Bedrock (uniBTC): control-plane safety record
1 indexed control-plane surface for Bedrock (uniBTC), pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contract: 0x047D…d6Da
What differs
Changed / discrepant
- Secure Mint precondition: adequacyRatio() 900 (existing supply x 0.9 vs reserves): Bedrock VaultWithoutNative 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da (Ethereum): adequacyRatio() = 900, so checkReserve() evaluates existing supply * 900 / 1000 <= reserves before minting … observed vs 'Before any minting action occurs, the smart contract automatically checks reserve sufficiency using the on-chain Proof of Reserve feed. documented
Show the full onchain evidence
Bedrock VaultWithoutNative 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da (Ethereum): adequacyRatio() = 900, so checkReserve() evaluates existing supply * 900 / 1000 <= reserves before minting (feeders: reserve 0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2, supply 0xE542919E4b281f10b437F947c8Ba224DdfaBc716). The incoming mint amount is absent from this inequality, so ~111.1% is not a post-mint ceiling; separate per-asset caps and collateral-transfer checks in _mint() still apply, and uniBTC.mint() (0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568) performs no PoR check of its own. MANAGER_ROLE (setAdequacyRatio / setPoRFeeder) and PAUSER_ROLE are held by 0x9251fd3D79522bB2243a58FFf1dB43E25A495aaB, an account carrying 23-byte EIP-7702 delegation code. The vault and uniBTC share ProxyAdmin 0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6, owned by the 3-of-5 Safe 0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3, which also holds uniBTC's DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This record does not assert a reserve deficit.
Show the full documented text
'Before any minting action occurs, the smart contract automatically checks reserve sufficiency using the on-chain Proof of Reserve feed. If reserves fall short, the mint transaction reverts.' (docs.bedrock.technology/security/secure-mint)
Protocol maintainer and fixed this gap? Get it re-verified on mainnet in 24h
Control-plane scorecard
Delta Docs and chain differ
- Upgradeability
- Not determined · Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published recordsEvidence: bedrock-unibtc-secure-mint-precondition-s30: separate per-asset caps and collateral-transfer checks in _mint() still apply, and uniBTC.mint() (0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568) performs no PoR …
- Timelock floor
- Not determined · No enforced admin delay in the published records
- Signer quorum
- Strong · Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5Evidence: bedrock-unibtc-secure-mint-precondition-s30: … 0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6, owned by the 3-of-5 Safe 0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3, …
- Emergency / freeze scope
- Strong · Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-5)Evidence: bedrock-unibtc-secure-mint-precondition-s30: separate per-asset caps and collateral-transfer checks in _mint() still apply, and uniBTC.mint() (0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568) performs no PoR …
- Docs-vs-chain parity
- Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)
Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.
Check it live (free)
The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da"
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da"})Provenance · research credit
Reported by @VB-Blue through the Pacta Wave 2 pool (PR #100, fixture bounties/wave-2/ethereum-bedrock-unibtc.json), merged under the Apache-2.0 commercial grant and paid $1.00 USDC (tx 0xa60d…cb71); credited on bedrock-unibtc-secure-mint-precondition-s30. Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.
Secure Mint precondition: adequacyRatio() 900 (existing supply x 0.9 vs reserves)
Observed onchain. Bedrock VaultWithoutNative 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da (Ethereum): adequacyRatio() = 900, so checkReserve() evaluates existing supply * 900 / 1000 <= reserves before minting (feeders: reserve 0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2, supply 0xE542919E4b281f10b437F947c8Ba224DdfaBc716). The incoming mint amount is absent from this inequality, so ~111.1% is not a post-mint ceiling; separate per-asset caps and collateral-transfer checks in _mint() still apply, and uniBTC.mint() (0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568) performs no PoR check of its own. MANAGER_ROLE (setAdequacyRatio / setPoRFeeder) and PAUSER_ROLE are held by 0x9251fd3D79522bB2243a58FFf1dB43E25A495aaB, an account carrying 23-byte EIP-7702 delegation code. The vault and uniBTC share ProxyAdmin 0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6, owned by the 3-of-5 Safe 0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3, which also holds uniBTC's DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This record does not assert a reserve deficit.
Documented. 'Before any minting action occurs, the smart contract automatically checks reserve sufficiency using the on-chain Proof of Reserve feed. If reserves fall short, the mint transaction reverts.' (docs.bedrock.technology/security/secure-mint)
cast call 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da \ "adequacyRatio()" \ --block 26449594 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26449594 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287
Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta
This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Bedrock (uniBTC) differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.
Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):
[](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/bedrock-unibtc/)
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/bedrock-unibtc/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/bedrock-unibtc.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>
Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/bedrock-unibtc.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/bedrock-unibtc.svg.
Fixed this gap? 24h mainnet re-verification ($99 intro)
A maintainer and an independent verifier re-check Bedrock (uniBTC) on mainnet within 24h and attest the result on Base. The fee pays for the 24-hour mainnet re-verification work, never the grade: your attestation reads Aligned when on-chain controls match the published documentation, and Delta when they do not.
Maintaining Bedrock (uniBTC)? Verify and reconcile the record
Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.
Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).