# Pacta — full agent reference (llms-full.txt)

> Block-pinned DeFi control-plane observations for AI agents: who can change a protocol's rules (proxy admins, timelocks, Safe quorums, roles), what the docs say, and what is queued. All feeds are free, real-time and read-only; every value replays against any archive node with the given cast command.

Generated deterministically from the feeds below (data as of 2026-11-13T21:40:42Z). 14 sprints · 37 indexed records · 3 queued-operation groups · 10 governance proposals · 5 onboarding briefs.

## Feeds (all free, no key, no paywall)
- https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/index.json: Block-pinned control-plane index (every record: target, call, block, block hash, classification, Base EAS UID)
- https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/lookup.json: Protocol / token lookup catalog: 53 protocols + 8 briefs with slug, aliases, checksummed contracts, evidence basis and preflightArgs
- https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/onboarding.json: Onboarding verification scans: every check with call, calldata, raw result, decoded value; role maps
- https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/proposals.json: Live governance proposals (Aave, Euler, Morpho, Sky) mapped to block-pinned observations
- https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/radar.json: Queued timelock operations with on-chain ETAs at a finalized block
- https://pacta.wtf/llms.txt: Short index for language models
- https://pacta.wtf/llms-full.txt: This file: the complete agent reference
- https://pacta.wtf/.well-known/agent.json: A2A Agent Card
- https://pacta.wtf/.well-known/mcp.json: MCP discovery manifest
- https://pacta.wtf/SKILL.md: Portable agent skill

## How to verify any value
1. Take the record's target, call signature and arguments, block number and block hash.
2. Run the listed `cast call … --block N` (or eth_call with EIP-1898 {blockHash, requireCanonical: true}) on any archive node.
3. Run `cast block N --field hash` and compare with the recorded block hash.

## MCP server
- Name: io.github.Fractal-Neurons/pacta · package @pacta/mcp-server v0.1.3 · transport stdio.
- Status: publication_pending: @pacta/mcp-server is not yet published to npm or the MCP registry. Use the remote MCP server now (no install): https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp. The stdio server runs from a clone of the repository: node packages/mcp-server/bin/pacta-mcp.mjs.
- Remote MCP (primary, zero install, Streamable HTTP): https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp · Claude Code: `claude mcp add --transport http pacta https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp` · MCP client config: {"mcpServers": {"pacta": {"url": "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp"}}} · remote tools: pacta_lookup_protocol, pacta_check_preflight, pacta_scan_control_plane, pacta_scan_timelock_op, pacta_scan_proposal_diff, pacta_get_live_timelocks.
- Local stdio server (from a clone; npm publication pending): `node packages/mcp-server/bin/pacta-mcp.mjs`. OpenAPI 3.1: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/openapi.json.
- Free MCP tier: every tools/call takes three required, non-personal fields: caller_agent (a lowercase slug naming the calling agent, IDE or framework, e.g. claude-code, cursor, coinbase-agentkit; never a name, e-mail, IP, URL, address or secret), requester_role (autonomous_agent | defi_developer | risk_curator_analyst | security_researcher | protocol_team | institutional_allocator | individual_user) and caller_purpose (pre_trade_safety | collateral_due_diligence | yield_allocation | security_audit | governance_monitoring | integration_testing | general_research). Missing or invalid values get JSON-RPC -32602 listing what is allowed. Over REST they are optional query parameters. Location is never asked: only the Cloudflare edge country is counted; no IP is stored.
- Name lookup first: if you only have a protocol or token name (e.g. Aave, Ethena, USDe, Moonwell, kUSD), call pacta_lookup_protocol (or GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/protocols/lookup?q=<name>) to resolve its verified record: canonical slug and page URL, checksummed primary contract and controller, classification with its evidence basis (eas_attested: Base-EAS-attested, documentation compared; rpc_observed: on-chain control plane pinned over JSON-RPC, documentationComparison not_assessed; briefs), and preflightArgs {chain, address} for pacta_check_preflight. 53 protocols + 8 briefs, answered in memory with no RPC; free in every pricing mode; an empty query lists the catalog. Catalog: https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/lookup.json.
- Tools:
  - pacta_lookup_protocol (free): Resolve a protocol or token name, symbol, slug or 0x address to its verified record and preflightArgs {chain, address} (query, chain, kind, limit; no RPC)
  - pacta_list_commitments (free): Filter indexed records (protocol, classification, sprint, limit)
  - pacta_get_anchoring (free): Base EAS anchoring: PactaCommitmentRegistry, schema, sprint attestation UIDs
  - pacta_list_proposals (free): Governance proposals feed (forum, topic_id, chain, limit, include_repro)
  - pacta_x402_discover (free): x402 gateway status and discovery manifest (only when PACTA_X402_URL is set)
  - pacta_check_preflight (x402 $0.01): Pre-execution check of a contract: verdict, 0-100 risk score, proxy / admin / timelock, capabilities (chain, address, block)
  - pacta_scan_control_plane (x402 $0.10): Live control-plane scan of a contract (chain, address)
  - pacta_scan_timelock_op (x402 $0.25): Live TimelockController operation state (timelock, opId)
  - pacta_live_timelocks (x402 $0.10): Live state of tracked queued timelock operations
  - pacta_scan_proposal_diff (x402 $0.15): Re-run a tracked governance proposal's pinned reads live, pinned-vs-live diffs (forum, topicId)
- Paid tools are disabled unless PACTA_X402_URL is set (opt-in: PACTA_X402_URL=https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev); the client refuses any 402 challenge (v1 body or v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header) whose payTo, asset or network differ from the values below, or whose amount exceeds $1.00 by default. Pay with xPaymentHeader (x402 v1) or paymentSignatureHeader (x402 v2).

