Concrete: control-plane safety record
3 indexed control-plane surfaces for Concrete, each pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contracts: 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381, 0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20.
What differs
Changed / discrepant
- Vault owner, VAULT_MANAGER and factory manager Safe threshold: 1-of-2: Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; observed vs docs.concrete.xyz (risks and safety): 'Separated roles. documented
Show the full onchain evidence
Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; it is the vault owner() (the gate for factory-driven vault upgrades), the only VAULT_MANAGER member and the factory's getFactoryManager().
Matched
- Vault DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: unassigned: matches the documentation
- Vault proxy admin: the factory: matches the documentation
Control-plane scorecard
Delta Docs and chain differ
- Upgradeability
- Not determined · Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published recordsEvidence: concrete-vault-proxy-admin-factory-s20: ctDeltaWeETH vault (0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20) EIP-1967 admin slot = ConcreteFactory 0x0265d73a8E61F698d8EB0dfeb91Ddce55516844C, which is also …
- Timelock floor
- Not determined · No enforced admin delay in the published records
- Signer quorum
- Weak · Lowest controlling quorum: 1-of-2Evidence: controller fact: Safe getThreshold()
- Emergency / freeze scope
- Not determined · No pause / freeze authority in the published records
- Docs-vs-chain parity
- Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)
Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.
Check it live (free)
The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20"
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20"})Vault DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: unassigned
Observed onchain. getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 0; every *_ADMIN role of the vault has one member, the 2-of-3 Safe 0x70EBF87bA7a1517c204979e51979cfbf693364F9.
Documented. docs.concrete.xyz (architecture): 'The default OpenZeppelin DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is intentionally unassigned at the vault.'
cast call 0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20 \ "getRoleMemberCount(bytes32)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d
Vault owner, VAULT_MANAGER and factory manager Safe threshold: 1-of-2
Observed onchain. Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; it is the vault owner() (the gate for factory-driven vault upgrades), the only VAULT_MANAGER member and the factory's getFactoryManager().
Documented. docs.concrete.xyz (risks and safety): 'Separated roles. Vault operations are split across distinct roles. No single key has full control or can drain a vault.'
cast call 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d
Vault proxy admin: the factory
Observed onchain. ctDeltaWeETH vault (0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20) EIP-1967 admin slot = ConcreteFactory 0x0265d73a8E61F698d8EB0dfeb91Ddce55516844C, which is also the vault's factory() and lists it (isRegisteredVault = true); implementation 0xFB65336D4323BA79d07F7024c81B8B69E1781527.
Documented. docs.concrete.xyz (architecture): 'The factory is the immutable admin of every vault proxy.'
cast storage 0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20 \ 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103 \ --block 26425374 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26425374 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d
Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta
This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Concrete differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the emerald Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.
Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):
[](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/concrete/)
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/concrete/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/concrete.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>
Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/concrete.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/concrete.svg.
Maintaining Concrete? Verify and reconcile the record
Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.
Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).