed": "SafeProxyFactory 0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67: EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots = 0x0; keccak256(runtime code) = 0x50c3cdc4…0b3317.",
    "recordId": "safe-singleton-core-proxy-factory-bytecode-s25",
    "surface": "SafeProxyFactory: registry code hash, no proxy and no admin"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "safe-singleton-core-singleton-bytecode-s25: … 0x1fe2df85…c5e1c4; EIP-1967 slots 0x0 (not a proxy).",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Immutable or ownership renounced"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SafeProxyFactory: registry code hash, no proxy and no admin",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26434786,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "safe-singleton-core-proxy-factory-bytecode-s25",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67",
    "target_label": "SafeProxyFactory v1.4.1"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "safe smart account (v1.4.1 singleton) safe-singleton-core smart account & multisig custody core safe 0x29fcb43b46531bca003ddc8fcb67ffe91900c762 0x41675c099f32341bf84bfc5382af534df5c7461a 0x4e1dcf7ad4e460cfd30791ccc4f9c8a4f820ec67",
   "slug": "safe-singleton-core",
   "summary_short": "v1.4.1 singleton and factory code match Safe's registry; singletons cannot be initialized",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/safe-singleton-core/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Base Lending & Integrated Liquidity",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": false,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Seamless Protocol (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.seamlessprotocol.com/technical/smart-contracts; governance: https://seamlessprotocol.com/). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state.",
    "observed": "SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider (0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (9,779 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No single-key Ownable or ProxyAdmin getter exposed on the primary entry contract; permissions follow immutable or role-scoped module architecture.",
    "recordId": "seamless-protocol-base-control-plane",
    "surface": "SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "seamless-protocol-base-control-plane: SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider (0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (9,779 bytes runtime code). …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "u",
     "value": "Uncompared: documentation not assessed (RPC-observed)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture",
   "grade": "observed",
   "gradeLabel": "OBSERVED",
   "name": "Seamless Protocol (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57421449,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0",
    "block_number": 57421449,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "seamless-protocol-base-control-plane",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0",
    "target_label": "SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Seamless Protocol (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity uncompared",
   "search": "seamless protocol (base) seamless-protocol-base base lending & integrated liquidity seam 0x0e02eb705be325407707662c6f6d3466e939f3a0",
   "slug": "seamless-protocol-base",
   "summary_short": "Non-proxy address provider with role-based admin; docs not assessed",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/seamless-protocol-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Bitcoin Reserve / Wrapped BTC",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.solv.finance/llms-full.txt: 'The admin privileges for upgrades are assigned to a Gnosis Safe multi-signature address ... The timelock mechanism will be added to further enhance security by introducing a delay between the upgrade proposal and execution.'",
    "observed": "SolvBTC is a beacon proxy: EIP-1967 beacon slot = UpgradeableBeacon 0xFc335FdA7E6a33329A83F4d5F578eC7d8A43DC4A (implementation() = 0xA4b6cf2BAaA235ab7Fe10EADB84b82460165B38F), whose owner() = SolvBTCFactory 0x443628281E4f3E5b5A5D029B9a0D13900ae41578 (getBeacon('Solv BTC') = that beacon). The factory's admin() = TimelockController 0xfd4B809AD88db6Ca9dbB295A4B9d23bB0093f497 (pendingAdmin() = 0) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3d); governor() = the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D (pendingGovernor() = 0), which holds the timelock's PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE but not DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (held by the timelock itself; EXECUTOR_ROLE not open). Verified source pinned to runtime code: SolvBTCFactory is a Sourcify exact_match and every beacon-mutating path (setImplementation -> upgradeTo, transferBeaconOwnership, importBeacon) and transferAdmin is onlyAdmin, while onlyGovernor only deploys new beacon proxies; the timelock (SolvTimelock is OpenZeppelin v5.0.0 TimelockController, fully verified on Blockscout, not on Sourcify) reverts schedule when delay < getMinDelay() and only lets itself call updateDelay.",
    "recordId": "solv-solvbtc-upgrade-beacon-3d-timelock-s17",
    "surface": "SolvBTC beacon upgrades behind a 3d TimelockController (docs: timelock 'will be added')"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "solv-solvbtc-upgrade-beacon-3d-timelock-s17: governor() = the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D (pendingGovernor() = 0), which holds the timelock's PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (3d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 259200s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "3d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "solv-solvbtc-owner-3of5-safe-s17: … (0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97).owner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D; …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SolvBTC beacon upgrades behind a 3d TimelockController (docs: timelock 'will be added'): docs say docs.solv.finance/llms-full.txt: 'The admin privileges for upgrades are assigned to a Gnosis Safe multi-signature address ... · chain says SolvBTC is a beacon proxy: EIP-1967 beacon slot = UpgradeableBeacon 0xFc335FdA7E6a33329A83F4d5F578eC7d8A43DC4A (implementation() = 0xA4b6cf2BAaA235ab7Fe10EADB84b82460165B38F), whose owner() = SolvBTCFactory 0x443628281E…",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Solv Protocol (SolvBTC)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26418060,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c",
    "block_number": 26418060,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "solv-solvbtc-owner-3of5-safe-s17",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97",
    "target_label": "Solv SolvBTC"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Solv Protocol (SolvBTC) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "solv protocol (solvbtc) solv-protocol-solvbtc bitcoin reserve / wrapped btc solvbtc solv 0x7a56e1c57c7475ccf742a1832b028f0456652f97 0xfd4b809ad88db6ca9dbb295a4b9d23bb0093f497",
   "slug": "solv-protocol-solvbtc",
   "summary_short": "Beacon upgrades already wait 3 days in a timelock the docs say will be added",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/solv-protocol-solvbtc/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Decentralized Credit & Liquidity",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Sky 48-hour Governance Security Module (GSM) delay and Spark SubDAO proxy ownership.",
    "observed": "GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY).",
    "recordId": "spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay",
    "surface": "Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay: GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider …",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Spark / Sky",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401638,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e",