## x402 micropayments (optional; only for live scans of unindexed contracts)
- Network: Base (chain id 8453) · scheme exact · asset USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 · payTo 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09 (attester EOA, pacta.base.eth).
- Pacta Treasury: 0x4348DF1BEFAffcbA248B5118B1b782B1B2bdEd14 (an externally owned account; the PactaCommitmentRegistry treasury slot). Pacta treasury (direct settlement EOA): Option B direct on-chain USDC settlement of commercial issuer clearance (Option A is a formal commercial invoice). An externally owned account, not a smart-contract wallet; not the x402 payTo.
- Live gateway: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev (Cloudflare Worker; pricingMode free_launch; x402Versions [1, 2]; PayAI facilitator; maxTimeoutSeconds 60).
- Free launch: every route answers HTTP 200 at $0 with no API key and no wallet (60 requests / minute per caller). The x402 prices below apply only if the operator switches pricingMode to x402_paid.
- x402 v1: network base · amount field maxAmountRequired · challenge in the 402 JSON body · pay with X-PAYMENT · receipt X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE.
- x402 v2: network eip155:8453 · amount field amount · challenge in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (base64 JSON) · pay with PAYMENT-SIGNATURE · receipt PAYMENT-RESPONSE · extensions.bazaar carries a JSON Schema draft 2020-12 schema (https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema).
- Bare probe: A bare GET (no query) or zero-byte POST with no payment header on any paid URL returns HTTP 402 at once: the v1 JSON body (x402Version 1, network base, maxAmountRequired) plus the v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (x402Version 2, network eip155:8453, amount, extensions.bazaar with a JSON Schema draft 2020-12 schema).
- Settlement: A settled call returns 200 with both PAYMENT-RESPONSE and X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE (base64 {success, transaction, network, payer}). That receipt is the facilitator's settlement assertion bound to the payer; the MCP client checks it against the signed authorization but does not look the transaction up on Base (onchainReceiptVerified: false).
- Gateway settlement guard: In x402_paid mode the gateway verifies every settlement on Base before releasing the product: eth_getTransactionReceipt must show status 0x1 and canonical USDC Transfer(payer -> payTo 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09) logs summing to at least the route price, and replays are rejected on a best-effort basis (402 replay_settlement_tx) via synchronous same-isolate state and non-atomic eventually-consistent KV used_tx:<txHash>; concurrent cross-isolate races are not globally atomic without Durable Objects. Otherwise the product is withheld: 402 unconfirmed_or_reverted_settlement_tx / insufficient_onchain_usdc_transfer, or 502 settlement_rpc_unavailable when no Base RPC answers.
- Paid routes (GET query or POST JSON body with the same names):
  - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum|base&address=0x…: 10000 atomic USDC ($0.01)
  - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/control-plane?chain=ethereum|base&address=0x…: 100000 atomic USDC ($0.10)
  - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/timelock-op?chain=ethereum|base&timelock=0x…&opId=0x…: 250000 atomic USDC ($0.25)
  - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/proposal-diff?forum=aave|euler|morpho|sky&topicId=<id>: 150000 atomic USDC ($0.15)
  - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/briefs/live-timelocks: 100000 atomic USDC ($0.10)
- Free: GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/health, GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/.well-known/x402, GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/sample/control-plane (/.well-known/x402 is the Bazaar discovery manifest, discoverable: true).

## On-chain anchoring (Base, chain id 8453)
- PactaCommitmentRegistry 0x35D21Bb4Df6586FE7759b5e57263ffeB3e1fd872 (Sourcify verified); attester pacta.base.eth 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09.
- EAS schema 0x7ff485bc1159dff3c70eefcb9dff2d65be990301760c2d53799e5a45e3badf83: uint16 sprintId, uint64 chainId, uint64 blockNumber, bytes32 blockHash, uint8 verifiedCount, uint8 driftCount, bytes32 summarySha256, string prURI.
- Sprint 1 attestation UID 0x34049a2c64fe3355f8e325481234754c8422a48bb4784fed1d028fa40eb93058
- Sprint 2 attestation UID 0xca4b525bf5142d8e88433cbed2a1aa87bb06a97d1353cb77621ec41a51ce8101
- Sprint 3 attestation UID 0x291e513f3d697eea41b20bd57bf53acdb085b5566e499dd655ff46d7cd9d95a8
- Sprint 4 attestation UID 0xa26f81b0e68248c7f286527286b3d2e6b299502d53f4dfbc4397df7d22262986
- Sprint 5 attestation UID 0x804289d4357b0a8d5a360911ec450c13ca36c4422d1e811c4c7040ef7d2628e5
- Sprint 6 attestation UID 0x749d96e1a3d214a4ab66c528ca12c84dce085fa138dc370dd0eb817d890f09fa
- Sprint 7 attestation UID 0x3e0e0e1b62de65b277b1399f9833cd70baf627e5ba69e17f1f4f76be30008779
- Sprint 8 attestation UID 0xfd7ce0f2b980da6606c8cd755da45d99f9ae4826e6df1321ff52c2b0f8e6a6c2
- Sprint 9 attestation UID 0x0e017bc4399101f9fef3d98a434dd9f2829b6e386e7733408dfd4b626d186eea
- Sprint 10 attestation UID 0xfdd83c8091ef6e8ffe67e8a55a78892fcfbb1092683b21ff2d85f8cc09750e6c
- Sprint 11 attestation UID 0x754edd7612258b755ff2e56903243d1f8867bad53c29ce3febb5ed9114005e42
- Sprint 12 attestation UID 0x7caae9c22c86ae171392def07dce83fa5da6fbf904b1ba9b5ff66a5021b16de9
- Sprint 13 attestation UID 0x6afd266541ea1643b680ce6ec15d218874356598820987c6b3eaf16342cd075c
- Sprint 14 attestation UID 0x8965ae6e51a78132a77eb14c0ac1c6cd1be357d6f261253efff28869478ae5b8
- Sprint 15 attestation UID 0x967a4935786194575835d5a46e3e39b1d553225deb6a96c7ff4acf52a34dff22
- Sprint 16 attestation UID 0x217d213de3cd9ef094670ff69d258af35adf132406caa547f729f487dc9d7e58

## Sentinel (Phase 2)
- PactaSentinelTripwire.sol: an ownerless, immutable contract granted Morpho Vault V2 isSentinel. Vault owners register rules (predicate module + config, cap id, adapter, liquidity reader). trigger(ruleId) is permissionless but re-checks the broken invariant on-chain in the same transaction, then sets the absolute cap to 0 (committed even if deallocate or the EAS receipt revert), deallocates min(allocation, liquid assets), and sweepRemaining(ruleId) drains the rest as liquidity returns. Zero custody. Predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate. Status: built and tested (Foundry, 107 tests incl. invariants and fork tests); not audited, not deployed.

## Governance proposals (from /api/v1/proposals.json)
### aave-25128: [ARFC] Onboard cirBTC on Aave v3 Core and Aave V4 Core
- https://governance.aave.com/t/25128 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard
- ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json circle-cirbtc-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/circle-cirbtc-eth/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- Upgrade authority: proxy admin() = 0xC9cE…a9BD, EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent. Implementation 0x4350…02dd; version() = “2”.
- Operational roles: owner() 0xd501…5182 (EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent); pauser() 0xabde…A222 (EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent); blacklister() 0xb5BE…1D79 (EOA (no contract code); 495 transactions sent); masterMinter() 0xC0Cc…87A2 (contract (5,346 bytes of code), owner() 0x5183…2256: EOA (no contract code); 9 transactions sent).
- None of these roles sits behind an on-chain TimelockController or multisig contract at the pinned block: upgrade, pause, blacklist and minter configuration take effect in the transaction that calls them. Key custody (HSM / MPC) is off-chain and not observable here.

