Protocol scorecards
Docs vs chain, a five-factor control-plane rosette and the main difference for each of 90 protocols. Select a row for the evidence.
Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk.
RosetteStrongModerateWeakNot determinedLonger, greener slices are stronger. Clockwise from the top: upgradeability, timelock floor, signer quorum, emergency scope, docs-vs-chain parity.
| Protocol | Docs vs chain | Control-plane rosette | What differs | Expand |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Aligned | Pause and unpause admin is the Aave Guardian 4-of-7 Safe, as documented | ||
Docs say: aave.com/docs (governance): 'The Protocol Emergency Guardian is a 4 of 7 multi-signature wallet consisting of the following signers:' and 'The Protocol Emergency Guardian holds the EMERGENCY_ ADMIN'; ACL Manager docs: 'Holders of this role can pause and unpause the pool or an individual reserve.' Chain says: Protocol Guardian Safe (0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968, v1.3.0): getThreshold() = 4 of 7 owners, the 7 signers listed in the docs; ACLManager 0x43955b0899Ab7232E3a454cf84AedD22Ad46FD33 hasRole(EMERGENCY_ADMIN, Safe) = true, hasRole(POOL_ADMIN, Safe) = false.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 57886975 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57886975 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | ACL admin role, executor delay and Guardian Safe match the docs | ||
Docs say: Aave V3 & Governance v3 address book specifies Level 1 Short Executor (1-day execution delay) and 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe. Chain says: ACLManager hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A) = true; PayloadsController (0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5) getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); GHO (0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f) totalSupply = 699,000,000 GHO.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc2aaCf6553D20d1e9d78E365AAba8032af9c85b0 \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Only allow-listed proposers can submit root bundles, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.across.to (security model): 'The Across Bond Token is a custom ERC-20 that functions similarly to WETH.' 'ABT has an additional property: it restricts which addresses may propose root bundles to the HubPool.' Chain says: Across Bond Token 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea (Sourcify exact match): proposers(0xf7bAc63fc7CEaCf0589F25454Ecf5C2ce904997c, the current root-bundle proposer) = true, proposers(address(0)) = false; hubPool() = HubPool 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda; owner() = the HubPool owner Safe 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea \ "proposers(address)" 0xf7bAc63fc7CEaCf0589F25454Ecf5C2ce904997c \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71 | ||||
| Base | Delta | Voter emergency council and epoch governor are the AerodromeMigration contract | ||
Docs say: github.com/aerodrome-finance/contracts (README): 'EpochGovernor.sol A simple epoch-based governance contract used exclusively for adjusting emissions.' / SPECIFICATION.md: 'Managed NFTs can be deactivated, a process which prevents the NFT from voting and from receiving deposits (requires emergency council).' Chain says: Voter 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5: emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration 0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721 (Sourcify match; MIGRATION_OPEN() = 1792620000), owned by Safe 0x42255e3C2d0b71a0b006243148fdF1a71d054cE0 (3-of-7, v1.5.0, the same 7 signers as the governor Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5 \ "emergencyCouncil()" \ --block 58203774 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58203774 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x619b45ca763563ff11fc3246da1d039a7d0ab2780bedff6cb0428c9290a2cb10 | ||||
| Base | Aligned | Pool factory owner and fee managers are the 3-of-7 team Safe, as documented | ||
Docs say: Aerodrome PERMISSIONS.md: 'Protocol Team' 'Multisig at [0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075]' and 'Fee Manager' 'Protocol team'; Slipstream deploy constants (script/constants/Base.json) name the same Safe as poolFactoryOwner and feeManager. Chain says: CLFactory (0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A) owner() = swapFeeManager() = unstakedFeeManager() = 3-of-7 Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075; swapFeeModule() = 0x090b2A6bb475c00e2256e2095A60887cD710803b, unstakedFeeModule() = 0x0AD08370c76Ff426F534bb2AFFD9b5555338ee68, defaultUnstakedFee() = 100000, allPoolsLength() = 3684. Context, not compared: Voter (0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5) governor() = the same Safe; emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration (0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721, owner() a 3-of-7 Safe v1.5.0), not the security page's Council 0x99249b10593fCa1Ae9DAE6D4819F1A6dae5C013D; the docs announce the 2026 merger into Aero.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A \ "owner()" \ --block 57842915 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57842915 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Deployment config lists an older gateway implementation; 3-day timelock with operator path | ||
Docs say: axelar-contract-deployments (mainnet config, chains.ethereum, linked from docs.axelar.dev): '"implementation": "0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098"' / '"authModule": "0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0"' Chain says: AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: implementation() = 0x16C22cbDD77350b1AC88AdDA344F691c12f41960, authModule() = 0x3d3C73E91B1b0C243f1437F2d8363b1D5B093BD0 (whose owner() is the gateway); the deployment config lists implementation 0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098 and auth module 0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5 \ "authModule()" \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Authorizer admin role is the 6-of-11 DAO multisig, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.balancer.fi (multisig): 'DAO Multi-sig 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f open in new window 6/11 DAO Signers DAO administrative permissions' and 'Ethereum DAO Multisig — Authorizer admin on Mainnet' Chain says: Authorizer 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 (the getActualAuthorizer() of the Vault's AuthorizerWithAdaptorValidation 0x6048A8c631Fb7e77EcA533Cf9C29784e482391e7): getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 1, member 0 = DAO Multi-sig 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f, a 6-of-11 Safe (v1.1.1, no modules).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 \ "getRoleMember(bytes32,uint256)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x0 \ --block 26427612 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26427612 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Docs list an older restaking implementation; uniETH upgrades via a 3-of-5 Safe ProxyAdmin | ||
Docs say: docs.bedrock.technology (uniETH contracts): 'Restaking proxy contract: https://etherscan.io/address/0x3f4eaceb930b0edfa78a1dfcbae5c5494e6e9850' / 'Restaking implementation: https://etherscan.io/address/0x9609af0490b96d7add7eea3554b1a944ee440262#code' Chain says: Restaking proxy 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x1e4D0A963953e7c08Fc7602B01e683547Fc4E518 (Sourcify match), not the documented 0x9609Af0490b96D7AdD7EEa3554b1a944ee440262; admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850 \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Base | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 6 hours · chain none | ||
Docs say: docs.beefy.finance (contracts and timelocks): 'Beefy ensures that all privileged functions and upgrades are protected by standardised smart contract timelocks.' and 'By default, a 6-hour timelock is configured for all strategy changes and upgrades.' / Base address book: 'vaultOwner: '0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309',' Chain says: vaultOwner timelock 0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309: getMinDelay() = 0s; the dev multisig 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 holds PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE, so an operation it schedules can execute in the same block; the timelock is its own admin (Sourcify exact match).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 58315414 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58315414 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Access-control admin is a Timelock, not the multisig the docs name | ||
Docs say: docs.cap.app (access controls): 'Roles are managed by the Access Control admin, currently set to Cap's multisig address' Chain says: AccessControl 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683: the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member, and the only grantAccess / revokeAccess holder, is the Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab; the Developer multisig 0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793 does not hold DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so role changes wait the 1-day delay.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Base | Aligned | OpsGuardian has no pause authority over Root, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.centrifuge.io (guardians) / Base deployment config: 'The ops guardian is deployed at `0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE` on all networks.' / 'The `OpsGuardian` is controlled by a separate Ops Safe multisig and handles day-to-day operational tasks such as adapter initialization, network wiring, and pool creation. It has no pause authority.' / '"opsAdmin": "0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16",' Chain says: Root 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f (Base, block #58534152): wards(OpsGuardian 0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE) = 0; OpsGuardian (Sourcify match) opsSafe() = Safe 0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16 (2-of-7, v1.4.1), not a ward either.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f \ "wards(address)" 0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE \ --block 58534152 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58534152 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Docs: only the MCMS proposes · chain: a 6-of-12 Safe can also propose | ||