    "block_number": 26401638,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "delay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay",
    "repro_calldata": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "target_contract": "0xbE286431454714F511008713973d3B053A2d38f3",
    "target_label": "GSM_PAUSE_PROXY"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Spark / Sky control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "spark / sky spark-sky decentralized credit & liquidity usds susds dai sky mkr spk 0xbe286431454714f511008713973d3b053a2d38f3",
   "slug": "spark-sky",
   "summary_short": "Addresses provider owner and governance delay match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/spark-sky/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Distributed Validator Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.ssv.network (governance): 'The first is execution of governance functions controlled by the governance multisig.' / smart contracts: 'SSV DAO Treasury 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6'",
    "observed": "SSVNetwork 0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1: owner() = SSV DAO Treasury 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6, a 5-of-9 Safe (v1.3.0, no modules); pendingOwner() = 0; SSVNetworkViews 0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4 has the same owner(); both are UUPS proxies (empty EIP-1967 admin slot).",
    "recordId": "ssv-network-dao-multisig-owns-network-s21",
    "surface": "SSVNetwork and SSVNetworkViews owner: the DAO governance multisig"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "ssv-network-dao-multisig-owns-network-s21: both are UUPS proxies (empty EIP-1967 admin slot).",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "ssv-network-dao-multisig-owns-network-s21: … 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6, a 5-of-9 Safe (v1.3.0, no modules); pendingOwner() …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-9"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SSVNetwork and SSVNetworkViews owner: the DAO governance multisig",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "SSV Network",
   "pinnedBlock": 26427612,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac",
    "block_number": 26427612,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "ssv-network-dao-multisig-owns-network-s21",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1",
    "target_label": "SSVNetwork (UUPS proxy)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "SSV Network control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "ssv network ssv-network distributed validator infrastructure ssv 0xdd9bc35ae942ef0cfa76930954a156b3ff30a4e1 0xafe830b6ee262ba11cce5f32fdcd760ffe6a66e4",
   "slug": "ssv-network",
   "summary_short": "SSVNetwork owner is the DAO governance multisig, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ssv-network/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "staderlabs.gitbook.io/ethereum states 'The Manager multisig is a 3-of-5 and is tasked with maintaining the protocol' and specifies a 7-day minimum delay on contract upgrades.",
    "observed": "Manager Safe (0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF) getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController (0x1112D5C55670Cb5144BF36114C20a122908068B9, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7d, PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-9 Community Safe 0x45B977CeCB9Dfaa17dFcBa88826ef684b8489fF6), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on ETHx and StaderConfig (0x4ABEF2263d5A5ED582FC9A9789a41D85b68d69DB); ETHx MINTER_ROLE held by StakePoolsManager (0xcf5EA1b38380f6aF39068375516Daf40Ed70D299), totalSupply = 58,434.16 ETHx (18 dec).",
    "recordId": "stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock",
    "surface": "Manager Safe Quorum & 7-Day TimelockController Admin Path"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock: ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (7d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 604800s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock: … getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Safe threshold: docs say 3-of-5 · chain says 3-of-6",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Stader Labs (ETHx)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403676,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae",
    "block_number": 26403676,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getThreshold()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0xe75235b8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xe75235b8",
    "target_contract": "0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF",
    "target_label": "Stader Manager Safe"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Stader Labs (ETHx) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "stader labs (ethx) stader-labs-ethx liquid staking ethx sd 0xaafb31780e4b9c95bc920e388f4925a874cd07af",
   "slug": "stader-labs-ethx",
   "summary_short": "Manager Safe: docs 3-of-5 · chain 3-of-6",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stader-labs-ethx/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Lockers & Yield Strategies",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 2,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.stakedao.org (timelock): 'Stake DAO's core contracts are protected by a governance timelock that enforces a 48-hour delay on all protocol changes.' and 'A proposer submits the operation with a minimum 48-hour delay'",
    "observed": "ProtocolTimelock 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a: getMinDelay() = 432000s (5 days). It owns the ProtocolController 0x2d8BcE1FaE00a959354aCD9eBf9174337A64d4fb; the Governance Safe 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765 holds PROPOSER_ROLE; OpenZeppelin TimelockController (Sourcify exact match).",
    "recordId": "stake-dao-protocol-timelock-min-delay-5d-s22",
    "surface": "Protocol changes wait 5 days, longer than the documented 48 hours"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "stake-dao-timelock-owns-protocol-controller-s22: … 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match); the timelock's …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Immutable or ownership renounced"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 432000s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "5d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "stake-dao-timelock-executor-permissioned-s22: … 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765 (3-of-5, Safe v1.3.0, 3 modules enabled) holds …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 2 d · chain says 5 d",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Stake DAO",
   "pinnedBlock": 26429396,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71",
    "block_number": 26429396,
    "call_args": [
     "0xd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63",
     "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    ],
    "call_signature": "hasRole(bytes32,address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "stake-dao-timelock-executor-permissioned-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0x91d14854d8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e630000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x91d14854",
    "target_contract": "0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a",
    "target_label": "Stake DAO ProtocolTimelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Stake DAO control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "stake dao stake-dao liquid lockers & yield strategies sdt vesdt 0x2d8bce1fae00a959354acd9ebf9174337a64d4fb 0xf930ebbd05ef8b25b1797b9b2109ddc9b0d43063 0xb27afc7844988948fbd6210aef4e1362bc2d8e6a",
   "slug": "stake-dao",
   "summary_short": "Timelock: docs 2 days · chain 5 days; Treasury Safe 3-of-5, not 4-of-7",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stake-dao/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking (LINK)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.stake.link (security and audits): '48-hour timelock. Actions executed by the multisig go through the GovernanceTimelock , which gives the community time to review pending changes.'",