### aave-25499: [ARFC] Onboard PAXGy to Aave V4 Global Dollar Hub
- https://governance.aave.com/t/25499 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard
- ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json paxos-paxgy-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/paxos-paxgy-eth/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- owner() of the vault, accountant, teller and manager is the TimelockController 0x0DcC…df08 (getMinDelay() = 86,400s). The RolesAuthority 0xC444…99DD is also owned by it. Owner-only changes (including setManageRoot, which no role holds) therefore wait at least 24 hours.
- Timelock roles (9 events replayed): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → 0x0DcC…df08; PROPOSER_ROLE → 0x0000…3f2F; EXECUTOR_ROLE → 0x0000…3f2F, 0x1D60…9312, 0x317e…A024, 0x4143…652C, 0x6Be5…526E, 0xFBf7…1A5e; CANCELLER_ROLE → 0x0000…3f2F.
- Capabilities granted through the RolesAuthority execute with no delay. updateExchangeRate is held by the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0000…3f2F and by 0x1755…4B56 (EOA (no contract code); 8,269 transactions sent). The accountant bounds each update: upper 10004 bps, lower 10000 bps of the current rate, at least 3,600s apart (current rate 1.004425 PAXG per PAXGy; platform / performance fee 0 / 0 bps). In the upstream Veda AccountantWithRateProviders source, an update outside these bounds or sooner than the minimum delay stores the new rate and pauses the accountant instead of reverting (the deployed bytecode was not compared with that source here).
- Full role → capability → holder map below, replayed from 68 RolesAuthority events (blocks 25,740,680–26,408,330). Selectors without a public signature are shown as raw 4-byte values.
- Teller 0x41AB…A6f7: isPaused() = false, shareLockPeriod() = 0s. The previous teller 0x5C43…fe72 is paused (isPaused() = true).

### aave-25721: [ARFC] Onboard syrupUSDC to Aave V4 on Arc
- https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-onboard-syrupusdc-to-aave-v4-on-arc/25721 · issuer_control_plane: the proposed collateral's issuer permission layer
- ethereum block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · source /api/v1/index.json maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate
- Maple Finance V2 / Syrup — EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock [parameter_delta, Sprint 6, block 26401540]: EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec). Documented: Governor admin actions documentation describes GovernorTimelock (3-day delay) governance path.

### aave-25902: [Direct-To-AIP] Onboard PT-sUSDe-28JAN2027 to Aave V3 Plasma Instance
- https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-onboard-pt-susde-28jan2027-to-aave-v3-plasma-instance/25902 · issuer_control_plane: queued Ethena minting-collateral changes underlying sUSDe
- ethereum block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · source /api/v1/index.json ethena-minting-rlusd-usat-onboarding-ops · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/ethena-ops-0x0ca0-0x1fe5/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — EthenaTimelockController 1d delay — queued RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding [parameter_delta, Sprint 14, block 26406106]: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operations 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b (ETA 1794651635, 2026-11-14 10:20:35 UTC) and 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 (ETA 1794651743, 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC) are pending. Both call EthenaMinting (0xe3490297a08d6fC8Da46Edb7B6142E4F461b62D3).addSupportedAsset (0x7cfbc42f) for RLUSD and USAT as STABLE with 200M / 20M USDe-per-block mint / redeem caps, the same as the USDC / USDT configuration. EthenaMinting.stablesDeltaLimit() = 0. Documented: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks (see the Sprint 7 record); public brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/ethena-ops-0x0ca0-0x1fe5/.

### aave-25927: Tether America USD (USAT) on Aave Avalanche Assessments
- https://governance.aave.com/t/25927 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard
- ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json tether-usat-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/tether-usat-eth/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- USAT 0x0704…8b68 is an EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x8B98…4d0e, ProxyAdmin 0x3e4C…d9C7 whose owner() is 0x62b3…c5Cb. USAT.owner() is the same address.
- That controller is a legacy MultiSigWallet (submit / confirm / execute; 5,705 bytes), required() = 3 of 5 owners. It is not a TimelockController: an upgrade or owner action executes as soon as the third confirmation lands.
- Linked queue: Ethena timelock 0xE8Dc…7c94 (86,400s delay) holds two pending operations (isOperationPending = true / true) that add RLUSD and USAT to EthenaMinting; the USAT operation becomes executable at 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC. See the Ethena pre-execution brief.
- The forum thread assesses the bridged USAT on Avalanche; this brief covers the canonical Ethereum token whose redemption and credit exposure that bridged asset inherits.

### aave-26304: [Direct-to-AIP] Ethena E-Mode Consolidation on Aave V3
- https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-ethena-e-mode-consolidation-on-aave-v3/26304 · issuer_control_plane: Ethena admin timelock and operating Safe
- ethereum block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · source /api/v1/index.json ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate
- Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — TimelockController MinDelay & Dev Multisig Quorum [parameter_delta, Sprint 7, block 26401638]: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe). Documented: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks and 7 signatures (key-addresses.md lists 5/11); Risk Committee forum topic 810 (Jul 2026) notes 1-day delay.

### euler-1850: efixDI/USDC on Base — tokenized Brazilian DI fund, D+0 NAV redemption (governedPerspective whitelist)
- https://forum.euler.finance/t/1850 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard
- base block 57050397 (0xd6d02efb420f81b3f0e095d78453362c4488afb9adc0f8e1c411bb265beb88a7) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json efix-efixdi-base · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/efix-efixdi-base/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- One 2-of-3 Safe, 0x9040…EeD4 (getThreshold() = 2), is governorAdmin() of the USDC vault, governor() of the EulerRouter (= 0x9040…EeD4) and holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on efixDI+. No TimelockController sits between that Safe and these contracts, so the router's oracle configuration, LTVs and caps can be changed by one executed 2-of-3 Safe transaction, with no enforced on-chain delay.
- The router prices efixDI+ through the custom adapter 0x9CD2…7788 (name() = “efixDI/USDC par x ChainlinkBRLUSD”). Borrow / liquidation LTV 70% / 77%, interest fee 15%.
- Supply cap 3,440.00 USDC, borrow cap 23,000.00 USDC; total assets 3,480.37 USDC, borrows 3,135.58 USDC (90.1% utilization).
- MINTER_ROLE on efixDI+ is held directly by 0x8f8C…CCb1, an account with no contract code (0 bytes) and 1,159 transactions sent, which is also one of the three signers of the governor Safe. Calls gated only by MINTER_ROLE need no second signature and no delay.
- efixDI+ AccessControl role history (19 events, blocks 41,724,585–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → 0x9040…EeD4 (2-of-3 Safe); PAUSER_ROLE → 0x9040…EeD4 (2-of-3 Safe); MINTER_ROLE → 0x8f8C…CCb1 (EOA, 1,159 txs, signer of 0x9040…EeD4).
- EFIX.owner() = 0x7C54…7537: an EOA carrying an EIP-7702 delegation designator to 0xdf02…8792, 156 transactions sent. It is not a Safe or a timelock.