Docs say: docs.chain.link (CCIP upgradability): 'All proposals originate from a ManyChainMultiSig (MCMS), which requires multiple independent signers to sign off.' / 'For example, you can view the Ethereum mainnet MCMS on Etherscan.' Chain says: RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449: getRoleMemberCount(PROPOSER_ROLE) = 3: ManyChainMultiSig 0xE53289F32c8E690b7173aA33affE9B6B0CB0012F (the MCMS the docs link), GnosisSafeProxy 0xD6597750bf74DCAEC57e0F9aD2ec998D837005bf (Safe v1.3.0, 6-of-12; also a canceller) and ManyChainMultiSig 0xD9757aA52907798d1aF2FDa7A6C0cC733E5aCf7e.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 \ "getRoleMemberCount(bytes32)" 0xb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1 \ --block 26433001 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26433001 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7 | ||||
| Base · Ethereum | Aligned | USDC roles on Base are single admin addresses, as Circle documents | ||
Docs say: Circle token design (stablecoin-evm, doc/tokendesign.md): '`owner` - re-assign any of the roles except for `admin`'; '`masterMinter` - adds and removes minters and increases their minting allowance'; '`pauser` - pause the contract, which prevents all transfers, minting, and burning'; '`blacklister` - prevent all transfers to or from a particular address, and prevents that address from minting or burning' / developers.circle.com (USDC contract addresses): 'Base 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913' Chain says: USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): owner() = 0x3ABd6f64A422225E61E435baE41db12096106df7, pauser() = 0xD3571B3bc51CECFf49194AD67aFFFC648d5e07b4, blacklister() = 0x1f2e3A640175d20ac31ed523B6733B977173E277 (no contract code); masterMinter() = MasterMinter 0x2230393EDAD0299b7E7B59F20AA856cD1bEd52e1, whose owner() is 0xb5bff84d169a72e76e94eC950da51Bac90b60284 (no code); rescuer() = 0x0; paused() = false; version() = 2.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 \ "owner()" \ --block 58422815 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58422815 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x5aced8e0d59eebe168d9dc8778d0305063a1a02f9ffd264774cbd75b3b979a51 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | The exchange rate is set by a rate-limited updater, as documented | ||
Docs say: github.com/coinbase/wrapped-tokens-os (README): 'The wrapped staked tokens inherit from Centre's fiat token contract and add an oracle role that can set an exchangeRate.' and 'we'll utilize a seperate rate limited exchange rate updater contract to minimize operational load.' Chain says: cbETH 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704: oracle() = ExchangeRateUpdater 0x9b37180d847B27ADC13C2277299045C1237Ae281 (Sourcify exact match), whose owner() is an externally owned account 0xA57aFe0Ba93f6854ed1DCd58dCE301E10B15D1D6.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704 \ "oracle()" \ --block 26427612 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26427612 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac | ||||
| Base | Aligned | Base markets follow the Ethereum Timelock plus a 1-day local timelock | ||
Docs say: docs.compound.finance (governance): 'The Timelock on Mainnet is the administrator of all community sanctioned instances of Compound III.' and 'Local Timelocks have an additional delay before Comet admin functions can be called via proposal execution.' Chain says: BridgeReceiver (0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A).govTimelock() = Ethereum Timelock 0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925 (delay() = 172800s on Ethereum); localTimelock() = 0xCC3E7c85Bb0EE4f09380e041fee95a0caeDD4a02 (delay() = 86400s, admin() = the BridgeReceiver); governor() of cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F), owner() of CometProxyAdmin 0xbdE8F31D2DdDA895264e27DD990faB3DC87b372d and governor() of the Configurator 0x45939657d1CA34A8FA39A924B71D28Fe8431e581 are the local timelock.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A \ "govTimelock()" \ --block 57886975 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57886975 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Governor, 48-hour Timelock and Pause Guardian Safe match the docs | ||
Docs say: Compound V3 governance documentation specifies 48-hour Timelock ownership and Community Multi-Sig pause guardian. Chain says: Sampled cUSDCv3 (0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3) & cWETHv3 (0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94) governor() = CompoundTimelock (0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925, delay() = 172800s / 48h, admin() = CompoundGovernor 0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0); pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 \ "governor()" \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Vault and factory manager Safe runs at 1-of-2 despite documented role separation | ||
Docs say: docs.concrete.xyz (risks and safety): 'Separated roles. Vault operations are split across distinct roles. No single key has full control or can drain a vault.' Chain says: Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; it is the vault owner() (the gate for factory-driven vault upgrades), the only VAULT_MANAGER member and the factory's getFactoryManager().
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Booster governance ownership chain matches the docs | ||
Docs say: Convex Booster governance ownership hierarchy documentation. Chain says: Convex Booster (0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31) owner() resolves via 0x3cE6408F923326f81A7D7929952947748180f1E6 -> 0x256e1bbA846611C37CF89844a02435E6C098b86D -> 3-of-5 DAO Multisig (0xa3C5A1e09150B75ff251c1a7815A07182c3de2FB) at block 26401312.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31 \ "owner()" \ --block 26401312 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401312 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | crvUSD factory admin is a LendingOwnerProxy; docs name the OwnershipAgent | ||
Docs say: curvefi/docs docs/developer/crvusd/factory.md states 'Only its admin, the CurveOwnershipAgent, can call to add a market'; LendingOwnerProxy intermediate wrapper added at block 26300155. Chain says: ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC) admin() = LendingOwnerProxy (0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1), where dao() = CurveOwnershipAgent (0x40907540d8a6C65c637785e8f8B742ae6b0b9968, Aragon voteTime = 604800s / 7d on 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) and emergency_dao() = 5-of-9 EmergencyDAO Safe (0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c); crvUSD (0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E) minter() = ControllerFactory, totalSupply = 2,134,809,204.98 crvUSD; debt_ceiling(0x370a449FeBb9411c95bf897021377fe0B7D100c0) = 1,000,000,000 crvUSD.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC \ "admin()" \ --block 26403523 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403523 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Core ProxyAdmin, executor Safe and 10-day Timelock match the docs | ||
Docs say: Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts main README documents Core ProxyAdmin, 10-day TimelockController + CommunityMultisig Executor wrapper, and PauserRegistry 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806. Chain says: DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = 1-of-2 ExecutorMultisig (0x369e6F597e22EaB55fFb173C6d9cD234BD699111) shared between 10d TimelockController (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Timelock delay: docs none · chain 7 days (stricter) | ||
Docs say: specs.enzyme.finance (fund lifecycle): 'MigratorA waits for the `migrationTimelock` defined on the `Dispatcher` to pass. [NOTE: This is no longer used and is set to `0`]'; access-control handoff: 'The owner is already the Enzyme Council.' (no Council address or threshold is published). Chain says: Dispatcher (0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32, Sourcify exact_match) getMigrationTimelock() = 604800s (7d), enforced by signalMigration (executableTimestamp = block.timestamp + migrationTimelock). getOwner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0xb270FE91e8E4b80452fBF1b4704208792A350f53 (getNominatedOwner() = 0), which also owns the live FundDeployer 0x4f1C53F096533C04d8157EFB6Bca3eb22ddC6360 (getCurrentFundDeployer()); setCurrentFundDeployer and setMigrationTimelock are onlyOwner with no delay.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32 \ "getMigrationTimelock()" \ --block 26421541 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26421541 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 7 days · chain 1 day | ||
Docs say: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks and 7 signatures (key-addresses.md lists 5/11); Risk Committee forum topic 810 (Jul 2026) notes 1-day delay. Chain says: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26401638 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401638 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | USDtb PSM is owned by a 24-hour timelock, not the Dev multisig directly | ||