    "observed": "GovernanceTimelock 0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F: getMinDelay() = 172800 (48 hours); owner() of StakingPool / stLINK 0xb8b295df2cd735b15BE5Eb419517Aa626fc43cD5, PriorityPool, WithdrawalPool, FundFlowController, RebaseController, OperatorVCS and CommunityVCS; PROPOSER / CANCELLER = the multisig 0xB351EC0FEaF4B99FdFD36b484d9EC90D0422493D.",
    "recordId": "stake-link-governance-timelock-48h-s20",
    "surface": "GovernanceTimelock delay: 48 hours"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 172800s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: Safe getThreshold()",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-8"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "GovernanceTimelock delay: 48 hours",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "stake.link",
   "pinnedBlock": 26425374,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d",
    "block_number": 26425374,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "stake-link-governance-timelock-48h-s20",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F",
    "target_label": "stake.link GovernanceTimelock (owner of StakingPool, PriorityPool, WithdrawalPool)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "stake.link control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "stake.link stake-link liquid staking (link) stlink sdl 0x4852e48215a4785ee99b640caced5378cc39d2a4 0xb351ec0feaf4b99fdfd36b484d9ec90d0422493d 0xb72d8f5213b3e52faf13aa074b03c4788e78349f",
   "slug": "stake-link",
   "summary_short": "Governance timelock delay is 48 hours, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stake-link/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.stakewise.io/docs/oracles/intro ('currently 6 of 11 Oracles'), docs/fees/intro ('5% fee on the rewards accumulated by osETH'), and docs/ostoken/how-ostoken-works ('liquidation threshold is set to 92% LTV').",
    "observed": "Sampled Keeper (0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5) totalOracles() = 11, rewardsMinOracles() = 6, validatorsMinOracles() = 6 (6-of-11 oracle signature quorum); osETH (0xf1C9acDc66974dFB6dEcB12aA385b9cD01190E38) owner() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, totalSupply = 148,452.02 osETH (18 dec); OsTokenVaultController (0x2A261e60FB14586B474C208b1B7AC6D0f5000306) feePercent() = 500 (5%), totalAssets = 160,753.18 ETH; OsTokenConfig (0x287d1e2A8dE183A8bf8f2b09Fa1340fBd766eb59) getConfig(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) = (1.01e18, 0.92e18, 0.90e18) (90% mint LTV, 92% liquidation threshold).",
    "recordId": "stakewise-v3-oseth-oracle-quorum-and-ltv",
    "surface": "Sampled Keeper Oracle Quorum, osETH Fee & LTV Configuration"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "stakewise-v3-oseth-oracle-quorum-and-ltv: … rewardsMinOracles() = 6, validatorsMinOracles() = 6 (6-of-11 oracle signature quorum); osETH (0xf1C9acDc66974dFB6dEcB12aA385b9cD01190E38) …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 6-of-11"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Keeper Oracle Quorum, osETH Fee & LTV Configuration",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "StakeWise V3 (osETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403676,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae",
    "block_number": 26403676,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "rewardsMinOracles()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "stakewise-v3-oseth-oracle-quorum-and-ltv",
    "repro_calldata": "0x7386749e",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x7386749e",
    "target_contract": "0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5",
    "target_label": "StakeWise V3 Keeper"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "StakeWise V3 (osETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "stakewise v3 (oseth) stakewise-v3-oseth liquid staking infrastructure oseth swise 0x6b5815467da09daa7dc83db21c9239d98bb487b5",
   "slug": "stakewise-v3-oseth",
   "summary_short": "Keeper oracle quorum, osETH fee and LTV settings match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stakewise-v3-oseth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Cross-chain Liquidity / Bridge",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "stargateprotocol.gitbook.io governance model: 'From time to time, a vote may require a change to the Stargate protocol or its treasury that requires action via multisig.'; V2 README: 'A Planner is a trusted entity that can allocate credit between chains off chain'; 'Fees within the Stargate protocol are dynamic, and are set by the AI Planning Module on a per pathway basis.'",
    "observed": "StargatePoolUSDC (0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7).owner() = OneSig 0xBE634B030FEAaB661300667EaF82510a3a025413 (threshold() = 5 of 7 signers, VERSION() = 0.0.1, Sourcify exact_match: executes threshold-signed Merkle roots carrying only an expiry, no delay); TokenMessaging (0x6d6620eFa72948C5f68A3C8646d58C00d3f4A980) and Treasurer (0x1041D127b2d4BC700F0F563883bC689502606918) owner() = the same OneSig. getAddressConfig() planner = 0xe37f7c80ceD04c4F243C0Fd04A5510D663CB88b5 (an EOA) = TokenMessaging.planner() = FeeLibV1USDC (0x52B35406CB2FB5e0038EdEcFc129A152a1f74087).owner(); status() = 1. Context, not compared: the docs' StargateDAO multisig 0x65bb797c2B9830d891D87288F029ed8dACc19705 (3-of-5 Safe) is not the owner of these V2 contracts.",
    "recordId": "stargate-v2-onesig-5of7-owner-planner-fees-s18",
    "surface": "V2 pool, TokenMessaging & Treasurer owner = 5-of-7 OneSig multisig; planner sets fees"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "stargate-v2-onesig-5of7-owner-planner-fees-s18: … 0xe37f7c80ceD04c4F243C0Fd04A5510D663CB88b5 (an EOA) = TokenMessaging.planner() = FeeLibV1USDC …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "V2 pool, TokenMessaging & Treasurer owner = 5-of-7 OneSig multisig; planner sets fees",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Stargate V2",
   "pinnedBlock": 26421541,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d",
    "block_number": 26421541,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "stargate-v2-onesig-5of7-owner-planner-fees-s18",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7",
    "target_label": "StargatePoolUSDC"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Stargate V2 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "stargate v2 stargate-v2 cross-chain liquidity / bridge stg stargate 0xc026395860db2d07ee33e05fe50ed7bd583189c7",
   "slug": "stargate-v2",
   "summary_short": "Pools and treasurer are owned by a 5-of-7 multisig, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stargate-v2/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Morpho v1 Curator Vault Suite (USDC, USDT, PYUSD)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Steakhouse on the Morpho forum (linked from the docs): 'The new guardians will be the following: - [steakUSDC](https://app.aragon.org/#/daos/ethereum/steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth/dashboard)' / 'Veto Mechanism: Seeking to provide depositors with even more control over their funds and curated vaults, Steakhouse introduced the Aragon DAO guardian to enable vault depositors to veto critical actions made by the curator.'",
    "observed": "steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (MetaMorpho, Sourcify exact match): guardian() = 0xaa0500198B4425DfC4E272FbE42C8E64E21fc03d, the Aragon DAO that steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth resolves to; no pending guardian; steakUSDT 0xbEef047a543E45807105E51A8BBEFCc5950fcfBa and steakPYUSD 0xbEEF02e5E13584ab96848af90261f0C8Ee04722a have their own guardian DAOs (0xaeC761545Fd135db6d04D27C92BCB3951668c67F, 0xCcFd0E9CEC732fb839fadDeCc72B6154530bC90f).",
    "recordId": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-guardian-aragon-s24",