### euler-1862: kUSD/USDC isolated market on Euler Base: deployed, ungoverned, and an underwriting packet for curators
- https://forum.euler.finance/t/1862 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard
- base block 57050397 (0xd6d02efb420f81b3f0e095d78453362c4488afb9adc0f8e1c411bb265beb88a7) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json kerne-kusd-base · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/kerne-kusd-base/
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- The market layer has no governor: governorAdmin() returns 0x0000…0000 on the USDC vault and 0x0000…0000 on the kUSD escrow vault, and EulerRouter.governor() returns 0x0000…0000. Oracle, LTVs and caps cannot be changed by anyone.
- Caps are unset and cannot be set: supply cap none (AmountCap 0), borrow cap none (AmountCap 0). Exposure limits exist only in the curator vault that allocates to this market.
- kUSD is priced at a fixed rate: getQuote(1e18 kUSD → USDC) = 1.00 USDC from 0x8f27…D2D3. Borrow / liquidation LTV 60.00% / 65.00%. No market price feeds liquidations, so lender recovery depends on kUSD redemption and its backing.
- kUSD implements AccessControl (supportsInterface(0x7965db0b) = true). DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on kUSD is held by the TimelockController 0x36A1…0D72 (hasRole = true; getMinDelay() = 172,800s, 48h). The 2-of-3 Safe 0x52d3…4877 is its proposer, executor and canceller (true / true / true) and does not hold DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on kUSD itself.
- MINTER_ROLE is held by 0xaBDE…9803 (kUSD() = 0x5C2E…0AA3, paused() = false), whose DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is the same timelock (true). Role changes on kUSD and on the minter pass a 48-hour public queue.
- kUSD AccessControl role history (16 events, blocks 44,448,090–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); MINTER_ROLE → 0xaBDE…9803 (contract, 11,376 bytes).
- kUSD admin TimelockController role history (4 events, blocks 49,495,127–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); PROPOSER_ROLE → 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe); EXECUTOR_ROLE → 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe); CANCELLER_ROLE → 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe).
- kUSD minter contract role history (11 events, blocks 48,469,020–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE → 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); MANAGER_ROLE → 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes), 0xC47a…Cc8E (contract, 1,012 bytes).

### morpho-2301: [RFC] A User-centric DeFi Collateral Transparency Framework - Phase 1
- https://forum.morpho.org/t/rfc-a-user-centric-defi-collateral-transparency-framework-phase-1/2301 · framework_reference: block-pinned Morpho Blue and MetaMorpho control-plane observations the framework discusses
- ethereum block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · source /api/v1/index.json morpho-blue-singleton-owner, metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate
- Morpho Blue Core — Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds [aligned_baseline, Sprint 3, block 26401070]: Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070. Documented: Morpho Blue core singleton ownership and immutable fee/LLTV bound specification.
- MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT) — Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration [parameter_delta, Sprint 5, block 26401405]: Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian). Documented: Peer Re7 curated vault architecture and Aragon guardian integration.

### sky-28390: [November 19, 2026] Proposed Changes to Spark for Upcoming Spell
- https://forum.skyeco.com/t/november-19-2026-proposed-changes-to-spark-for-upcoming-spell/28390 · governance_path: the GSM pause delay every Spark spell passes through
- ethereum block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · source /api/v1/index.json spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay
- Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate
- Spark / Sky — Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay [aligned_baseline, Sprint 7, block 26401638]: GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY). Documented: Sky 48-hour Governance Security Module (GSM) delay and Spark SubDAO proxy ownership.

## Queued timelock operations (from /api/v1/radar.json)
Refreshed at finalized block 26406890 (2026-11-13 15:18 UTC).
- Ethena: Ethena USDe — RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding · timelock 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (86400s) · 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b pending=true eta=1794651635; 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 pending=true eta=1794651743
- Treehouse: Treehouse TREE — UUPS upgrade adding Blacklistable · timelock 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e (432000s) · 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f pending=true eta=1794891107
- ether.fi: ether.fi — LayerZero V2 delegate moved behind the 10-day timelock · timelock 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 (864000s) · 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f pending=true eta=1795193651