Docs say: docs.ethena.fi key addresses (Dev multisig): '5/11 signers.' and 'Owner of Ethena's deployed mainnet smart contracts & able to modify contract parameters.' Chain says: PSM (0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728).owner() = EthenaTimelockController 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (getMinDelay() = 86400s), which also holds the PSM DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig does not); the Dev multisig 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862 (5-of-10, v1.3.0) holds PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on the timelock; asset() = USDtb, isSwapEnabled() = true.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728 \ "owner()" \ --block 26422243 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26422243 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410 | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | 10-day upgrade timelock; a queued LayerZero delegate change moves behind it | ||
Docs say: Public pre-execution brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/etherfi-op-0x244e/ (decoded calldata, storage-layout and delegate trace). Chain says: getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d); operation 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1795193651 (2026-11-20 16:54:11 UTC). The scheduled call EtherfiL1SyncPoolETH (0xD789870beA40D056A4d26055d0bEFcC8755DA146).setDelegate(EtherFiTimelock) puts the LayerZero V2 endpoint delegate behind the 10-day timelock.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26401638 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401638 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | RolesAuthority owner and timelock wiring match the docs | ||
Docs say: Sampled BoringVault Accountant authority() and RolesAuthority TimelockController ownership verified at block 26401070. Chain says: AccountantWithRateProviders (0x0d05D94a5F1E76C18fbeB7A13d17C8a314088198) authority() = 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122; RolesAuthority.owner() = 0xD829F278016b90FEc735F9A12Bf8b75E06102C89 (TimelockController, getMinDelay = 86400s / 1d at block 26401070).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122 \ "owner()" \ --block 26401070 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401070 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Factory upgrades wait 4 days in a timelock (DAO 4-of-8 proposes), as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.euler.finance: '`FactoryGovernor` is installed as the `upgradeAdmin` of the EVK factory.' and 'The deployed EVC is immutable'; Euler forum: 'The signer set will be updated to 6 Euler Labs signers and 2 Foundation Directors, with a 4/8 threshold.' The prose docs state no delay; the official evk-periphery deployment script sets EVAULT_FACTORY_TIMELOCK_MIN_DELAY = 4 days. Chain says: GenericFactory (0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e).upgradeAdmin() = FactoryGovernor 0x2F13256E04022d6356d8CE8C53C7364e13DC1f3d; its only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is TimelockController 0xfb034c1C6c7F42171b2d1Cb8486E0f43ED07A968 (getMinDelay() = 345600s, 4d; PROPOSER_ROLE: 4-of-8 Safe 0xcAD001c30E96765aC90307669d578219D4fb1DCe; EXECUTOR_ROLE open; CANCELLER_ROLE: that Safe and 2-of-3 Safe 0xb3b84e8320250Afe7a5fb313Ee32B52982b73c53). PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE has 3 members (2-of-6 Safe 0xB1345E7A4D35FB3E6bF22A32B3741Ae74E5Fba27, 0xff217004BdD3A6A592162380dc0E6BbF143291eB, 0xcC6451385685721778E7Bd80B54F8c92b484F601); UNPAUSE_ADMIN_ROLE: the 2-of-6 Safe. EthereumVaultConnector (0x0C9a3dd6b8F28529d72d7f9cE918D493519EE383): no EIP-1967 slots; owner() and admin() revert.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e \ "upgradeAdmin()" \ --block 26421541 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26421541 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d | ||||
| Base | Observed | Non-proxy lending pool with role-based admin; docs not assessed | ||
Docs say: Extra Finance (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.extrafi.io/; governance: https://snapshot.org/#/extrafi.eth). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state. Chain (pinned; docs not compared): ExtraLendingPool_Base (0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (20,198 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns governance controller contract 0x5a70429e0e5c7BE9E5F83B497C18F5AC82345113.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD \ "owner()" \ --block 57421449 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57421449 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Treasury admin sits with the Ops and Emergency Safes, not the 3-day Timelock | ||
Docs say: LongPoolManager (0x250893CA4Ba5d05626C785e8da758026928FCD24) and v2 governance docs scope EmergencySafe strictly to EMERGENCY_ROLE behind 3-day Timelock admin. Chain says: DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on all 4 v2 ProtocolTreasury proxies (0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6, 0xb178197E88D58Da21bE22A408E850d1e6Dc09A38, 0x6D9e81c5b7C4b37d0Fe9E8CDA776e057f4040868, 0x87d5e4cAaF4358A4337C10859c7107c7AEF4f8Ce) held directly by OpsSafe (0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF, 6-of-9 Safe) and EmergencySafe (0x28c921adAC4c1072658eB01a28DA06b5F651eF62, 3-of-4 Safe), while Timelock (0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, getMinDelay = 259200s) holds false.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6 \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF \ --block 26400152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26400152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa9a61622304ec55c5fec49abbcabec60069f66f28792cf841bdd7aef12ce63aa | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | sUSDf cooldown is zero, so unstaking to USDf is instant, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.falcon.finance/mechanism/redemptions/: 'This is not to be confused with unstaking, where users can unstake their sUSDf and receive USDf in return immediately.' Chain says: sUSDf (0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0).cooldownDuration() = 0; asset() = USDf (0xFa2B947eEc368f42195f24F36d2aF29f7c24CeC2); totalSupply() = 33,273,012.15 sUSDf (USDf 1,516,215,860.42). Context, not compared with documentation: USDf and sUSDf are EIP-1967 proxies whose admins (0x3Ef1127Fdf81B553066daE0FaEA58785A2AA6E14, 0x16a2605C026BFe4f4B7f4471933714D9b2149AcE) both return owner() = 4-of-6 Safe 0x1E482B60bf19Cb1cc859389e0eA3DED153f16Bd7.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0 \ "cooldownDuration()" \ --block 26418060 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26418060 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Migration auth is live on four vaults, beyond the documented multisig scope | ||
Docs say: fluid-permissions-and-mutability.md describes narrow fee/reward/magnifier team multisig scope outside migration grants. Chain says: isVaultAuth(vault, 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e) returns true on Vault 76 (0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8), Vault 110 (0xee327311D8640156E87eC33ea55FcbF2309e0ce6), Vault 111 (0x984636a30ed2B4A61FB7150CED644096349275d3), and Vault 144 (0x0e19B64F3A79FeeE12Df1b6f239929c6ab6C7ED0) per IGP-98 / IGP-126 migration configuration.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x324c5Dc1fC42c7a4D43d92df1eBA58a54d13Bf2d \ "isVaultAuth(address,address)" 0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e \ --block 26401405 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401405 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | frxETHMinter owner is the documented Comptroller | ||
Docs say: docs.frax.com (frxETH addresses): 'Multisigs / Chain / Name / Contract / Ethereum / Comptroller / 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C' Chain says: frxETHMinter 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138: owner() = Comptroller 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C (4-of-7 Safe), nominatedOwner() = 0; not upgradeable.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138 \ "owner()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Upgrades go through a 1-day timelock run by the 4-of-7 Frax Safe | ||
Docs say: docs.frax.com (frxUSD): 'The Frax DAO retains ownership and ultimate control of the protocol and may amend or revoke delegated authority at any time.' / addresses: 'frxUSD Chain type Address Ethereum Native 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29' Chain says: frxUSD 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x0b2C3dF006b2bd43cBCC60075e7a0bf314474eD6, owner() = Timelock 0xb898Ad2976b4d8f2E21521C9db16b7497825E503 (Sourcify exact match): delay() = 86400s (1 day), admin() = Safe 0xfFFffF4F3baC444b2C0ecf2A1840d018bE783937 (4-of-7, v1.3.0); frxUSD owner() is the same Safe directly.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29 \ 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103 \ --block 26431152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26431152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 2 days · chain 36 hours | ||
Docs say: docs.gearbox.finance states technical changes are 'behind a 2-day timelock' (172800s) and lists InstanceManager multisig as '4-of-12 (Subject to chain-specific configuration)'. Chain says: LegacyTimelock (0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b) delay() = 129600s (36 hours, GIP-104), admin() = LegacyGovernor (0x29B97F37B3E0C704bCFD785F5b7bBa2A0B7df2c7); InstanceManager (0x77777777144339Bdc3aCceE992D8d4D31734CB2e) owner() = 4-of-21 Gnosis Safe (0x1E9ec044853611F4bCD4BBcFE7657508BD1c53D3); Tech (0xA7D5DDc1b8557914F158076b228AA91eF613f1D5, 6-of-12), Veto (0xbb803559B4D58b75E12dd74641AB955e8B0Df40E, 4-of-12), Treasury (0x7b065Fcb0760dF0CEA8CFd144e08554F3CeA73D1, 5-of-10), and Fee (0x3E965117A51186e41c2BB58b729A1e518A715e5F, 5-of-10) Guard Safes match documented thresholds.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b \ "delay()" \ --block 26403523 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403523 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Allocator custody role admin is the Grove SubProxy under Sky governance | ||