    "surface": "steakUSDC guardian: its own Aragon DAO (steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth), as announced"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-timelock-7d-s24: observed_delay_seconds = 604800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum-vaults-owner-safe-5-of-10-s24: … 0x827e86072B06674a077f592A531dcE4590aDeCdB (3-of-9).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-9"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-guardian-aragon-s24: steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (MetaMorpho, Sourcify exact match): guardian() = 0xaa0500198B4425DfC4E272FbE42C8E64E21fc03d, the Aragon DAO …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "steakUSDC guardian: its own Aragon DAO (steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth), as announced",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26433001,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7",
    "block_number": 26433001,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "guardian()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-guardian-aragon-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0x452a9320",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x452a9320",
    "target_contract": "0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB",
    "target_label": "Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC) MetaMorpho vault"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "steakhouse financial (ethereum) steakhouse-financial-ethereum morpho v1 curator vault suite (usdc, usdt, pyusd) steakusdt steakpyusd steakusdc steakhouse 0x0a0e559bc3b0950a7e448f0d4894db195b9cf8dd 0x79864900a4d34fb7907de9fe404758de5a4956de 0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb",
   "slug": "steakhouse-financial-ethereum",
   "summary_short": "steakUSDC guardian is its own Aragon DAO, as announced",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/steakhouse-financial-ethereum/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Curated Lending Vault (MetaMorpho)",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "steakhouse.financial/docs/llms-full.txt: 'Steakhouse vaults 7-day timelocks (above the minimum, protocol-enforced 3-day timelock)'.",
    "observed": "Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC, 0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183) on Base: timelock() = 604800s (7d); asset() = USDC (0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913); MORPHO() = 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb; owner() = 5-of-10 Safe 0x0A0e559bc3b0950a7e448F0d4894db195b9cf8DD; curator() = 3-of-9 Safe 0x827e86072B06674a077f592A531dcE4590aDeCdB; totalAssets() = 102,512,832.83 USDC. Context, not compared with documentation: guardian() = 0x9e0FdDDa790651E6a05CD2dE69e624B94C04eAf5 has no contract code (eth_getCode = 0x on Base and on Ethereum at #26,418,060) and nonce 0 on Base; the docs say guardians are 'typically onchain Aragon multisigs ... When they're not, it's usually because a commercial distribution partner has taken on that role' and list this vault with partner Coinbase; chain state does not show who holds it.",
    "recordId": "steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17",
    "surface": "MetaMorpho timelock() = 7d (604800s)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17: observed_delay_seconds = 604800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17: … 0x9e0FdDDa790651E6a05CD2dE69e624B94C04eAf5 has no contract code (eth_getCode = 0x on Base and on Ethereum …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17: totalAssets() = 102,512,832.83 USDC. Context, not compared with documentation: guardian() = 0x9e0FdDDa790651E6a05CD2dE69e624B94C04eAf5 has no contract code …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority held by a single key"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "MetaMorpho timelock() = 7d (604800s)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Steakhouse USDC MetaMorpho (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57635450,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x78ddbdca540b630c823e1c79dcadbfc25dd957c60d1396f4c6b60f11f67a164f",
    "block_number": 57635450,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "timelock()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17",
    "repro_calldata": "0xd33219b4",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xd33219b4",
    "target_contract": "0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183",
    "target_label": "Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC) vault on Base"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Steakhouse USDC MetaMorpho (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum weak; Emergency / freeze scope weak; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "steakhouse usdc metamorpho (base) steakhouse-usdc-metamorpho-base curated lending vault (metamorpho) steakusdc steakhouse metamorpho 0xbeef010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9af9c6b1228183",
   "slug": "steakhouse-usdc-metamorpho-base",
   "summary_short": "MetaMorpho vault timelock is 7 days, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/steakhouse-usdc-metamorpho-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Omnichain ERC-7579 Vault & Yield Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": false,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Superform Core v2 (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.superform.xyz/deployment-addresses; governance: https://docs.superform.xyz/operate/permissions). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state.",
    "observed": "SuperGovernor (0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (15,614 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract SuperVaultAggregator (0x10AC0b33e1C4501CF3ec1cB1AE51ebfdbd2d4698, 21,772 bytes) verified live at the same block.",
    "recordId": "superform-v2-base-control-plane",
    "surface": "SuperGovernor & SuperVaultAggregator Control Plane"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "u",
     "value": "Uncompared: documentation not assessed (RPC-observed)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "SuperGovernor & SuperVaultAggregator Control Plane",
   "grade": "observed",
   "gradeLabel": "OBSERVED",
   "name": "Superform Core v2 (Base)",
   "pinnedBlock": 57421449,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0",
    "block_number": 57421449,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "superform-v2-base-control-plane",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4",
    "target_label": "SuperGovernor"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Superform Core v2 (Base) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity uncompared",
   "search": "superform core v2 (base) superform-v2-base omnichain erc-7579 vault & yield infrastructure superform supervaults 0xb5396ef2bf8ca360ceb4166b77afb2bed20e74d4",
   "slug": "superform-v2-base",
   "summary_short": "SuperGovernor and vault aggregator control plane pinned; docs not assessed",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/superform-v2-base/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Institutional RWA / Tokenized Funds",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.superstate.com/investors/smart-contracts.md states 'At time of writing, fees are set to 0 and only USDC is supported.'",
    "observed": "Sampled USTB (0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e) supportedStablecoins(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48) returns sweep destination 0x774AE279c21B6a17a6E2BD5ab5398FF98F398807 and subscription fee = 0 for USDC; USTB totalSupply = 39,459,575.14 USTB (6 dec), USCC (0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c) totalSupply = 4,066,680.13 USCC (6 dec).",
    "recordId": "superstate-ustb-uscc-fee-and-usdc-alignment",
    "surface": "Sampled USDC Subscription Fee & Fund Supply Alignment"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled USDC Subscription Fee & Fund Supply Alignment",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Superstate (USTB / USCC)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403676,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae",