## Indexed records (from /api/v1/index.json)
- ethena-minting-rlusd-usat-onboarding-ops [parameter_delta] Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — EthenaTimelockController 1d delay — queued RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 · getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operations 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b (ETA 1794651635, 2026-11-14 10:20:35 UTC) and 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 (ETA 1794651743, 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC) are pending. Both call EthenaMinting (0xe3490297a08d6fC8Da46Edb7B6142E4F461b62D3).addSupportedAsset (0x7cfbc42f) for RLUSD and USAT as STABLE with 200M / 20M USDe-per-block mint / redeem caps, the same as the USDC / USDT configuration. EthenaMinting.stablesDeltaLimit() = 0.
- inverse-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-sentinel [protective_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — BorrowController stalenessThreshold 0-sentinel — queued 48h fix for sDOLA market · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 · Timelock (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h), and the Timelock is BorrowController.operator(). stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 0, which disables the oracle staleness check (isPriceStale returns false when the threshold is 0). A queued Timelock transaction (queuedTransactions = true) sets it to 86500s at eta 1794633827 (2026-11-14 05:23:47 UTC), which enables the check (protective).
- kelp-rseth-proxyadmin-10d-timelock-s14 [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — rsETH & LRTDepositPool ProxyAdmin owned by 10d TimelockController · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7 · rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) and LRTDepositPool (0x036676389e48133B63a802f8635AD39E752D375D) EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78); owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1) with getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d).
- treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11 [aligned_baseline] Treehouse (TREE / tETH) — TREE UUPS owner = 5d TimelockController — queued Blacklistable upgrade · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e · getMinDelay() = 432000s (5d); TREE (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3).owner() = TimelockController. Operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f is pending (ETA 1794891107, 2026-11-17 04:51:47 UTC). It upgrades TREE to implementation 0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6, which adds a Blacklistable module whose blacklister is a 5-of-7 Safe; after execution that Safe can freeze transfers with no delay.
- etherfi-core-timelock-op-0x244e [protective_delta] ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH) — Core Upgrade Timelock (10d) — queued LayerZero V2 setDelegate to Timelock · Sprint 13 · block 26405302 (0xe05f4fd5698556131e7514b3a8eb24960962a768f8e0bfe0e99e3f1681127f65) · target 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 · getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d); operation 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1795193651 (2026-11-20 16:54:11 UTC). The scheduled call EtherfiL1SyncPoolETH (0xD789870beA40D056A4d26055d0bEFcC8755DA146).setDelegate(EtherFiTimelock) puts the LayerZero V2 endpoint delegate behind the 10-day timelock.
- stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock [parameter_delta] Stader Labs (ETHx) — Manager Safe Quorum & 7-Day TimelockController Admin Path · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF · Manager Safe (0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF) getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController (0x1112D5C55670Cb5144BF36114C20a122908068B9, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7d, PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-9 Community Safe 0x45B977CeCB9Dfaa17dFcBa88826ef684b8489fF6), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on ETHx and StaderConfig (0x4ABEF2263d5A5ED582FC9A9789a41D85b68d69DB); ETHx MINTER_ROLE held by StakePoolsManager (0xcf5EA1b38380f6aF39068375516Daf40Ed70D299), totalSupply = 58,434.16 ETHx (18 dec).
- stakewise-v3-oseth-oracle-quorum-and-ltv [aligned_baseline] StakeWise V3 (osETH) — Sampled Keeper Oracle Quorum, osETH Fee & LTV Configuration · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5 · Sampled Keeper (0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5) totalOracles() = 11, rewardsMinOracles() = 6, validatorsMinOracles() = 6 (6-of-11 oracle signature quorum); osETH (0xf1C9acDc66974dFB6dEcB12aA385b9cD01190E38) owner() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, totalSupply = 148,452.02 osETH (18 dec); OsTokenVaultController (0x2A261e60FB14586B474C208b1B7AC6D0f5000306) feePercent() = 500 (5%), totalAssets = 160,753.18 ETH; OsTokenConfig (0x287d1e2A8dE183A8bf8f2b09Fa1340fBd766eb59) getConfig(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) = (1.01e18, 0.92e18, 0.90e18) (90% mint LTV, 92% liquidation threshold).
- superstate-ustb-uscc-fee-and-usdc-alignment [aligned_baseline] Superstate (USTB / USCC) — Sampled USDC Subscription Fee & Fund Supply Alignment · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e · Sampled USTB (0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e) supportedStablecoins(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48) returns sweep destination 0x774AE279c21B6a17a6E2BD5ab5398FF98F398807 and subscription fee = 0 for USDC; USTB totalSupply = 39,459,575.14 USTB (6 dec), USCC (0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c) totalSupply = 4,066,680.13 USCC (6 dec).
- swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds [aligned_baseline] Swell (swETH / rswETH) — Sampled 7-Day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins & Reprice Bounds · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b · swETH (0xf951E335afb289353dc249e82926178EaC7DEd78) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0x25EAf579cA2255fAA5463c635eec28697b5b8846) and rswETH (0xFAe103DC9cf190eD75350761e95403b7b8aFa6c0) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0xD750B84845f1cAdfEAc63f96Ec74635e949bFd14) both resolve owner() to SwellTimelock (0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b, delay() = 604800s / 7d, admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0x20fDF47509C5eFC0e1101e3CE443691781C17F90), which is also the sole PLATFORM_ADMIN on both AccessControlManagers (0x625087d72c762254a72CB22cC2ECa40da6b95EAC, 0x796592b2092F7E150C48643dA19Dd2F28be3333F); minimumRepriceTime = 3600s (1h), maximumRepriceDifferencePercentage = 1% (1e16); swETH totalSupply = 9,635.13 swETH, rswETH totalSupply = 10,363.44 rswETH.
- curve-crvusd-factory-lending-owner-proxy [parameter_delta] Curve Finance (crvUSD) — ControllerFactory Admin Proxy & EmergencyDAO Debt-Ceiling Guard · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC · ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC) admin() = LendingOwnerProxy (0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1), where dao() = CurveOwnershipAgent (0x40907540d8a6C65c637785e8f8B742ae6b0b9968, Aragon voteTime = 604800s / 7d on 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) and emergency_dao() = 5-of-9 EmergencyDAO Safe (0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c); crvUSD (0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E) minter() = ControllerFactory, totalSupply = 2,134,809,204.98 crvUSD; debt_ceiling(0x370a449FeBb9411c95bf897021377fe0B7D100c0) = 1,000,000,000 crvUSD.
- gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe [parameter_delta] Gearbox V3 / V3.1 — LegacyTimelock Delay & InstanceManager Safe Quorum · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b · LegacyTimelock (0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b) delay() = 129600s (36 hours, GIP-104), admin() = LegacyGovernor (0x29B97F37B3E0C704bCFD785F5b7bBa2A0B7df2c7); InstanceManager (0x77777777144339Bdc3aCceE992D8d4D31734CB2e) owner() = 4-of-21 Gnosis Safe (0x1E9ec044853611F4bCD4BBcFE7657508BD1c53D3); Tech (0xA7D5DDc1b8557914F158076b228AA91eF613f1D5, 6-of-12), Veto (0xbb803559B4D58b75E12dd74641AB955e8B0Df40E, 4-of-12), Treasury (0x7b065Fcb0760dF0CEA8CFd144e08554F3CeA73D1, 5-of-10), and Fee (0x3E965117A51186e41c2BB58b729A1e518A715e5F, 5-of-10) Guard Safes match documented thresholds.
- lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock [aligned_baseline] Lombard (LBTC) — Sampled Core ProxyAdmin Wiring & 24h TimelockController · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59 · LBTC (0x8236a87084f8B84306f72007F36F2618A5634494) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xbae061C73876952aa2C5e483B74DfA785425f879), whose owner() — along with AssetRouter ProxyAdmin (0xBf4202c8a0d852D432266dfE112ED624a1a36754) and Consortium ProxyAdmin (0x1629AE77cC70DaAc95Ec479caAEA23ECE77c67c5) — resolves to TimelockController (0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59, getMinDelay() = 86400s / 24h, EXECUTOR_ROLE held by 3-of-5 Safe 0x251a604E8E8f6906d60f8dedC5aAeb8CD38F4892 with Guard 0x87bde523e05Fee2C557d6F592F7EB686C69189Ab); LBTC totalSupply = 6,203.54 LBTC (8 dec).
- resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe [aligned_baseline] Resolv (USR / RLP) — Sampled USR AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay & Request Counters · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110 · Sampled USR (0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110) defaultAdmin() = 4-of-6 Core Safe (0xD6889F307BE1b83Bb355d5DA7d4478FB0d2Af547) with defaultAdminDelay() = 86400s (1 day); sampled UsrExternalRequestsManager (0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861) and RlpExternalRequestsManager (0xc7AB90c2Ea9271EFB31f5fA2843Eeb4B331eaFA0) return paused() = true; USR totalSupply = 6,085,929.53 USR, RLP (0x4956b52aE2fF65D74CA2d61207523288e4528f96) totalSupply = 1,592,731.62 RLP.
- lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock [aligned_baseline] Lido (stETH / Dual Governance) — EmergencyProtectedTimelock Delays, DualGovernance & Committee Safes · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316 · EmergencyProtectedTimelock (0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316) getAfterSubmitDelay() = 259200s (3d), getAfterScheduleDelay() = 86400s (1d), getGovernance() = DualGovernance (0xC1db28B3301331277e307FDCfF8DE28242A4486E), getEmergencyProtectionDetails() = (2592000, 0, 1813449600); Emergency Activation (0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45, 4-of-7 Safe), Emergency Execution (0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF, 5-of-7 Safe), Reseal (0xFFe21561251c49AdccFad065C94Fb4931dF49081, 5-of-6 Safe), and CircuitBreaker (0x8772E3a2D86B9347A2688f9bc1808A6d8917760C, 3-of-6 Safe); stETH totalSupply = 9,759,371.53 stETH.
- mantle-lsp-meth-upgrade-timelock [protective_delta] Mantle Liquid Staking (mETH / cmETH) — Core Proxy EIP-1967 Admin Slot & 3-Day UpgradeTimelock · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2 · mETH (0xd5F7838F5C461fefF7FE49ea5ebaF7728bB0ADfa) & Staking (0xe3cBd06D7dadB3F4e6557bAb7EdD924CD1489E8f) EIP-1967 admin slots point to UpgradeTimelock (0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3 days) and PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-14 Security Council Safe (0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f); mETH totalSupply = 217,256.94 mETH.
- ondo-ousg-rate-limiter-and-flux-timelock [parameter_delta] Ondo Finance (OUSG & Flux Finance) — OUSG RateLimiter Global Subscription Limit & Flux 1d Timelock · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c · RateLimiter (0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c) globalSubscriptionLimits(0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92) word [2] = 100000000000000000000000000 ($100M per 86400s window), globalRedemptionLimits(OUSG) word [2] = 50000000000000000000000000 ($50M per 86400s); Flux Comptroller (0x95Af143a021DF745bc78e845b54591C53a8B3A51) admin() = FluxTimelock (0x2c5898da4DF1d45EAb2B7B192a361C3b9EB18d9c, delay() = 86400s / 1d, admin() = 0x336505EC1BcC1A020EeDe459f57581725D23465A); OUSG totalSupply = 1,110,569.33 OUSG.
- symbiotic-core-immutable-registries-and-safes [aligned_baseline] Symbiotic Core — Sampled Non-Upgradeable Core Registries & Factory/Adapter Safes · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346 · VaultFactory (0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346), OperatorRegistry (0xAd817a6Bc954F678451A71363f04150FDD81Af9F), and NetworkRegistry (0xC773b1011461e7314CF05f97d95aa8e92C1Fd8aA) hold zero EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots (0x00...00); VaultFactory.owner() = 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0); AdapterRegistry (0x788823C9579A049D986eB76718bC758C0998594a) owner() = 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (0xf6BB2e64Bd201A862f2Fe5461fc7Ef01e2040b6A).
- aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1 [aligned_baseline] Aave V3 / GHO — ACLManager Admin Role, Executor Lvl1 Delay & Guardian Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xc2aaCf6553D20d1e9d78E365AAba8032af9c85b0 · ACLManager hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A) = true; PayloadsController (0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5) getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); GHO (0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f) totalSupply = 699,000,000 GHO.
- compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe [aligned_baseline] Compound V3 (Comet) — Comet Governor, 48h Timelock & Pause-Guardian Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 · Sampled cUSDCv3 (0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3) & cWETHv3 (0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94) governor() = CompoundTimelock (0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925, delay() = 172800s / 48h, admin() = CompoundGovernor 0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0); pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c).
- eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock [aligned_baseline] EigenLayer Core — Core ProxyAdmin, Dual-Owner Executor Safe & 10d Timelock · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d · DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = 1-of-2 ExecutorMultisig (0x369e6F597e22EaB55fFb173C6d9cD234BD699111) shared between 10d TimelockController (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.
- kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — ProxyAdmin 10d Timelock & LRTConfig Admin Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1 · rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78), owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1, getMinDelay() = 864000s / 10d); LRTConfig (0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7) DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by 6-of-11 Safe (0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d); rsETH totalSupply = 338,071.33 rsETH.
- renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee [parameter_delta] Renzo Protocol (ezETH) — DepositQueue.feeBasisPoints Parameter vs. Staking Docs · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60 · feeBasisPoints() = 1500 (15%); Admin Multisig (0xD1e6626310fD54Eceb5b9a51dA2eC329D6D4B68A) is 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe; ezETH (0xbf5495Efe5DB9ce00f80364C8B423567e58d2110) totalSupply = 39,495.32 ezETH.
- usual-money-registry-access-delay [parameter_delta] Usual Money (USD0 / USD0++) — OpenZeppelin AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0x0D374775E962c3608B8F0A4b8B10567DF739bb56 · defaultAdminDelay() = 1s (0x01); pendingDefaultAdminDelay() = (0, 0); defaultAdmin() = 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7 (8-of-15 Gnosis Safe).
- yearn-v3-role-manager-timelock [protective_delta] Yearn V3 — Sampled RoleManager.governance() Timelock Wiring · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41 · governance() = 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336B7090767F367BF73 (TimelockController, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7 days); getDaddy() = 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 (6-of-9 ychad.eth Safe); getBrain() = 0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7 (3-of-6 Safe).
- ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe [parameter_delta] Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — TimelockController MinDelay & Dev Multisig Quorum · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 · getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe).
- etherfi-core-timelocks [aligned_baseline] ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH) — Sampled Upgrade & Operating Timelock Delays · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 · Upgrade Timelock getMinDelay() = 864000s (10 days); Operating Timelock (0xcD425f44758a08BaAB3C4908f3e3dE5776e45d7a) getMinDelay() = 172800s (2 days); LiquidityPool (0x308861A430be4cce5502d0A12724771Fc6DaF216) getTotalPooledEther = 2,276,605.53 ETH.
- spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay [aligned_baseline] Spark / Sky — Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0xbE286431454714F511008713973d3B053A2d38f3 · GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY).
- liquity-v2-bold-immutability [aligned_baseline] Liquity V2 (BOLD) — Sampled Owner & EIP-1967 Slot Alignment · Sprint 6 · block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · target 0x6440f144b7e50D6a8439336510312d2F54beB01D · BOLD.owner() = 0x0; Governance (0x807DEf5E7d057DF05C796F4bc75C3Fe82Bd6EeE1) owner() = 0x0; CollateralRegistry (0xf949982B91C8c61e952B3bA942cbbfaef5386684) EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x00...00.
- maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin [parameter_delta] Maple Finance V2 / Syrup — EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock · Sprint 6 · block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · target 0xBe10aDcE8B6E3E02Db384E7FaDA5395DD113D8b3 · EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec).
- fluid-instadapp-vault-factory-auth [parameter_delta] Fluid / Instadapp — VaultFactory.isVaultAuth Migration Scope · Sprint 5 · block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · target 0x324c5Dc1fC42c7a4D43d92df1eBA58a54d13Bf2d · isVaultAuth(vault, 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e) returns true on Vault 76 (0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8), Vault 110 (0xee327311D8640156E87eC33ea55FcbF2309e0ce6), Vault 111 (0x984636a30ed2B4A61FB7150CED644096349275d3), and Vault 144 (0x0e19B64F3A79FeeE12Df1b6f239929c6ab6C7ED0) per IGP-98 / IGP-126 migration configuration.
- metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity [parameter_delta] MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT) — Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration · Sprint 5 · block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · target 0x78Fc2c2eD1A4cDb5402365934aE5648aDAd094d0 · Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian).
- convex-booster-governance-chain [aligned_baseline] Convex Finance — Sampled Booster Governance Ownership Chain · Sprint 4 · block 26401312 (0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109) · target 0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31 · Convex Booster (0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31) owner() resolves via 0x3cE6408F923326f81A7D7929952947748180f1E6 -> 0x256e1bbA846611C37CF89844a02435E6C098b86D -> 3-of-5 DAO Multisig (0xa3C5A1e09150B75ff251c1a7815A07182c3de2FB) at block 26401312.
- mellow-lido-earn-curator-quorum [parameter_delta] Mellow Protocol / Lido Earn — Curator Safe Quorum & Lazy Admin Signer Overlap · Sprint 4 · block 26401312 (0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109) · target 0xe5abcc40196174Ae0d12153dE286F0D8E401769d · getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe); DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on earnETH (0x6a37725ca7f4CE81c004c955f7280d5C704a249e) and earnUSD (0x014e6DA8F283C4aF65B2AA0f201438680A004452) held by 5-of-8 Lazy Vault Admin Safe (0x0Dd73341d6158a72b4D224541f1094188f57076E, Timelock 0x363Ba8843d06BA5968f55C26aB055162eDd62189 getMinDelay = 0s), where all 5 Curator signers are Lazy Vault Admin owners.
- etherfi-liquid-veda-roles-authority [aligned_baseline] ether.fi Liquid / Veda BoringVault — Sampled RolesAuthority Owner & Timelock Wiring · Sprint 3 · block 26401070 (0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234) · target 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122 · AccountantWithRateProviders (0x0d05D94a5F1E76C18fbeB7A13d17C8a314088198) authority() = 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122; RolesAuthority.owner() = 0xD829F278016b90FEc735F9A12Bf8b75E06102C89 (TimelockController, getMinDelay = 86400s / 1d at block 26401070).
- morpho-blue-singleton-owner [aligned_baseline] Morpho Blue Core — Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds · Sprint 3 · block 26401070 (0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234) · target 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb · Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070.
- fx-protocol-v2-treasury-admin [parameter_delta] f(x) Protocol v2 — ProtocolTreasury DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Holders · Sprint 2 · block 26400152 (0xa9a61622304ec55c5fec49abbcabec60069f66f28792cf841bdd7aef12ce63aa) · target 0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6 · DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on all 4 v2 ProtocolTreasury proxies (0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6, 0xb178197E88D58Da21bE22A408E850d1e6Dc09A38, 0x6D9e81c5b7C4b37d0Fe9E8CDA776e057f4040868, 0x87d5e4cAaF4358A4337C10859c7107c7AEF4f8Ce) held directly by OpsSafe (0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF, 6-of-9 Safe) and EmergencySafe (0x28c921adAC4c1072658eB01a28DA06b5F651eF62, 3-of-4 Safe), while Timelock (0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, getMinDelay = 259200s) holds false.
- inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe [parameter_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock · Sprint 1 · block 26399876 (0x8bf896b892683ff3267b88b367ab015a70cf5caf53542eb405f4f648f6bcde8a) · target 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 · GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h).