Docs say: docs.grove.finance (allocator permissions, governance addresses): 'DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Grants and revokes all other roles.' / 'Grove SubProxy ( GROVE_PROXY) 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba' Chain says: ALMProxy 0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E, MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5 and RateLimits 0x5F5cfCB8a463868E37Ab27B5eFF3ba02112dF19a: hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Grove SubProxy 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba) = true; CONTROLLER on the ALMProxy and RateLimits = the MainnetController; none of the three is a proxy.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba \ --block 26427612 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26427612 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Pause roles are administered by MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER; docs say GOVERNOR | ||
Docs say: docs.infinifi.xyz (roles documentation): 'PAUSE / Pause protocol functions / GOVERNOR / UNPAUSE / Unpause functions / GOVERNOR' Chain says: InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490: getRoleAdmin(UNPAUSE) = getRoleAdmin(PAUSE) = keccak256("MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER") (0x9849206c..6512), whose members are the Team Multisig 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c and the Long Timelock; GOVERNOR is not the admin of either role.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490 \ "getRoleAdmin(bytes32)" 0xe7276a2a84d8de556657ec9cf93a55a7d66f096e529d0582ed08e9e2208b92b5 \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Policy Committee Safe: docs 5-of-9 · chain 4-of-7 | ||
Docs say: Working-groups governance documentation lists 5-of-9 Policy Committee multisig. Chain says: GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26399876 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26399876 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x8bf896b892683ff3267b88b367ab015a70cf5caf53542eb405f4f648f6bcde8a | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | ProxyAdmin sits behind a 10-day timelock; config admin Safe as documented | ||
Docs say: Kelp DAO security & contract documentation specifies 10-day TimelockController upgrade governance and multisig admin. Chain says: rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78), owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1, getMinDelay() = 864000s / 10d); LRTConfig (0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7) DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by 6-of-11 Safe (0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d); rsETH totalSupply = 338,071.33 rsETH.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Endpoint is immutable; a 5-of-9 multisig sets the message defaults, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.layerzero.network (endpoint): 'The LayerZero Endpoint is the immutable, permissionless protocol entrypoint for sending and receiving omnichain messages.' / 'The LayerZero Endpoint is the single, immutable entry and exit point for cross‑chain messaging, built on five core modules:' Chain says: EndpointV2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c (Ethereum; Sourcify match): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x0 (not a proxy); the Base endpoint at the same address is also not a proxy.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Dual Governance timelock delays and committee Safes match the docs | ||
Docs say: lidofinance/dual-governance deploy-config-mainnet.toml, lidofinance/docs committee specs, and forum record 10032. Chain says: EmergencyProtectedTimelock (0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316) getAfterSubmitDelay() = 259200s (3d), getAfterScheduleDelay() = 86400s (1d), getGovernance() = DualGovernance (0xC1db28B3301331277e307FDCfF8DE28242A4486E), getEmergencyProtectionDetails() = (2592000, 0, 1813449600); Emergency Activation (0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45, 4-of-7 Safe), Emergency Execution (0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF, 5-of-7 Safe), Reseal (0xFFe21561251c49AdccFad065C94Fb4931dF49081, 5-of-6 Safe), and CircuitBreaker (0x8772E3a2D86B9347A2688f9bc1808A6d8917760C, 3-of-6 Safe); stETH totalSupply = 9,759,371.53 stETH.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316 \ "getAfterSubmitDelay()" \ --block 26403121 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403121 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Upgrade and admin firewalls are run by 4-of-7 Safes, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.liquidcollective.io (ETH FAQs): 'An administrative multisig is made up of a variety of Liquid Collective ecosystem participants.' Chain says: River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549) EIP-1967 admin slot = Firewall 0x3A5b4db174a3CC17d8cE40C5B04272737195151b, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0x8EE3fC0Bcd7B57429203751C5bE5fdf1AB8409f3 (4-of-7, v1.3.0, no modules); getAdmin() = Firewall 0xd745A68c705F5aa75DFf528540678288ed2aD9eE, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0xE3208Aa9d1186c1D1C8A5b76E794b2B68E6cb3a5 (4-of-7, the same 7 owners, no modules); the Firewall executor Safe 0xDE55C9dc78f985fE1502484Cb98EBfAB66A56B62 (2-of-3) may call pause() but not unpause() or upgradeTo(address). Implementation RiverV1 0x0056f9ed62dAa4dc3F972340C92326AcCddd1a9D (version() = 1.3.0).
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549 \ 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103 \ --block 26422243 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26422243 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Liquidation thresholds are 110% and 150% in Recovery Mode, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.liquity.org (Liquity V1, borrowing): 'This is a protocol parameter that is set to `110%`.' / Recovery Mode: 'During Recovery Mode, Troves with a collateral ratio below 150% can be liquidated.' Chain says: TroveManager 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: MCR() = 1100000000000000000 (110%), CCR() = 1500000000000000000 (150%); compile-time constants of a contract with no owner and no proxy.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2 \ "MCR()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Sampled owner and proxy slots match the docs | ||
Docs say: Liquity V2 immutability and non-upgradeable core specification. Chain says: BOLD.owner() = 0x0; Governance (0x807DEf5E7d057DF05C796F4bc75C3Fe82Bd6EeE1) owner() = 0x0; CollateralRegistry (0xf949982B91C8c61e952B3bA942cbbfaef5386684) EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x00...00.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x6440f144b7e50D6a8439336510312d2F54beB01D \ "owner()" \ --block 26401540 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401540 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Core ProxyAdmin wiring and 24-hour timelock match the docs | ||
Docs say: docs.lombard.finance/learn/transparency/smart-contracts states 'Each Proxy Upgrade Timelock enforces a 24-hour minimum delay on contract upgrades.' Chain says: LBTC (0x8236a87084f8B84306f72007F36F2618A5634494) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xbae061C73876952aa2C5e483B74DfA785425f879), whose owner() — along with AssetRouter ProxyAdmin (0xBf4202c8a0d852D432266dfE112ED624a1a36754) and Consortium ProxyAdmin (0x1629AE77cC70DaAc95Ec479caAEA23ECE77c67c5) — resolves to TimelockController (0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59, getMinDelay() = 86400s / 24h, EXECUTOR_ROLE held by 3-of-5 Safe 0x251a604E8E8f6906d60f8dedC5aAeb8CD38F4892 with Guard 0x87bde523e05Fee2C557d6F592F7EB686C69189Ab); LBTC totalSupply = 6,203.54 LBTC (8 dec).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26403523 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403523 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | MToken has no proxy slots: immutable core logic, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.m0.org/raw/protocol/m-token.md: 'The MToken contract itself is designed to be immutable, meaning its core logic cannot be upgraded directly.' Chain says: MToken (0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b) EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots are both 0 (no EIP-1967 proxy); name() = 'M by M^0', totalSupply() = 249,955,861.65 M (6 decimals); ttgRegistrar() = Registrar (0x119FbeeDD4F4f4298Fb59B720d5654442b81ae2c), minterGateway() = MinterGateway (0xf7f9638cb444D65e5A40bF5ff98ebE4ff319F04E).
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 26418060 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26418060 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Timelock delay: docs none · chain 3 days (stricter) | ||
Docs say: docs.mantle.xyz/meth/concepts/risk-management/upgradability-and-timelock.md previously noted 'The timelock is configured with a default delay of 0' (live deployment enforces stricter 3-day UpgradeTimelock). Chain says: mETH (0xd5F7838F5C461fefF7FE49ea5ebaF7728bB0ADfa) & Staking (0xe3cBd06D7dadB3F4e6557bAb7EdD924CD1489E8f) EIP-1967 admin slots point to UpgradeTimelock (0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3 days) and PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-14 Security Council Safe (0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f); mETH totalSupply = 217,256.94 mETH.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26403121 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403121 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Proxy admin is the 4-of-7 DAO Safe; docs describe a 3-day GovernorTimelock | ||
Docs say: Governor admin actions documentation describes GovernorTimelock (3-day delay) governance path. Chain says: EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec).