    "block_number": 26403676,
    "call_args": [
     "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"
    ],
    "call_signature": "supportedStablecoins(address)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "superstate-ustb-uscc-fee-and-usdc-alignment",
    "repro_calldata": "0xbf7d9119000000000000000000000000a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xbf7d9119",
    "target_contract": "0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e",
    "target_label": "Superstate USTB"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Superstate (USTB / USCC) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "superstate (ustb / uscc) superstate-ustb-uscc institutional rwa / tokenized funds ustb uscc 0x43415eb6ff9db7e26a15b704e7a3edce97d31c4e",
   "slug": "superstate-ustb-uscc",
   "summary_short": "USDC subscription fee and fund supply match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/superstate-ustb-uscc/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Liquid Staking & Restaking",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Swell v3-core-public deployment architecture specifying 7-day Timelock upgrade/platform-admin control, 1h minimum reprice cadence, and 1% maximum reprice bound.",
    "observed": "swETH (0xf951E335afb289353dc249e82926178EaC7DEd78) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0x25EAf579cA2255fAA5463c635eec28697b5b8846) and rswETH (0xFAe103DC9cf190eD75350761e95403b7b8aFa6c0) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0xD750B84845f1cAdfEAc63f96Ec74635e949bFd14) both resolve owner() to SwellTimelock (0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b, delay() = 604800s / 7d, admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0x20fDF47509C5eFC0e1101e3CE443691781C17F90), which is also the sole PLATFORM_ADMIN on both AccessControlManagers (0x625087d72c762254a72CB22cC2ECa40da6b95EAC, 0x796592b2092F7E150C48643dA19Dd2F28be3333F); minimumRepriceTime = 3600s (1h), maximumRepriceDifferencePercentage = 1% (1e16); swETH totalSupply = 9,635.13 swETH, rswETH totalSupply = 10,363.44 rswETH.",
    "recordId": "swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds",
    "surface": "Sampled 7-Day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins & Reprice Bounds"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds: swETH (0xf951E335afb289353dc249e82926178EaC7DEd78) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0x25EAf579cA2255fAA5463c635eec28697b5b8846) and rswETH …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (7d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds: observed_delay_seconds = 604800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds: … (0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b, delay() = 604800s / 7d, admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0x20fDF47509C5eFC0e1101e3CE443691781C17F90), …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled 7-Day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins & Reprice Bounds",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Swell (swETH / rswETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403676,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae",
    "block_number": 26403676,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "delay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds",
    "repro_calldata": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x6a42b8f8",
    "target_contract": "0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b",
    "target_label": "SwellTimelock"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Swell (swETH / rswETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "swell (sweth / rsweth) swell-sweth-rsweth liquid staking & restaking sweth rsweth swell 0xba829003e6b5dd858fbed3945719939a6dc3073b",
   "slug": "swell-sweth-rsweth",
   "summary_short": "7-day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins and reprice bounds match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/swell-sweth-rsweth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Restaking Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Symbiotic Core architecture specifies non-upgradeable core registries and multisig-governed implementation/adapter whitelists.",
    "observed": "VaultFactory (0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346), OperatorRegistry (0xAd817a6Bc954F678451A71363f04150FDD81Af9F), and NetworkRegistry (0xC773b1011461e7314CF05f97d95aa8e92C1Fd8aA) hold zero EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots (0x00...00); VaultFactory.owner() = 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0); AdapterRegistry (0x788823C9579A049D986eB76718bC758C0998594a) owner() = 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (0xf6BB2e64Bd201A862f2Fe5461fc7Ef01e2040b6A).",
    "recordId": "symbiotic-core-immutable-registries-and-safes",
    "surface": "Sampled Non-Upgradeable Core Registries & Factory/Adapter Safes"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "symbiotic-core-immutable-registries-and-safes: … (0x00...00); VaultFactory.owner() = 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0); …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 2-of-3"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Sampled Non-Upgradeable Core Registries & Factory/Adapter Safes",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Symbiotic Core",
   "pinnedBlock": 26403121,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c",
    "block_number": 26403121,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": null,
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_getStorageAt",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "symbiotic-core-immutable-registries-and-safes",
    "repro_calldata": null,
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc",
    "target_contract": "0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346",
    "target_label": "Symbiotic VaultFactory"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Symbiotic Core control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum moderate; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "symbiotic core symbiotic-core restaking infrastructure symbiotic 0xaeb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909f703e9af6a346",
   "slug": "symbiotic-core",
   "summary_short": "Core registries are non-upgradeable; factory Safes match the docs",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/symbiotic-core/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Derivatives Liquidity Infrastructure",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Synthetix V3 Ethereum deployment table, AccountProxy row: 'AccountProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847 n/a' / 'AccountProxy 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac'",
    "observed": "AccountProxy 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac: owner() = CoreProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847; nominatedOwner() = 0x0.",
    "recordId": "synthetix-v3-core-account-owner-s24",
    "surface": "Account NFT (AccountProxy) owner: the CoreProxy, not a key or Safe"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "synthetix-v3-core-oracle-owner-s24: … 0xEb3107117FEAd7de89Cd14D463D340A2E6917769 (4-of-7); nominatedOwner() = 0x0.",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Account NFT (AccountProxy) owner: the CoreProxy, not a key or Safe",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Synthetix V3 Core",
   "pinnedBlock": 26433001,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7",
    "block_number": 26433001,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "synthetix-v3-core-account-owner-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac",
    "target_label": "Synthetix V3 AccountProxy"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Synthetix V3 Core control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "synthetix v3 core synthetix-v3-core derivatives liquidity infrastructure snx susd 0x0e429603d3cb1dfae4e6f52add5fe82d96d77dac 0x0aaf300e148378489a8a471dd3e9e53e30cb42e3 0xb2f30a7c980f052f02563fb518dcc39e6bf38175 0xffffffaeff0b96ea8e4f94b2253f31abdd875847",