## RPC-pinned records (from /api/v1/rpc-pinned.json; NOT EAS-attested)
No sprint number, summary document or Base EAS UID: block-pinned public JSON-RPC reads, independently re-read at the same block.
Classification rpc_observed: on-chain control plane pinned at an archive block height over JSON-RPC; documentation parameter comparison unassessed (documentation is linked for reference only).
- across-protocol-hubpool-control-plane [rpc_observed] Across Protocol (HubPool) — AcrossHubPool · 3-of-5 Safe Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda · AcrossHubPool (0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (19,572 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/across-protocol-hubpool/
- aerodrome-finance-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Aerodrome Finance (Base) — AerodromePoolFactory & AerodromeVoter Control Plane · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da · AerodromePoolFactory (0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (3,516 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract AerodromeVoter (0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5, 16,912 bytes) verified live at the same block. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aerodrome-finance-base/
- balancer-v2-vault-timelock-control-plane [rpc_observed] Balancer V2 Vault & TimelockAuthorizer — BalancerV2Vault · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8 · BalancerV2Vault (0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (24,512 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct getAuthorizer() returns governance controller contract 0x6048A8c631Fb7e77EcA533Cf9C29784e482391e7. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/balancer-v2-vault-timelock/
- bedrock-unieth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Bedrock (uniETH) — RockXStakingProxy · 3-of-5 Safe Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xF1376bceF0f78459C0Ed0ba5ddce976F1ddF51F4 · RockXStakingProxy (0xF1376bceF0f78459C0Ed0ba5ddce976F1ddF51F4) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (2,118 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0x8a94866dF557Bb7FCe88EfF9917237286098e590, EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6). Direct owner() returns 0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/bedrock-unieth/
- beefy-finance-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Beefy Finance (Base) — BeefyFeeConfig_Base · 3-of-6 Safe Control Plane · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0xfc69704cC3cAac545cC7577009Ea4AA04F1a61Eb · BeefyFeeConfig_Base (0xfc69704cC3cAac545cC7577009Ea4AA04F1a61Eb) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,112 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0xAb35d11199216c7F7368080Cf41beD8f3AbBc4E4, EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x2b0C9702A4724f2BFe7922DB92c4082098533c62). Direct owner() returns 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 3-of-6 Safe multisig. Companion timelock BeefyVaultOwnerTimelock_Base (0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309) reports minimum delay 0s (0s). · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/beefy-finance-base/
- centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Centrifuge V3 Root (Base) — CentrifugeRoot_Base · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f · CentrifugeRoot_Base (0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,618 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No single-key Ownable or ProxyAdmin getter exposed on the primary entry contract; permissions follow immutable or role-scoped module architecture. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base/
- euler-v2-evk-control-plane [rpc_observed] Euler V2 (EVK & EVC) — EulerEVaultFactory & EthereumVaultConnector Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e · EulerEVaultFactory (0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (5,631 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract EthereumVaultConnector (0x0C9a3dd6b8F28529d72d7f9cE918D493519EE383, 21,989 bytes) verified live at the same block. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/euler-v2-evk/
- extra-finance-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Extra Finance (Base) — ExtraLendingPool_Base · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD · ExtraLendingPool_Base (0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (20,198 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns governance controller contract 0x5a70429e0e5c7BE9E5F83B497C18F5AC82345113. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/extra-finance-base/
- frax-ether-sfrxeth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH) — frxETHMinter · 4-of-7 Safe & 2d Governance Timelock · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138 · frxETHMinter (0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (12,312 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 4-of-7 Safe multisig. Companion timelock FraxGovernanceTimelock (0x8412ebf45bAC1B340BbE8F318b928C466c4E39CA) reports minimum delay 172,800s (2d). · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/frax-ether-sfrxeth/
- moonwell-lending-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Moonwell (Base) — MoonwellUnitroller_Base · Admin Contract Owned by a 3-of-5 Safe · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C · MoonwellUnitroller_Base (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (1,412 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct admin() returns contract 0x8b621804a7637b781e2BbD58e256a591F2dF7d51 (8,658 bytes runtime code; not a Safe: getThreshold() reverts). That contract's owner() is 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/moonwell-lending-base/
- origin-superoeth-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base) — SuperOETHb_VaultProxy · 2d Timelock Admin Path · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3 · SuperOETHb_VaultProxy (0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,402 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0xCcd483cE093682D7D9a41e645EEb710AFaa88249, EIP-1967 admin slot = zero (UUPS / internal upgrade authority). Direct admin() returns timelock controller 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f with minimum delay 172,800s (2d). · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/origin-superoeth-base/
- pendle-finance-v2-control-plane [rpc_observed] Pendle Finance V2 — VotingEscrowPendleMainchain · 3-of-5 Safe Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0x4f30A9D41B80ecC5B94306AB4364951AE3170210 · VotingEscrowPendleMainchain (0x4f30A9D41B80ecC5B94306AB4364951AE3170210) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (13,144 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/pendle-finance-v2/
- puffer-finance-pufeth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Puffer Finance (pufETH) — PufferVaultV2 (pufETH) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Upgrade Authority · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xD9A442856C234a39a81a089C06451EBAa4306a72 · PufferVaultV2 (pufETH) (0xD9A442856C234a39a81a089C06451EBAa4306a72) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (163 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0x3b2fdFdEFE919dBcCE0bc5ac426097d5523B8AFA, EIP-1967 admin slot = zero (UUPS / internal upgrade authority). Direct authority() returns governance controller contract 0x8c1686069474410E6243425f4a10177a94EBEE11. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/puffer-finance-pufeth/
- reserve-protocol-rtoken-control-plane [rpc_observed] Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken) — ReserveRToken_eUSD · EIP-1967 Proxy & Upgrade Authority · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F · ReserveRToken_eUSD (0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (686 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0x258ce833CF9AD19208372763A00aA1565Dd40b3C, EIP-1967 admin slot = zero (UUPS / internal upgrade authority). No single-key Ownable or ProxyAdmin getter exposed on the primary entry contract; permissions follow immutable or role-scoped module architecture. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/reserve-protocol-rtoken/
- rocket-pool-reth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Rocket Pool (rETH) — RocketTokenRETH & RocketStorage Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc6393 · RocketTokenRETH (0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc6393) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (8,800 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract RocketStorage (0x1d8f8f00cfa6758d7bE78336684788Fb0ee0Fa46, 11,270 bytes) verified live at the same block. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/rocket-pool-reth/
- safe-singleton-core-control-plane [rpc_observed] Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) — SafeSingleton_v1_4_1 & SafeProxyFactory_v1_4_1 Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a · SafeSingleton_v1_4_1 (0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (23,579 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract SafeProxyFactory_v1_4_1 (0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67, 3,054 bytes) verified live at the same block. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/safe-singleton-core/
- seamless-protocol-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Seamless Protocol (Base) — SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0 · SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider (0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (9,779 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No single-key Ownable or ProxyAdmin getter exposed on the primary entry contract; permissions follow immutable or role-scoped module architecture. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/seamless-protocol-base/
- superform-v2-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Superform Core v2 (Base) — SuperGovernor & SuperVaultAggregator Control Plane · Base block 57421449 (0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0) · target 0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4 · SuperGovernor (0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (15,614 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract SuperVaultAggregator (0x10AC0b33e1C4501CF3ec1cB1AE51ebfdbd2d4698, 21,772 bytes) verified live at the same block. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/superform-v2-base/
- synthetix-v3-core-control-plane [rpc_observed] Synthetix V3 Core — SynthetixCoreProxy · 4-of-7 Safe Control Plane · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847 · SynthetixCoreProxy (0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (344 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns 0xEb3107117FEAd7de89Cd14D463D340A2E6917769, verified via getThreshold() and getOwners() as a 4-of-7 Safe multisig. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/synthetix-v3-core/
- uniswap-governance-timelock-control-plane [rpc_observed] Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock — UniswapV3Factory · Owner Contract under the 2d Governance Timelock · Ethereum block 26414499 (0xb83fee0a1d10d5fb8510d87ee9e33b180acac3208a7d00162a6a6f97789c0978) · target 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984 · UniswapV3Factory (0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,414,499 (24,535 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract 0xf2371551Fe3937Db7c750f4DfABe5c2fFFdcBf5A (7,266 bytes runtime code; exposes no timelock delay getter). That contract's owner() is the Uniswap governance Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC, whose delay() returns 172,800s (2d). · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/uniswap-governance-timelock/

## Scope
- Observations of on-chain state at the stated blocks; not code audits, reserve attestations or investment advice.
- Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes.
- Pacta reads governance forums and never posts on them.