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0xBe10aDcE8B6E3E02Db384E7FaDA5395DD113D8b3 \ 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103 \ --block 26401540 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401540 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Curator Safe: docs 3-of-6 · chain 3-of-5 | ||
Docs say: lidofinance/docs (earn/deployment-contracts.md line 199) lists 3/6 multisig; Mellow Core Vault docs describe bounded curator permissions. Chain says: getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe); DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on earnETH (0x6a37725ca7f4CE81c004c955f7280d5C704a249e) and earnUSD (0x014e6DA8F283C4aF65B2AA0f201438680A004452) held by 5-of-8 Lazy Vault Admin Safe (0x0Dd73341d6158a72b4D224541f1094188f57076E, Timelock 0x363Ba8843d06BA5968f55C26aB055162eDd62189 getMinDelay = 0s), where all 5 Curator signers are Lazy Vault Admin owners.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xe5abcc40196174Ae0d12153dE286F0D8E401769d \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26401312 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401312 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Re7 WETH vault has no guardian; its owner is a 2-of-4 Safe with a 3-day timelock | ||
Docs say: Peer Re7 curated vault architecture and Aragon guardian integration. Chain says: Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x78Fc2c2eD1A4cDb5402365934aE5648aDAd094d0 \ "guardian()" \ --block 26401405 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401405 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510 | ||||
| Base | Delta | Pause guardian: docs 3-of-5 Security Council · chain 2-of-4 Safe | ||
Docs say: Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.' Chain says: Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C \ "pauseGuardian()" \ --block 57842915 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57842915 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Singleton owner and fee and LLTV bounds match the docs | ||
Docs say: Morpho Blue core singleton ownership and immutable fee/LLTV bound specification. Chain says: Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb \ "owner()" \ --block 26401070 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401070 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Governance needs 3 Advisory Board votes plus a 24-hour timelock, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.nexusmutual.io/governance/: 'Three votes in favour carry the proposal, at which point voting closes and the timelock starts.' and 'A 24-hour timelock runs before a carried proposal can be executed.' Chain says: Governor (0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32, EIP-1967 proxy; implementation Governor 0xcafea466bF6dEFe480cdd54056C020c63b7DA830, Sourcify exact_match): TIMELOCK_PERIOD() = 86400s, VOTING_PERIOD() = 259200s, ADVISORY_BOARD_THRESHOLD() = 3. Registry (0xcafea2c575550512582090AA06d0a069E7236b9e, ADVISORY_BOARD_SEATS() = 5) lists the Governor at contract index 2, is the proxyOwner() of all 10 module proxies resolved through NXMaster.getLatestAddress (GV, P1, MR, TC, CO, SP, RA, AS, CI, LO), and is itself an EIP-1967 proxy administered by the Governor; its verified upgradeContract is onlyGovernor. Pause: getPauseConfig() = 0; isEmergencyAdmin() is true for 6 EOAs (the 5 Advisory Board seat holders and 0x6fe2c2643cb5064951fb7dd87fbce4777fb146e3), and a pause needs one admin to propose and another to confirm. Context, not compared: the legacy NXMaster (0x01BFd82675DBCc7762C84019cA518e701C0cD07e) is owned by the legacy Governance proxy (0x4A5C681dDC32acC6ccA51ac17e9d461e6be87900) running TemporaryGovernance, whose advisoryBoardMultisig (0x51ad1265C8702c9e96Ea61Fe4088C2e22eD4418e, 3-of-5 Safe owned by the 5 seat holders) can execute any call through it without a timelock; the docs list NXMaster and Governance as legacy.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32 \ "TIMELOCK_PERIOD()" \ --block 26421541 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26421541 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Supply: docs cap 500M · chain no cap; a 2-of-3 Safe holds the minter role | ||
Docs say: docs.obol.org (token distribution; OBOL token): 'The total supply is capped at 500 million tokens.' / 'The official token contract address of the OBOL Token is 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7' Chain says: ObolToken 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 (Sourcify exact match): totalSupply() = 500000000000000103303500000 (500,000,000.0000001033035 OBOL); mint() has no supply cap; MINTER_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by Safe 0x42D201CC4d9C1e31c032397F54caCE2f48C1FA72 (2-of-3, v1.3.0), not by the timelock.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 \ "totalSupply()" \ --block 26433001 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26433001 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | OUSG instant mint limit: docs $50M · chain $100M per day | ||
Docs say: docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/instant-limits.md states 'Instant minting has a $50M Global Limit' and 'Instant redemptions have a $50M Global Limit'; Flux docs specify 1-day Timelock governance. Chain says: RateLimiter (0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c) globalSubscriptionLimits(0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92) word [2] = 100000000000000000000000000 ($100M per 86400s window), globalRedemptionLimits(OUSG) word [2] = 50000000000000000000000000 ($50M per 86400s); Flux Comptroller (0x95Af143a021DF745bc78e845b54591C53a8B3A51) admin() = FluxTimelock (0x2c5898da4DF1d45EAb2B7B192a361C3b9EB18d9c, delay() = 86400s / 1d, admin() = 0x336505EC1BcC1A020EeDe459f57581725D23465A); OUSG totalSupply = 1,110,569.33 OUSG.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c \ "globalSubscriptionLimits(address)" 0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92 \ --block 26403121 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403121 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c | ||||
| Base | Observed | Vault proxy admin path runs through a 2-day timelock; docs not assessed | ||
Docs say: Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.originprotocol.com/; governance: https://snapshot.org/#/ousdgov.eth). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state. Chain (pinned; docs not compared): SuperOETHb_VaultProxy (0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (2,402 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation slot resolves to 0xCcd483cE093682D7D9a41e645EEb710AFaa88249, EIP-1967 admin slot = zero (UUPS / internal upgrade authority). Direct admin() returns timelock controller 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f with minimum delay 172,800s (2d).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3 \ "admin()" \ --block 57421449 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast call 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f "getMinDelay()(uint256)" --block 57421449 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57421449 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Pause and asset-protection roles sit with one key address, as documented | ||
Docs say: PYUSD contract README: 'In the event of a critical security threat, Paxos has the ability to pause transfers and approvals of the PYUSD token. The ability to pause is controlled by a single `owner` role,' / 'The `ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE` can freeze and unfreeze the token balance of any address on chain.' / docs.paxos.com: 'Ethereum Mainnet 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8' Chain says: PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: defaultAdmin() = owner() = 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B (no contract code), holding PAUSE_ROLE, ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (roles not enumerable); defaultAdminDelay() = 10800s (3 hours); no pending default admin; paused() = false.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8 \ "defaultAdmin()" \ --block 26431152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26431152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Markets send 80% of swap fees to the treasury and 20% to LPs, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.pendle.finance (fees): '20% of all swap fees are given to LP providers of the pool as yield.' Chain says: PendleMarketFactory (0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f).reserveFeePercent() = 80 (maxReserveFeePercent() = 100); treasury() = 0x8270400d528c34e1596EF367eeDEc99080A1b592; owner() = PendleGovernanceProxy 0x2aD631F72fB16d91c4953A7f4260A97C2fE2f31e (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1); EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin 0xA28c08f165116587D4F3E708743B4dEe155c5E64 (owner() = the Safe).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f \ "reserveFeePercent()" \ --block 26422243 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26422243 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Community multisig: docs 3-of-6 · chain 3-of-7 | ||