   "slug": "synthetix-v3-core",
   "summary_short": "Account NFT is owned by the CoreProxy, not a key or Safe, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/synthetix-v3-core/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "Fiat-Backed Stablecoin (USDT)",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "tether.to (FAQ): 'Tether Tokens are created by having multiple Tether private authorization keys sign and broadcast creation transactions on the specific blockchain.' and 'Tether’s multi-signature (or multi-sig) model protects against a single person from authorizing Tether Tokens on their own, which would represent a single point of failure and a security risk.' / supported protocols: 'USD₮ contract address: https://etherscan.io/token/0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7'",
    "observed": "TetherToken 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7: getOwner() = owner() = MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828 (Sourcify match): required() = 3, getOwners() = 6 owners (transactionCount() = 5848).",
    "recordId": "tether-usdt-owner-multisig-3of6-s23",
    "surface": "Owner: a 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet (multi-signature authorization)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "tether-usdt-token-live-blacklist-under-owner-s23: … pause and deprecate are onlyOwner (the 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828; …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "tether-usdt-token-live-blacklist-under-owner-s23: addBlackList / destroyBlackFunds, pause and deprecate are onlyOwner (the 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828; no timelock) …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-6)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Owner: a 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet (multi-signature authorization)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Tether USDT",
   "pinnedBlock": 26431152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46",
    "block_number": 26431152,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getOwner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "tether-usdt-owner-multisig-3of6-s23",
    "repro_calldata": "0x893d20e8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x893d20e8",
    "target_contract": "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
    "target_label": "Tether USD (TetherToken)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Tether USDT control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "tether usdt tether-usdt fiat-backed stablecoin (usdt) usdt 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7",
   "slug": "tether-usdt",
   "summary_short": "Owner is a 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/tether-usdt/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Decentralized Bitcoin Bridge",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.threshold.network contract addresses (Mainnet, tBTC application contracts) list 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D as the tBTC 'Timelock Controller'; the docs state no delay for it. The '2-day' timelock in the Governance Process page belongs to the separate Governor Bravo Timelock Controller (0x87F005317692D05BAA4193AB0c961c69e175f45f, getMinDelay() = 172800s at the same block).",
    "observed": "getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operation 0xb6671bbbedf818d7232a4006d4a85b21e3f3055d17244188f244c1da8263e0c7: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1794604955 (2026-11-13 21:22:35 UTC). It is a public CallScheduled upgradeAndCall (0x9623609d) on ProxyAdmin (0x7Affa05f726D293eB1193807A91617318292008e) for WalletRegistry (0x46d52E41C2F300BC82217Ce22b920c34995204eb) to implementation 0x14fAD0C11C83AC736e5929D5661bbA7E6BB9c0D6.",
    "recordId": "threshold-tbtc-timelock-1d-walletregistry-op-0xb667",
    "surface": "tBTC TimelockController 1d delay — public WalletRegistry upgradeAndCall schedule"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "threshold-tbtc-timelock-1d-walletregistry-op-0xb667: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operation 0xb6671bbbedf818d7232a4006d4a85b21e3f3055d17244188f244c1da8263e0c7: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 86400s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "b",
     "value": "1d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "tBTC TimelockController 1d delay — public WalletRegistry upgradeAndCall schedule",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Threshold Network (tBTC)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26407707,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x9030abf37638c14a5f9c145f298a0f4cd74b247a99f3dddd119b9c6b09f5dced",
    "block_number": 26407707,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "threshold-tbtc-timelock-1d-walletregistry-op-0xb667",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D",
    "target_label": "Threshold Council TimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Threshold Network (tBTC) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor moderate; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "threshold network (tbtc) threshold-network-tbtc decentralized bitcoin bridge tbtc t 0x92f2d8b72a7f6a551be60b9aa4194248e9b4913d",
   "slug": "threshold-network-tbtc",
   "summary_short": "tBTC timelock is 1 day; the WalletRegistry upgrade schedule is public",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/threshold-network-tbtc/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "eth_lst_lrt"
   ],
   "category": "Fixed Income / LST",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "Treehouse docs: 'All Treehouse contracts are secured by a 5-day timelock' (protocol/tasset/security/timelock); public brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/treehouse-op-0x2f11/.",
    "observed": "getMinDelay() = 432000s (5d); TREE (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3).owner() = TimelockController. Operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f is pending (ETA 1794891107, 2026-11-17 04:51:47 UTC). It upgrades TREE to implementation 0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6, which adds a Blacklistable module whose blacklister is a 5-of-7 Safe; after execution that Safe can freeze transfers with no delay.",
    "recordId": "treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11",
    "surface": "TREE UUPS owner = 5d TimelockController — queued Blacklistable upgrade"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 432000s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "5d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11: … Blacklistable module whose blacklister is a 5-of-7 Safe; after execution that Safe can …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 5-of-7"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11: TREE (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3).owner() = TimelockController. Operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f is …",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (5-of-7)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "TREE UUPS owner = 5d TimelockController — queued Blacklistable upgrade",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Treehouse (TREE / tETH)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26407707,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf",
    "block_number": 26406106,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "getMinDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf27a0c92",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf27a0c92",
    "target_contract": "0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e",
    "target_label": "Treehouse TimelockController"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 2,
   "rosetteAria": "Treehouse (TREE / tETH) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope strong; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "treehouse (tree / teth) treehouse-tree-teth fixed income / lst teth tree 0x2225dabffc7f862c99477381e971e8b1fdab467e 0xd11c452fc99cf405034ee446803b6f6c1f6d5ed8",
