Treehouse TREE Token — Pending UUPS Upgrade Op 0x2f11...451f
Pre-execution calldata, ERC-7201 storage-namespace verification, and post-upgrade transfer-freeze authority analysis for TREE token holders and lenders (note: targets TREE governance token, not tETH).
1. What Is Queued & Why It Matters for TREE Holders & Venues
In Ethereum Mainnet transaction 0x36f7071cb0cae1f60d9b9be05fa381993e04550ee807621134dd08f74fe9dee5 (block 26396588), Treehouse's 5-of-7 Governance Safe (0x22261B4D6F629D8cF946C3524df86bF7222901F6) scheduled operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f on TimelockController (0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e, 432,000s / 5d delay) targeting the UUPS proxy TreehouseToken (TREE) (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3):
- Decoded UUPS Upgrade & Nested Init Call: Calls
upgradeToAndCall(0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6, 0xad38bf2200000000000000000000000022261b4d6f629d8cf946c3524df86bf7222901f6), upgradingTREEfrom implementation0xFC0732c97f3dF6284A7a9De2a8363CE39b497423to0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6and atomically invokingupdateBlacklister(0x22261B4D6F629D8cF946C3524df86bF7222901F6). - New Post-Upgrade 0-Second Freeze Authority: The new implementation inherits
Blacklistableand overrides_update(from, to, value)withnotBlacklisted(from) notBlacklisted(to) notBlacklisted(msg.sender). While rotatingblacklisteror upgradingTREEremains gated byonlyOwner(the 5-dayTimelockController), the designated5-of-7Safe (0x22261B4D6F629D8cF946C3524df86bF7222901F6, threshold/owner state read by scanner at block26406429, hash0xb65c04eeddc59de1affade1a5e76250fed78467ad3a69f5d292c5e5f089dab84) gains direct, 0-secondblacklist(address)/unBlacklist(address)authority overTREEsenders, recipients, andmsg.sendercallers (includingtransferFromspenders). - Asset Scope Distinction: This operation modifies only the
TREEgovernance token (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3); it does not alter thetETHLST contract (0xD11c452fc99cF405034ee446803b6F6c1F6d5ED8).
2. Deterministic Verification & ERC-7201 Storage Audit
| Verification Check | Attributed On-Chain / Cryptographic Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|
OZ hashOperation Preimage |
Independent verifier (block 26406275): keccak256(abi.encode(0x7714..d1f3, 0, 0x4f1ef286.., 0x00..00, 0x00..00)) == 0x2f11dcc3...c451f |
Pass |
| ERC-7201 Namespace Derivation | Independent verifier (block 26406275): keccak256(abi.encode(uint256(keccak256("treehouse.storage.Blacklistable")) - 1)) & ~bytes32(uint256(0xff)) == 0xdf68130666baa706ccbe7ae2392f8ae200401e1ace517b31c8be7bd447dd6b00 |
Pass |
| Source-Level Linear Layout Diff | Independent verifier (block 26406275): shared OZ base contracts in verified source are byte-identical; Blacklistable uses only ERC-7201 namespaced storage with zero new linear state variables (ccipAdmin linear declaration unchanged); constructors call _disableInitializers() |
Preserved |
| Archive Simulation & Access Guard | Scanner archive simulation (block 26406106 / 26406207): upgradeToAndCall simulated from 0x2225...467e returns 0x; unprivileged caller reverts OwnableUnauthorizedAccount (0x118cdaa7) |
Pass |
3. Curator & Venue Monitoring Summary
- Lending & DEX Pool Risk (Before
2026-11-17 04:51 UTC): Any venue acceptingTREEas collateral or LP inventory should treatTREEpost-execution as an issuer-freezable token (comparable toUSDC/USDTblacklist semantics): blacklisting a vault, pool, or borrower address blocks liquidations andtransferFromsettlements involving that address. - Scope Note: Storage verification above covers verified Solidity source-level linear declarations and ERC-7201 formula derivation at the pinned block, without certifying compiler artifact equivalence or off-chain signer policy.
Issuing Treehouse? Reconcile & Anchor 24h Institutional Clearance
Reconcile documentation drift, verify multisig and timelock control planes across archive RPCs, prepare an upstream docs reconciliation PR, and anchor a Base EAS Aligned Attestation + Curator Diligence Dossier within 24 hours.