Docs say: docs.puffer.fi (multisig): 'Puffer's Community Multisig is a 3-of-6 multisig composed of reputable and aligned Ethereum community members and auditing firms.' Chain says: Safe 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a (= Timelock COMMUNITY_MULTISIG()): getThreshold() = 3 with 7 owners (v1.3.0); holds AccessManager role 1 (upgrader) with execution delay 0.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | 0.25% shield fees; upgrades and pauses only via the on-chain protocol vote, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.railgun.org (deductions / helpful links): 'The smart contracts take a 0.25% deduction per shield and unshield interaction which is then sent to the “treasury address”.' / 'Protocol deductions (0.25% on shield and unshield interactions) are sent directly on-chain to the treasury contract for that network.' Chain says: RailgunSmartWallet 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9: shieldFee() = 25 and unshieldFee() = 25 basis points (of 10000); treasury() = 0xE8A8B458BcD1Ececc6b6b58F80929b29cCecFF40.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9 \ "shieldFee()" \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Vault admin role sits only behind the timelock; docs say the Safe holds it too | ||
Docs say: docs.re.xyz (ICL permissions note): 'The Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on every ICL (Ethereum reUSD and reUSDe, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base), alongside the chain's timelock.' and '... so the Safe can grant itself ICL UPGRADER_ROLE with no delay' Chain says: ICL 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 (shareToken() = reUSD): hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD) = false; the Timelock 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and UPGRADER_ROLE; getRoleAdmin(UPGRADER_ROLE) = DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so granting UPGRADER_ROLE on this ICL waits the 48-hour delay.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x5086bf358635B81D8C47C66d1C8b9E567Db70c72 \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 \ --block 26427612 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26427612 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Restaking fee: docs 10% · chain 15% | ||
Docs say: docs.renzoprotocol.com/docs/products/staking-suite/ezeth states 10% fee on restaking rewards. Chain says: feeBasisPoints() = 1500 (15%); Admin Multisig (0xD1e6626310fD54Eceb5b9a51dA2eC329D6D4B68A) is 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe; ezETH (0xbf5495Efe5DB9ce00f80364C8B423567e58d2110) totalSupply = 39,495.32 ezETH.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60 \ "feeBasisPoints()" \ --block 26401725 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401725 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Long freeze is 1 week, the documented default | ||
Docs say: docs.reserve.org (Yield DTF advanced parameters): 'Long freeze duration (s) The number of seconds a long freeze lasts. Long freezes can be disabled by removing all addresses associated with the role. Default value: 604800 = 1 week' Chain says: eUSD Main 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a (eUSD 0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F.main()): longFreeze() = 604800s (1 week); frozen() = false.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a \ "longFreeze()" \ --block 26431152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26431152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | USR admin-rules delay and request counters match the docs | ||
Docs say: docs.resolv.xyz/litepaper/for-developers/smart-contracts.md core token and external request manager deployment registry. Chain says: Sampled USR (0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110) defaultAdmin() = 4-of-6 Core Safe (0xD6889F307BE1b83Bb355d5DA7d4478FB0d2Af547) with defaultAdminDelay() = 86400s (1 day); sampled UsrExternalRequestsManager (0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861) and RlpExternalRequestsManager (0xc7AB90c2Ea9271EFB31f5fA2843Eeb4B331eaFA0) return paused() = true; USR totalSupply = 6,085,929.53 USR, RLP (0x4956b52aE2fF65D74CA2d61207523288e4528f96) totalSupply = 1,592,731.62 RLP.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110 \ "defaultAdminDelay()" \ --block 26403523 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403523 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Safe threshold: docs 3-of-4 · chain 3-of-5 | ||
Docs say: docs.resupply.finance (multisig and admin permissions): 'Multisig Members (3 of 4)' / contract addresses: 'Multisig (3-of-4) | `0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6`' Chain says: Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 5 owners; Safe v1.4.1, no modules).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Council leave notice: chain 28 days · RPIP-33 bound under 14 days | ||
Docs say: rpips.rocketpool.net RPIP-33 parameter table, members.leave.time: 'How long a member must give notice for before manually leaving the security council' with the bound '< 14 days' Chain says: RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity (0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf).getLeaveTime() = 2419200s (28 days). The security council has 1 member, Safe 0x6C565aF34f15dE064b56afEdF7B0F59C15bB20FE (2-of-3).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf \ "getLeaveTime()" \ --block 26422243 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26422243 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | v1.4.1 singleton and factory code match Safe's registry; singletons cannot be initialized | ||
Docs say: safe-deployments registry (v1.4.1): '"address": "0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67",' / '"1": "canonical",' / 'The Safe proxy factory contract provides a simple way to create a new proxy contract pointing to a singleton and executing a setup function in the newly deployed proxy all in one transaction.' Chain says: SafeProxyFactory 0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67: EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots = 0x0; keccak256(runtime code) = 0x50c3cdc4…0b3317.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67 \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Base | Observed | Non-proxy address provider with role-based admin; docs not assessed | ||
Docs say: Seamless Protocol (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.seamlessprotocol.com/technical/smart-contracts; governance: https://seamlessprotocol.com/). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state. Chain (pinned; docs not compared): SeamlessPoolAddressesProvider (0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (9,779 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No single-key Ownable or ProxyAdmin getter exposed on the primary entry contract; permissions follow immutable or role-scoped module architecture.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0x0E02EB705be325407707662C6f6d3466E939f3a0 \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 57421449 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57421449 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0 | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Beacon upgrades already wait 3 days in a timelock the docs say will be added | ||
Docs say: docs.solv.finance/llms-full.txt: 'The admin privileges for upgrades are assigned to a Gnosis Safe multi-signature address ... The timelock mechanism will be added to further enhance security by introducing a delay between the upgrade proposal and execution.' Chain says: SolvBTC is a beacon proxy: EIP-1967 beacon slot = UpgradeableBeacon 0xFc335FdA7E6a33329A83F4d5F578eC7d8A43DC4A (implementation() = 0xA4b6cf2BAaA235ab7Fe10EADB84b82460165B38F), whose owner() = SolvBTCFactory 0x443628281E4f3E5b5A5D029B9a0D13900ae41578 (getBeacon('Solv BTC') = that beacon). The factory's admin() = TimelockController 0xfd4B809AD88db6Ca9dbB295A4B9d23bB0093f497 (pendingAdmin() = 0) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3d); governor() = the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D (pendingGovernor() = 0), which holds the timelock's PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE but not DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (held by the timelock itself; EXECUTOR_ROLE not open). Verified source pinned to runtime code: SolvBTCFactory is a Sourcify exact_match and every beacon-mutating path (setImplementation -> upgradeTo, transferBeaconOwnership, importBeacon) and transferAdmin is onlyAdmin, while onlyGovernor only deploys new beacon proxies; the timelock (SolvTimelock is OpenZeppelin v5.0.0 TimelockController, fully verified on Blockscout, not on Sourcify) reverts schedule when delay < getMinDelay() and only lets itself call updateDelay.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97 \ "owner()" \ --block 26418060 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26418060 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Addresses provider owner and governance delay match the docs | ||