   "slug": "treehouse-tree-teth",
   "summary_short": "TREE owner is a 5-day timelock; a blacklistable upgrade is queued",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/treehouse-tree-teth/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [],
   "category": "Blue-Chip DEX & Governance",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "developers.uniswap.org (governance process): '7-day voting period for the community to vote' / 'Duration: 2-day waiting period, 7-day voting period, 2-day timelock (if passed)'",
    "observed": "GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3: votingPeriod() = 40320 blocks = 483,840s (5.6 days) at 12-second slots; votingDelay() = 13140 blocks (~1.83 days).",
    "recordId": "uniswap-governance-voting-period-40320-blocks-s23",
    "surface": "Voting period: 40,320 blocks (~5.6 days at 12-second slots), not 7 days"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "uniswap-governance-timelock-delay-2d-s23: observed_delay_seconds = 172800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Voting period: 40,320 blocks (~5.6 days at 12-second slots), not 7 days: docs say developers.uniswap.org (governance process): '7-day voting period for the community to vote' / 'Duration: 2-day waiting period, 7-day voting period, 2-day timelock (if passed)' · chain says GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3: votingPeriod() = 40320 blocks = 483,840s (5.6 days) at 12-second slots;",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock",
   "pinnedBlock": 26431152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46",
    "block_number": 26431152,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "votingPeriod()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "uniswap-governance-voting-period-40320-blocks-s23",
    "repro_calldata": "0x02a251a3",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x02a251a3",
    "target_contract": "0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3",
    "target_label": "Uniswap GovernorBravoDelegator"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "uniswap v3 & governance timelock uniswap-governance-timelock blue-chip dex & governance uni 0x1f98431c8ad98523631ae4a59f267346ea31f984 0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc 0x408ed6354d4973f66138c91495f2f2fcbd8724c3",
   "slug": "uniswap-governance-timelock",
   "summary_short": "Voting period: docs 7 days · chain 5.6 days",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/uniswap-governance-timelock/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base"
   ],
   "category": "Blue-Chip DEX (Singleton PoolManager & Protocol Fees)",
   "chains": [
    "base",
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "developers.uniswap.org (v4 deployments, governance reference): 'Ethereum: 1 Contract Address PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90' / 'The contracts below are actively deployed on Ethereum mainnet.' / 'Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC' / 'Uniswap Governance has specific controls under its domain, including: Spend funds from the treasury Set and activate the protocol fee'",
    "observed": "PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 (Sourcify match): owner() = Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC: delay() = 172800s (2 days) = MINIMUM_DELAY(), admin() = GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3.",
    "recordId": "uniswap-v4-poolmanager-owner-timelock-s24",
    "surface": "Owner: the 2-day governance Timelock run by GovernorBravo"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "uniswap-v4-poolmanager-owner-timelock-s24: observed_delay_seconds = 172800",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "2d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Owner: the 2-day governance Timelock run by GovernorBravo",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Uniswap V4",
   "pinnedBlock": 58534152,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7",
    "block_number": 26433001,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "uniswap-v4-poolmanager-owner-timelock-s24",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90",
    "target_label": "Uniswap V4 PoolManager (Ethereum)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Uniswap V4 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "uniswap v4 uniswap-v4 blue-chip dex (singleton poolmanager & protocol fees) uni uniswap v4 poolmanager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90 0x498581ff718922c3f8e6a244956af099b2652b2b 0x89a5d5bf00a27d55c02951e49078a5c5771051db",
   "slug": "uniswap-v4",
   "summary_short": "Owner is the 2-day governance Timelock run by GovernorBravo, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/uniswap-v4/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "stable_rwa"
   ],
   "category": "RWA Stablecoin",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "tech.usual.money/overview/architecture/role-management states a delay of three days (259200s) before granting default admin to a new address.",
    "observed": "defaultAdminDelay() = 1s (0x01); pendingDefaultAdminDelay() = (0, 0); defaultAdmin() = 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7 (8-of-15 Gnosis Safe).",
    "recordId": "usual-money-registry-access-delay",
    "surface": "OpenZeppelin AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "usual-money-registry-access-delay: observed_delay_seconds = 1",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "1s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "usual-money-registry-access-delay: … 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7 (8-of-15 Gnosis Safe).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 8-of-15"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 3 d · chain says 1 s",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "Usual Money (USD0 / USD0++)",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401725,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1",
    "block_number": 26401725,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "defaultAdminDelay()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "usual-money-registry-access-delay",
    "repro_calldata": "0xcc8463c8",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xcc8463c8",
    "target_contract": "0x0D374775E962c3608B8F0A4b8B10567DF739bb56",
    "target_label": "RegistryAccess"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Usual Money (USD0 / USD0++) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "usual money (usd0 / usd0++) usual-money-usd0-usd0 rwa stablecoin usd0 usd0++ usual 0x0d374775e962c3608b8f0a4b8b10567df739bb56",
   "slug": "usual-money-usd0-usd0",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs 3 days · chain 1 second",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/usual-money-usd0-usd0/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base"
   ],
   "category": "Cross-Chain Messaging (Guardian-Attested Core Bridge)",
   "chains": [
    "base",
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "wormhole.com/docs (guardians / security): 'Once a sufficient delegate quorum is reached or once Guardians independently observe the event, signatures accumulate until the required 13-of-19 quorum is achieved.' / 'Some chains (such as Ethereum and Solana) are secured by all 19 Guardians.' / 'The Core Contract does not distinguish between chains with direct observation and delegated chains; it verifies only that a valid 13-of-19 VAA has been produced.'",
    "observed": "Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: getCurrentGuardianSetIndex() = 7; getGuardianSet(7) = 19 keys, expirationTime 0; quorum(19) = 13.",
    "recordId": "wormhole-core-ntt-eth-guardian-quorum-s25",
    "surface": "Messages need 13 of the 19 guardians (guardian set 7)"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "wormhole-core-ntt-eth-upgrade-governance-s25: Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x3c3d457f1522D3540AB3325Aa5f1864E34cBA9D0",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No enforced admin delay in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No signer quorum in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "wormhole-core-ntt-eth-upgrade-governance-s25: upgrades only through submitContractUpgrade with a governance message signed by the current guardian set's quorum.",
