Resupply: control-plane safety record
4 indexed control-plane surfaces for Resupply, each pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contracts: 0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94, 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3, 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6, 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d.
What differs
Changed / discrepant
- Safe threshold: 3-of-5 observed vs 3-of-4 documented
Matched
- On-chain governance: the Voter executes as Core after a 1-day delay: matches the documentation
- Emergency guardian role: the main multisig, through a Core-owned operator proxy: matches the documentation
- Registry owner: Core (changes only through governance): matches the documentation
Control-plane scorecard
Delta Docs and chain differ
- Upgradeability
- Not determined · Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published recordsEvidence: resupply-guardian-role-main-multisig-s22: ERC-1967 proxy with implementation GuardianUpgradeable 0x74C85620F1459862834A947dB9441911BCEBF066 (Sourcify match). The Treasury Manager operator proxy …
- Timelock floor
- Moderate · 1d minimum enforced delay across control surfacesEvidence: resupply-core-voter-execution-delay-1d-s22: observed_delay_seconds = 86400
- Signer quorum
- Strong · Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-5Evidence: resupply-main-multisig-3of5-s22: … 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = …
- Emergency / freeze scope
- Strong · Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-N Safe)Evidence: resupply-guardian-role-main-multisig-s22: Guardian operator proxy 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3: guardian() = Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6
- Docs-vs-chain parity
- Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)
Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.
Check it live (free)
The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d"
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d"})Provenance · research credit
First reported by @scavenger-osan through the Pacta Wave 1 bounty (Slot #2, PR #31), merged under the Apache-2.0 grant and paid $25.00 USDC (tx 0x58aa…e3f2 ↗). Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.
On-chain governance: the Voter executes as Core after a 1-day delay
Observed onchain. Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d: voter() = Voter 0x11111111063874cE8dC6232cb5C1C849359476E6 (owner() = core() = Core); Voter executionDelay() = 86400s (1 day), votingPeriod() = 604800s (1 week), quorumPct() = 3000 of MAX_PCT 10000 (30%), minCreateProposalPct() = 100 (1%), EXECUTION_DEADLINE() = 1814400s (3 weeks).
Documented. docs.resupply.finance (governance voting): 'All contracts on Resupply will be owned by a main core contract with a separate voter contract that is able to execute any transactions as though it is core.'; live parameters: 'Execution delay after vote passes | 1 day', 'Voting period | 1 week', 'Quorum to pass | 30% of total weight', 'Execution deadline | 3 weeks (after creation)'
cast call 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d \ "voter()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71
Emergency guardian role: the main multisig, through a Core-owned operator proxy
Observed onchain. Guardian operator proxy 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3: guardian() = Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6; owner() = Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d; ERC-1967 proxy with implementation GuardianUpgradeable 0x74C85620F1459862834A947dB9441911BCEBF066 (Sourcify match). The Treasury Manager operator proxy 0x4CF97a55d58Aad14C493A46C8151a0BFffb10403: manager() = the same multisig, owner() = Core.
Documented. docs.resupply.finance (multisig and admin permissions): 'The following roles are occupied by the Resupply main multisig.' Guardian: 'Can pause the protocol in an emergency'; 'The proxies are owned by `Core` which means that upgrades can be performed only via successful governance vote.'
cast call 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3 \ "guardian()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71
Main multisig: 3-of-5 signers
Observed onchain. Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 5 owners; Safe v1.4.1, no modules).
Documented. docs.resupply.finance (multisig and admin permissions): 'Multisig Members (3 of 4)' / contract addresses: 'Multisig (3-of-4) | `0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6`'
cast call 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6 \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71
Registry owner: Core (changes only through governance)
Observed onchain. Registry 0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94: owner() = core() = Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d; the Voter 0x11111111063874cE8dC6232cb5C1C849359476E6 and both operator proxies also report owner() = Core.
Documented. docs.resupply.finance (multisig and admin permissions): 'All Resupply contracts are owned by `Core`, which can authorize specific accounts (generically referred to as "operators") to call specified functions on protocol or non-protocol assets from the context of Core.' / contract addresses: 'Registry | `0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94`'
cast call 0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94 \ "owner()" \ --block 26429396 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26429396 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71
Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta
This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Resupply differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the emerald Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.
Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):
[](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/resupply/)
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/resupply/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/resupply.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>
Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/resupply.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/resupply.svg.
Maintaining Resupply? Verify and reconcile the record
Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.
Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).