Docs say: Sky 48-hour Governance Security Module (GSM) delay and Spark SubDAO proxy ownership. Chain says: GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xbE286431454714F511008713973d3B053A2d38f3 \ "delay()" \ --block 26401638 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401638 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | SSVNetwork owner is the DAO governance multisig, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.ssv.network (governance): 'The first is execution of governance functions controlled by the governance multisig.' / smart contracts: 'SSV DAO Treasury 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6' Chain says: SSVNetwork 0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1: owner() = SSV DAO Treasury 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6, a 5-of-9 Safe (v1.3.0, no modules); pendingOwner() = 0; SSVNetworkViews 0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4 has the same owner(); both are UUPS proxies (empty EIP-1967 admin slot).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1 \ "owner()" \ --block 26427612 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26427612 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Manager Safe: docs 3-of-5 · chain 3-of-6 | ||
Docs say: staderlabs.gitbook.io/ethereum states 'The Manager multisig is a 3-of-5 and is tasked with maintaining the protocol' and specifies a 7-day minimum delay on contract upgrades. Chain says: Manager Safe (0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF) getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController (0x1112D5C55670Cb5144BF36114C20a122908068B9, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7d, PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-9 Community Safe 0x45B977CeCB9Dfaa17dFcBa88826ef684b8489fF6), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on ETHx and StaderConfig (0x4ABEF2263d5A5ED582FC9A9789a41D85b68d69DB); ETHx MINTER_ROLE held by StakePoolsManager (0xcf5EA1b38380f6aF39068375516Daf40Ed70D299), totalSupply = 58,434.16 ETHx (18 dec).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Timelock: docs 2 days · chain 5 days; Treasury Safe 3-of-5, not 4-of-7 | ||
Docs say: docs.stakedao.org (timelock): 'Stake DAO's core contracts are protected by a governance timelock that enforces a 48-hour delay on all protocol changes.' and 'A proposer submits the operation with a minimum 48-hour delay' Chain says: ProtocolTimelock 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a: getMinDelay() = 432000s (5 days). It owns the ProtocolController 0x2d8BcE1FaE00a959354aCD9eBf9174337A64d4fb; the Governance Safe 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765 holds PROPOSER_ROLE; OpenZeppelin TimelockController (Sourcify exact match).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0xd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Governance timelock delay is 48 hours, as documented | ||
Docs say: docs.stake.link (security and audits): '48-hour timelock. Actions executed by the multisig go through the GovernanceTimelock , which gives the community time to review pending changes.' Chain says: GovernanceTimelock 0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F: getMinDelay() = 172800 (48 hours); owner() of StakingPool / stLINK 0xb8b295df2cd735b15BE5Eb419517Aa626fc43cD5, PriorityPool, WithdrawalPool, FundFlowController, RebaseController, OperatorVCS and CommunityVCS; PROPOSER / CANCELLER = the multisig 0xB351EC0FEaF4B99FdFD36b484d9EC90D0422493D.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Keeper oracle quorum, osETH fee and LTV settings match the docs | ||
Docs say: docs.stakewise.io/docs/oracles/intro ('currently 6 of 11 Oracles'), docs/fees/intro ('5% fee on the rewards accumulated by osETH'), and docs/ostoken/how-ostoken-works ('liquidation threshold is set to 92% LTV'). Chain says: Sampled Keeper (0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5) totalOracles() = 11, rewardsMinOracles() = 6, validatorsMinOracles() = 6 (6-of-11 oracle signature quorum); osETH (0xf1C9acDc66974dFB6dEcB12aA385b9cD01190E38) owner() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, totalSupply = 148,452.02 osETH (18 dec); OsTokenVaultController (0x2A261e60FB14586B474C208b1B7AC6D0f5000306) feePercent() = 500 (5%), totalAssets = 160,753.18 ETH; OsTokenConfig (0x287d1e2A8dE183A8bf8f2b09Fa1340fBd766eb59) getConfig(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) = (1.01e18, 0.92e18, 0.90e18) (90% mint LTV, 92% liquidation threshold).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5 \ "rewardsMinOracles()" \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Pools and treasurer are owned by a 5-of-7 multisig, as documented | ||
Docs say: stargateprotocol.gitbook.io governance model: 'From time to time, a vote may require a change to the Stargate protocol or its treasury that requires action via multisig.'; V2 README: 'A Planner is a trusted entity that can allocate credit between chains off chain'; 'Fees within the Stargate protocol are dynamic, and are set by the AI Planning Module on a per pathway basis.' Chain says: StargatePoolUSDC (0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7).owner() = OneSig 0xBE634B030FEAaB661300667EaF82510a3a025413 (threshold() = 5 of 7 signers, VERSION() = 0.0.1, Sourcify exact_match: executes threshold-signed Merkle roots carrying only an expiry, no delay); TokenMessaging (0x6d6620eFa72948C5f68A3C8646d58C00d3f4A980) and Treasurer (0x1041D127b2d4BC700F0F563883bC689502606918) owner() = the same OneSig. getAddressConfig() planner = 0xe37f7c80ceD04c4F243C0Fd04A5510D663CB88b5 (an EOA) = TokenMessaging.planner() = FeeLibV1USDC (0x52B35406CB2FB5e0038EdEcFc129A152a1f74087).owner(); status() = 1. Context, not compared: the docs' StargateDAO multisig 0x65bb797c2B9830d891D87288F029ed8dACc19705 (3-of-5 Safe) is not the owner of these V2 contracts.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7 \ "owner()" \ --block 26421541 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26421541 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | steakUSDC guardian is its own Aragon DAO, as announced | ||
Docs say: Steakhouse on the Morpho forum (linked from the docs): 'The new guardians will be the following: - [steakUSDC](https://app.aragon.org/#/daos/ethereum/steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth/dashboard)' / 'Veto Mechanism: Seeking to provide depositors with even more control over their funds and curated vaults, Steakhouse introduced the Aragon DAO guardian to enable vault depositors to veto critical actions made by the curator.' Chain says: steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (MetaMorpho, Sourcify exact match): guardian() = 0xaa0500198B4425DfC4E272FbE42C8E64E21fc03d, the Aragon DAO that steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth resolves to; no pending guardian; steakUSDT 0xbEef047a543E45807105E51A8BBEFCc5950fcfBa and steakPYUSD 0xbEEF02e5E13584ab96848af90261f0C8Ee04722a have their own guardian DAOs (0xaeC761545Fd135db6d04D27C92BCB3951668c67F, 0xCcFd0E9CEC732fb839fadDeCc72B6154530bC90f).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB \ "guardian()" \ --block 26433001 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26433001 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7 | ||||
| Base | Aligned | MetaMorpho vault timelock is 7 days, as documented | ||
Docs say: steakhouse.financial/docs/llms-full.txt: 'Steakhouse vaults 7-day timelocks (above the minimum, protocol-enforced 3-day timelock)'. Chain says: Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC, 0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183) on Base: timelock() = 604800s (7d); asset() = USDC (0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913); MORPHO() = 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb; owner() = 5-of-10 Safe 0x0A0e559bc3b0950a7e448F0d4894db195b9cf8DD; curator() = 3-of-9 Safe 0x827e86072B06674a077f592A531dcE4590aDeCdB; totalAssets() = 102,512,832.83 USDC. Context, not compared with documentation: guardian() = 0x9e0FdDDa790651E6a05CD2dE69e624B94C04eAf5 has no contract code (eth_getCode = 0x on Base and on Ethereum at #26,418,060) and nonce 0 on Base; the docs say guardians are 'typically onchain Aragon multisigs ... When they're not, it's usually because a commercial distribution partner has taken on that role' and list this vault with partner Coinbase; chain state does not show who holds it.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183 \ "timelock()" \ --block 57635450 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57635450 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x78ddbdca540b630c823e1c79dcadbfc25dd957c60d1396f4c6b60f11f67a164f | ||||
| Base | Observed | SuperGovernor and vault aggregator control plane pinned; docs not assessed | ||
Docs say: Superform Core v2 (Base) documentation is linked for reference (https://docs.superform.xyz/deployment-addresses; governance: https://docs.superform.xyz/operate/permissions). This RPC-pinned record does not compare documentation parameters with the on-chain state. Chain (pinned; docs not compared): SuperGovernor (0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #57,421,449 (15,614 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Paired protocol control contract SuperVaultAggregator (0x10AC0b33e1C4501CF3ec1cB1AE51ebfdbd2d4698, 21,772 bytes) verified live at the same block.