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Pause / freeze authority present; its holder is not determined"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Messages need 13 of the 19 guardians (guardian set 7)",
   "grade": "aligned",
   "gradeLabel": "ALIGNED",
   "name": "Wormhole Core (NTT)",
   "pinnedBlock": 58641783,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987",
    "block_number": 26434786,
    "call_args": [
     "0x7"
    ],
    "call_signature": "getGuardianSet(uint32)",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "wormhole-core-ntt-eth-guardian-quorum-s25",
    "repro_calldata": "0xf951975a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0xf951975a",
    "target_contract": "0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B",
    "target_label": "Wormhole Core (Ethereum)"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 4,
   "rosetteAria": "Wormhole Core (NTT) control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor not determined; Signer quorum not determined; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "wormhole core (ntt) wormhole-core-ntt cross-chain messaging (guardian-attested core bridge) wormhole ntt guardian 0x98f3c9e6e3face36baad05fe09d375ef1464288b 0xbebdb6c8ddc678ffa9f8748f85c815c556dd8ac6",
   "slug": "wormhole-core-ntt",
   "summary_short": "Messages and upgrades need 13 of 19 guardians on Ethereum and Base, as documented",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/wormhole-core-ntt/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Yield Aggregation Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "ethereum"
   ],
   "deltas": 0,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "yearn-devdocs security overview previously noted governance was not behind a timelock (live deployment enforces stricter 7-day TimelockController).",
    "observed": "governance() = 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336B7090767F367BF73 (TimelockController, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7 days); getDaddy() = 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 (6-of-9 ychad.eth Safe); getBrain() = 0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7 (3-of-6 Safe).",
    "recordId": "yearn-v3-role-manager-timelock",
    "surface": "Sampled RoleManager.governance() Timelock Wiring"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "Upgrade path not in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "controller fact: getMinDelay() = 604800s",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "7d minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "yearn-v3-role-manager-timelock: … 0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7 (3-of-6 Safe).",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Chain matches or is stronger than the documentation"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 0 s (no delay) · chain says 7 d",
   "grade": "protective",
   "gradeLabel": "PROTECTIVE",
   "name": "Yearn V3",
   "pinnedBlock": 26401725,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1",
    "block_number": 26401725,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "governance()",
    "chain": "ethereum",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "yearn-v3-role-manager-timelock",
    "repro_calldata": "0x5aa6e675",
    "rpc_env_var": "$ETH_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x5aa6e675",
    "target_contract": "0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41",
    "target_label": "RoleManager"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 1,
   "rosetteAria": "Yearn V3 control-plane rosette: Upgradeability not determined; Timelock floor strong; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity strong",
   "search": "yearn v3 yearn-v3 yield aggregation vaults yfi 0xb3bd6b2e61753c311efbcf0111f75d29706d9a41",
   "slug": "yearn-v3",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs none · chain 7 days (stricter)",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/yearn-v3/"
  },
  {
   "baskets": [
    "base",
    "lending_vaults"
   ],
   "category": "Cross-Chain Yield Optimizer Vaults",
   "chains": [
    "base"
   ],
   "deltas": 1,
   "easAttested": true,
   "evidence": {
    "documented": "docs.yo.xyz (YO V2 Security Framework): 'Approval Registry: Onchain, timelocked caps on how much of each asset a vault may approve to each contract' and 'Every path a dollar can take is written into immutable adapters and timelocked registries'",
    "observed": "YoApprovalRegistry 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021: owner() = YO Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6 Safe, v1.4.1, no modules), not the YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match). It is the approvalRegistry() of yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7 and yoUSD 0x0000000f2eB9f69274678c76222B35eEc7588a65; the Pool, BridgeRoute, MorphoMarket, SwapPair and ERC4626Vault registries are also owned directly by the Admin Multisig.",
    "recordId": "yo-protocol-approval-registry-owner-admin-safe-s22",
    "surface": "Approval Registry owner: the Admin Multisig directly, not the 48-hour timelock"
   },
   "factors": [
    {
     "evidence": "yo-protocol-vault-upgrades-behind-timelock-s22: yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xd460CF1f5D764acAD1c3276c549EE5f1BB671473, owner() = YO Timelock …",
     "key": "upgrade",
     "label": "Upgradeability",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Upgradeable behind a ≥48h delay (2d)"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "yo-protocol-approval-registry-owner-admin-safe-s22: observed_delay_seconds = 0",
     "key": "timelock",
     "label": "Timelock floor",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "0s minimum enforced delay across control surfaces"
    },
    {
     "evidence": "yo-protocol-approval-registry-owner-admin-safe-s22: … 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6 Safe, v1.4.1, no modules), not the …",
     "key": "quorum",
     "label": "Signer quorum",
     "state": "g",
     "value": "Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-6"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "emergency",
     "label": "Emergency / freeze scope",
     "state": "n",
     "value": "No pause / freeze authority in the published records"
    },
    {
     "evidence": null,
     "key": "parity",
     "label": "Docs-vs-chain parity",
     "state": "a",
     "value": "Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)"
    }
   ],
   "finding": "Timelock delay: docs say 2 d · chain says 0 s (no delay)",
   "grade": "delta",
   "gradeLabel": "DELTA",
   "name": "YO Protocol",
   "pinnedBlock": 58315414,
   "probe": {
    "block_hash": "0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd",
    "block_number": 58315414,
    "call_args": [],
    "call_signature": "owner()",
    "chain": "base",
    "check_type": "eth_call",
    "extra_calls": [],
    "id": "yo-protocol-approval-registry-owner-admin-safe-s22",
    "repro_calldata": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "rpc_env_var": "$BASE_RPC_URL",
    "selector_or_slot": "0x8da5cb5b",
    "target_contract": "0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021",
    "target_label": "YoApprovalRegistry"
   },
   "reconciled": false,
   "reconciledFrom": [],
   "reconciledTo": [],
   "records": 3,
   "rosetteAria": "YO Protocol control-plane rosette: Upgradeability strong; Timelock floor weak; Signer quorum strong; Emergency / freeze scope not determined; Docs-vs-chain parity weak",
   "search": "yo protocol yo-protocol cross-chain yield optimizer vaults yoeth yousd yo 0x38ce5e45d0f5d03e83863bb19b3b1a272c186f48 0xb4b3f5c964a360bbd7201f72a55d0c48b8ad7021 0xd460cf1f5d764acad1c3276c549ee5f1bb671473",
   "slug": "yo-protocol",
   "summary_short": "Timelock delay: docs 2 days · chain none",
   "url": "https://pacta.wtf/protocols/yo-protocol/"
  }
 ],
 "schema": "pacta.scorecards.v1"
}