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4 \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 57421449 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57421449 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x36147f7f0b6d2a0a94975e98b14c979034930dbe6f9905a5b0bcb2ab45ba35b0 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | USDC subscription fee and fund supply match the docs | ||
Docs say: docs.superstate.com/investors/smart-contracts.md states 'At time of writing, fees are set to 0 and only USDC is supported.' Chain says: Sampled USTB (0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e) supportedStablecoins(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48) returns sweep destination 0x774AE279c21B6a17a6E2BD5ab5398FF98F398807 and subscription fee = 0 for USDC; USTB totalSupply = 39,459,575.14 USTB (6 dec), USCC (0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c) totalSupply = 4,066,680.13 USCC (6 dec).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e \ "supportedStablecoins(address)" 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | 7-day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins and reprice bounds match the docs | ||
Docs say: Swell v3-core-public deployment architecture specifying 7-day Timelock upgrade/platform-admin control, 1h minimum reprice cadence, and 1% maximum reprice bound. Chain says: swETH (0xf951E335afb289353dc249e82926178EaC7DEd78) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0x25EAf579cA2255fAA5463c635eec28697b5b8846) and rswETH (0xFAe103DC9cf190eD75350761e95403b7b8aFa6c0) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0xD750B84845f1cAdfEAc63f96Ec74635e949bFd14) both resolve owner() to SwellTimelock (0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b, delay() = 604800s / 7d, admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0x20fDF47509C5eFC0e1101e3CE443691781C17F90), which is also the sole PLATFORM_ADMIN on both AccessControlManagers (0x625087d72c762254a72CB22cC2ECa40da6b95EAC, 0x796592b2092F7E150C48643dA19Dd2F28be3333F); minimumRepriceTime = 3600s (1h), maximumRepriceDifferencePercentage = 1% (1e16); swETH totalSupply = 9,635.13 swETH, rswETH totalSupply = 10,363.44 rswETH.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b \ "delay()" \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Core registries are non-upgradeable; factory Safes match the docs | ||
Docs say: Symbiotic Core architecture specifies non-upgradeable core registries and multisig-governed implementation/adapter whitelists. Chain says: VaultFactory (0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346), OperatorRegistry (0xAd817a6Bc954F678451A71363f04150FDD81Af9F), and NetworkRegistry (0xC773b1011461e7314CF05f97d95aa8e92C1Fd8aA) hold zero EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots (0x00...00); VaultFactory.owner() = 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0); AdapterRegistry (0x788823C9579A049D986eB76718bC758C0998594a) owner() = 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (0xf6BB2e64Bd201A862f2Fe5461fc7Ef01e2040b6A).
Reproduce on any archive node cast storage 0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346 \ 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc \ --block 26403121 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403121 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Account NFT is owned by the CoreProxy, not a key or Safe, as documented | ||
Docs say: Synthetix V3 Ethereum deployment table, AccountProxy row: 'AccountProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847 n/a' / 'AccountProxy 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac' Chain says: AccountProxy 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac: owner() = CoreProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847; nominatedOwner() = 0x0.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac \ "owner()" \ --block 26433001 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26433001 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Owner is a 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet, as documented | ||
Docs say: tether.to (FAQ): 'Tether Tokens are created by having multiple Tether private authorization keys sign and broadcast creation transactions on the specific blockchain.' and 'Tether’s multi-signature (or multi-sig) model protects against a single person from authorizing Tether Tokens on their own, which would represent a single point of failure and a security risk.' / supported protocols: 'USD₮ contract address: https://etherscan.io/token/0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7' Chain says: TetherToken 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7: getOwner() = owner() = MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828 (Sourcify match): required() = 3, getOwners() = 6 owners (transactionCount() = 5848).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7 \ "getOwner()" \ --block 26431152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26431152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | tBTC timelock is 1 day; the WalletRegistry upgrade schedule is public | ||
Docs say: docs.threshold.network contract addresses (Mainnet, tBTC application contracts) list 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D as the tBTC 'Timelock Controller'; the docs state no delay for it. The '2-day' timelock in the Governance Process page belongs to the separate Governor Bravo Timelock Controller (0x87F005317692D05BAA4193AB0c961c69e175f45f, getMinDelay() = 172800s at the same block). Chain says: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operation 0xb6671bbbedf818d7232a4006d4a85b21e3f3055d17244188f244c1da8263e0c7: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1794604955 (2026-11-13 21:22:35 UTC). It is a public CallScheduled upgradeAndCall (0x9623609d) on ProxyAdmin (0x7Affa05f726D293eB1193807A91617318292008e) for WalletRegistry (0x46d52E41C2F300BC82217Ce22b920c34995204eb) to implementation 0x14fAD0C11C83AC736e5929D5661bbA7E6BB9c0D6.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26407707 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26407707 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x9030abf37638c14a5f9c145f298a0f4cd74b247a99f3dddd119b9c6b09f5dced | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | TREE owner is a 5-day timelock; a blacklistable upgrade is queued | ||
Docs say: Treehouse docs: 'All Treehouse contracts are secured by a 5-day timelock' (protocol/tasset/security/timelock); public brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/treehouse-op-0x2f11/. Chain says: getMinDelay() = 432000s (5d); TREE (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3).owner() = TimelockController. Operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f is pending (ETA 1794891107, 2026-11-17 04:51:47 UTC). It upgrades TREE to implementation 0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6, which adds a Blacklistable module whose blacklister is a 5-of-7 Safe; after execution that Safe can freeze transfers with no delay.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26406106 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26406106 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Voting period: docs 7 days · chain 5.6 days | ||
Docs say: developers.uniswap.org (governance process): '7-day voting period for the community to vote' / 'Duration: 2-day waiting period, 7-day voting period, 2-day timelock (if passed)' Chain says: GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3: votingPeriod() = 40320 blocks = 483,840s (5.6 days) at 12-second slots; votingDelay() = 13140 blocks (~1.83 days).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3 \ "votingPeriod()" \ --block 26431152 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26431152 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46 | ||||
| Base · Ethereum | Aligned | Owner is the 2-day governance Timelock run by GovernorBravo, as documented | ||
Docs say: developers.uniswap.org (v4 deployments, governance reference): 'Ethereum: 1 Contract Address PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90' / 'The contracts below are actively deployed on Ethereum mainnet.' / 'Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC' / 'Uniswap Governance has specific controls under its domain, including: Spend funds from the treasury Set and activate the protocol fee' Chain says: PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 (Sourcify match): owner() = Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC: delay() = 172800s (2 days) = MINIMUM_DELAY(), admin() = GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 \ "owner()" \ --block 26433001 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26433001 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 3 days · chain 1 second | ||
Docs say: tech.usual.money/overview/architecture/role-management states a delay of three days (259200s) before granting default admin to a new address. Chain says: defaultAdminDelay() = 1s (0x01); pendingDefaultAdminDelay() = (0, 0); defaultAdmin() = 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7 (8-of-15 Gnosis Safe).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x0D374775E962c3608B8F0A4b8B10567DF739bb56 \ "defaultAdminDelay()" \ --block 26401725 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401725 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1 | ||||
| Base · Ethereum | Aligned | Messages and upgrades need 13 of 19 guardians on Ethereum and Base, as documented | ||
Docs say: wormhole.com/docs (guardians / security): 'Once a sufficient delegate quorum is reached or once Guardians independently observe the event, signatures accumulate until the required 13-of-19 quorum is achieved.' / 'Some chains (such as Ethereum and Solana) are secured by all 19 Guardians.' / 'The Core Contract does not distinguish between chains with direct observation and delegated chains; it verifies only that a valid 13-of-19 VAA has been produced.' Chain says: Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: getCurrentGuardianSetIndex() = 7; getGuardianSet(7) = 19 keys, expirationTime 0; quorum(19) = 13.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B \ "getGuardianSet(uint32)" 0x7 \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | Timelock delay: docs none · chain 7 days (stricter) | ||
Docs say: yearn-devdocs security overview previously noted governance was not behind a timelock (live deployment enforces stricter 7-day TimelockController). Chain says: governance() = 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336B7090767F367BF73 (TimelockController, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7 days); getDaddy() = 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 (6-of-9 ychad.eth Safe); getBrain() = 0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7 (3-of-6 Safe).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41 \ "governance()" \ --block 26401725 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401725 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1 | ||||
| Base | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 2 days · chain none | ||
Docs say: docs.yo.xyz (YO V2 Security Framework): 'Approval Registry: Onchain, timelocked caps on how much of each asset a vault may approve to each contract' and 'Every path a dollar can take is written into immutable adapters and timelocked registries' Chain says: YoApprovalRegistry 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021: owner() = YO Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6 Safe, v1.4.1, no modules), not the YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match). It is the approvalRegistry() of yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7 and yoUSD 0x0000000f2eB9f69274678c76222B35eEc7588a65; the Pool, BridgeRoute, MorphoMarket, SwapPair and ERC4626Vault registries are also owned directly by the Admin Multisig.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021 \ "owner()" \ --block 58315414 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58315414 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd | ||||
No protocol matches these filters.